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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the phenomenon, understanding, and treatment of 
trauma at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology and neuroscience. I argue that 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological method, with its emphasis on the conscious and 
embodied nature of human phenomena, provides crucial insights into the nature and 
treatment of combat trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). By situating the 
discussion of trauma and adaptation within research on the topic in neuroscience and 
psychology, the dissertation demonstrates how phenomenological understanding of trauma 
contributes fundamentally to the understanding of trauma proffered by the sciences. 
After discussing the history of trauma in psychology, phenomenology and 
neuroscience, I address traumatic memory as a prevalent feature of trauma. In traumatic 
memory, the victim relives rather than simply remembers the traumatic experience.  I show 
how traumatic memory differs psychologically, neurologically, and phenomenologically from 
non-traumatic memory.  In particular, I argue that phenomenological analysis of traumatic 
  viii 
memory dramatically reveals the subjective and embodied character of human experiences, 
thereby providing psychological and neuroscientific accounts of trauma with a necessary, 
largely overlooked dimension of the experience. 
No serious study of trauma can neglect the question of adaptation. Using Merleau-
Ponty’s work on adaptation, I argue that PTSD is better understood as the result of an 
attempt to adapt to a traumatic event than as a mental illness. In the last chapter of the 
dissertation I demonstrate how, against the backdrop of this interdisciplinary understanding, 
one specific adaptive tool to PTSD, namely, narrative therapy, can contribute positively to 
the process of adapting to trauma.  
This dissertation is the first detailed examination of combat trauma in the 
phenomenological tradition. Moreover, it offers new philosophical insights into the 
understanding and treatment of trauma. As an in-depth example of how insights from 
phenomenology, psychology and neuroscience can be fruitfully combined, it also provides a 
model of the potential of phenomenological inquiry to enhance our scientific accounts of 
human phenomena.  
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Introduction 	  
 The word ‘trauma’ first appeared in Herodotus’ Histories, in reference to physical 
wounds sustained during battle.1 As time went on, ‘trauma’ gained a second definition as it 
began to refer to injuries that were psychological in nature rather than physical. In 1894, 
William James used ‘trauma’ to describe a kind of lasting psychological injury that came 
about after certain kinds of events. He describes these “psychic tramata” as “thorns in the 
spirit, so to speak.”2 In French, ‘trauma’ is defined as “a violent emotion that changes the 
personality of the subject when facing emotions of the same kind.”3  
 Though originally the word ‘trauma’ referred exclusively to physical wounds and only 
later expanded to include psychological wounds, the ordering of definitions has since been 
reversed. Today there is a widespread use of ‘trauma’ to refer to certain psychological 
experiences. In this sense it is synonymous with a variety of words from ‘upheaval’ or 
‘distress’ to ‘shock’ or ‘horror.’  To be sure, the original sense of the term to signify simple 
physical trauma still survives, particularly in medical or pathological settings, as when the 
coroner identifies the cause of death as trauma due to the force of a blow to the head. 
 The gradual expansion of the definition of trauma to include psychological wounds 
suggests two things. It suggests, first, that when we describe psychological trauma we 
recognize that there is something similar about wounds sustained by the body and wounds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “The assault is resisted, and a vigorous tussle ensues in which heads are broken and not a few 
actually die of the wounds they receive.” Herodotus, The Histories, Revised, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt 
(New York: Penguin, 2003), 120.   
2 William James, "Hysteria," Psychological Review 1, no. 1 (1894): 199.  
3 Alain Rey and Danièle Morvan, Le Dictionanaire Culturel En Langue Francaise (Paris: Dictionnaires Le 
Robert, 2005), 1551. 
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sustained psychologically.4  There are some events capable of producing scars on the psyche. 
The gradual expansion of the term also suggests that these psychological traumas occur no 
less frequently than certain wounds of bodies. 
  The appearance of this second kind of wound raises many questions. What exactly is 
the similarity between wounds of the body and wounds of the mind? What do we mean 
when we say that someone has a “thorn in the spirit”? Further, how can this kind of injury 
be addressed?  
 Physical injuries or wounds (physical traumas) are largely straightforward. When 
someone goes to the hospital for a broken arm, there is a standard protocol that is followed 
to treat that injury. Specifically, the arm is radiographed to determine the location and extent 
of the break. If the break is in the forearm for example, a fracture brace is applied, and 
progressive resistive exercises are recommended for eight to twelve weeks.5 In this case both 
the injury (a broken bone resulting in pain and a restricted range of motion) and the remedy 
(set the bone so that it can heal and gradually restore range of motion) are obvious.  
 Psychological trauma, on some level, mimics physical trauma. Though we are no 
longer referring to a physical wound, we still speak as if an injury occurred that calls out to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This point may make it seem like I am attributing a distinction between the mind and the body. It is 
important to note that this is not the case. In fact, I will advocate for an embodied account of trauma 
- one that attempts to understand trauma as something that happens to the mind and the body. When 
I say physical injury as distinct from psychological injury, I do not mean to posit that when the body 
is injured the mind is not affected or vice versa. I mean that the primary location of the injury is either 
the mind or the body. For example, someone can be diagnosed with PTSD after surviving combat 
with no physical injuries at all. It does not follow though, that the body is not implicated in the injury 
even though it would be classified as a mental injury and not a bodily one. In fact, many PTSD 
symptoms are strictly bodied. What I am suggesting is that the PTSD diagnosis is a type of injury that 
happens to both the mind and the body. 
5 Joanne Bosch, et al. "Standard of Care: Distal Upper Extremity Fractures," Brigham & Women’s 
Hospital Protocol (September 2007).  
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be addressed. Presumably this is what James meant when he referred to a psychological 
injury as a “thorn in the spirit.” In order to continue life in a functional way, that “thorn” 
needs to be removed and the “spirit” needs to be repaired. Though the etymology suggests a 
similarity between psychological and physical traumas, methods for treating the former are 
not as straightforward. Since the “thorn” cannot be seen, the injury can seem much more 
difficult to treat.  
 This problem within the analogy is significant, but does not leave us completely at a 
loss. In fact, the paradigm of physical injury provides a structure to begin to understand 
psychological trauma. The work to be done consists in understanding what exactly it means to 
be psychologically wounded or traumatized and how a healing adaptation to that injury 
becomes possible.  In this dissertation, I draw on relevant work in phenomenology, 
psychology and neuroscience in order to give a robust account of both how trauma works 
and how adaptation to it may be possible. I look at one kind of trauma (combat trauma), and 
one method of healing adaptation (narrative) in an effort to provide a foundation for 
beginning to understand trauma and adaptation more generally.  
 Since ‘trauma’ is colloquially used to describe a wide range of experiences, it is 
important to limit the topic here significantly in order to have a productive discussion. As 
noted above, early use of the word referred to battle. So it is perhaps unsurprising that both 
physical and psychological trauma related to combat remain the most documented and well-
studied kind of trauma.6 The trauma of war and its related symptoms and disorders have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Three texts that give an excellent history of the study of trauma and combat trauma are: Judith 
Herman, Trauma & Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: 
Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); and Bessel A. van 
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been intensely studied immediately after wars, as hundreds of thousands of people suddenly 
face the enormous task of living through traumatic events and adapting to their lasting 
physical and psychological scars.7 Though traumatic events can occur anytime and to 
anyone, the history of trauma and our understanding of it begin with the history of war. 
Though I reference other types of trauma occasionally, the main topic of this work is 
combat trauma.8  
 While many individuals have traumatic experiences in the sense that they have been 
exposed to events that can be classified as traumatic,9 I limit my discussion to those whose 
suffering from those events continues for significant periods. Even more specifically, I 
restrict my focus to cases of a specific sample of people who have been the subjects of 
extensive studies, namely, the victims of combat trauma.  I refer to victims who are 
candidates for a diagnosis of PTSD according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Der Kolk, Alexander C. McFarlane, and Lars Weisæth, Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming 
Experience on Mind, Body, and Society (New York: Guilford, 1996).  
7 Herman credits the “ episodic amnesia” with which trauma is studied partially to the presence and 
absence of war. During times of combat, trauma is intensely studied. During times of peace, trauma 
tends to be disregarded (Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 7-32).  
8 ‘Combat trauma’ is a term meant to convey a set of involuntary responses brought on by the 
experience of war. It is not meant to entail a specific kind of combat event (i.e., frontline man to man 
battle), but rather to capture any possible event that is experienced by the individual as traumatic 
during the course of war. Watching a fellow battalion member become dismembered by an 
improvised explosive device (IED) while on convoy for example, is an event that is not directly 
related to combat in the strictest sense of the word. It is, however a traumatic event sustained during 
war, and therefore would be understood to be combat trauma. It will be argued later on that it is not 
the circumstances of the event that make it traumatic, but rather the way the event is experienced by 
the individual(s) involved.  
9 It should be noted that the adherence to the clinical diagnostic definition of trauma and PTSD 
being followed here is not necessarily one that is followed by everyone in the field. Robert Stolorow, 
for example advocates for a wider understanding of trauma as simply “unbearable affect.” See Robert 
D. Stolorow, Trauma and Human Existence: Autobiographical, Psychoanalytic, and Philosophical Reflections 
(New York: Analytic, 2007); and Robert D. Stolorow, World, Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-
Cartesian Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 2011).  
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Mental Disorders (DSM).10 Unless otherwise indicated, all of the contemporary cases 
referenced in this work are cases in which the victim qualifies for and, in many cases, has 
received a diagnosis of PTSD. Therefore, unless otherwise specified, I use the terms ‘trauma’ 
and ‘PTSD’ interchangeably. I place these constraints on the scope of the investigation in an 
attempt to develop a solid foundation for understanding a salient form of trauma – indeed, 
arguably the paradigmatic form – and some of the ways in which healing adaptation to it 
becomes possible. Not only is combat trauma well documented, it has been studied from a 
variety of different perspectives which helps give a more thorough understanding of trauma.  
 Beyond methodological concerns, understanding and treating combat trauma is a 
matter of considerably urgency. Since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than 2.1 
million service members have been deployed in battle and returned with significant scars.11 
Now, more than ever, trauma and its effects desperately need to be understood.  
 Though there are many facets to combat trauma, I focus on the debilitating nature of 
traumatic memory. The most recent version of the DSM specifies several criteria clusters for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Vol. 5 
(Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 265-290.  
11 At present, the Department of Veterans Affairs approximates that 20-30% of military members 
who have spent time in the war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan currently have PTSD. This compares 
to an estimate of 7.8% of all Americans who will experience PTSD at some point during their lives. 
Given the 2.1 million service members who have been deployed, this would mean that approximately 
630,000 veterans currently have PTSD in the United States alone (statistics gathered from the 
veterans posttraumatic stress website of the United States government, as well as the National 
Institutes of Health websites). See United States Department of Veterans Affairs, “National Center 
for PTSD," DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for PTSD Released 
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/diagnostic_criteria_dsm-5.asp. See also United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs, “VA Issues New Report on Suicide Data,” 
http://www.va/gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2427. For the statistics from the NIMH, see 
National Institutes of Mental Health, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Among Adults,” 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/1ad_ptsd_adult.shtml; and see also National Institutes of 
Mental Health, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/post-
traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd/index.shtml#part6.  
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a diagnosis of PTSD.12 These criteria are not only helpful for the purposes of diagnosis, but 
also in order to understand what the wound left by combat trauma entails. One of the 
criteria central to the experience of trauma is that of intrusive memories that force the victim 
to re-live the trauma.13 These intrusive experiences of re-living are isolating, terrifying and 
seemingly unstoppable.14 This criterion is especially significant because the way that the 
trauma continues unfolding reveals the nature of this type of wound.   
 Study of the phenomenon of combat trauma is a matter not simply of detailing what 
the wound looks like, but also of examining how victims can adapt to these injuries. In other 
words, mere description or even definition of the phenomenon hardly suffices when it 
comes to elaborating a workable criterion (or criteria) for adequately understanding the 
mechanism of trauma.  A plausible account of possible ways of healing its victims is also 
needed to yield such a criterion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 There have been four previous editions of the DSM, each having different diagnostic criteria and 
disorders. PTSD was first introduced into the DSM in 1981, and was not changed markedly until this 
most recent version. Some of the most recent changes are relevant to this discussion (especially 
regarding the discussion of the decision by the APA to not classify PTSD as an injury) and will be 
referenced when necessary. Unless otherwise indicated, any references to the DSM refer to the most 
recent version. For two articles discussing the changes as they relate to PTSD diagnoses among the 
military population specifically, see Matthew J. Friedman, et al., "Considering PTSD for DSM-5," 
Depression and Anxiety 28, no. 9 (2011): 750-69.  See also M. W. Miller, et al., “The Prevalence and 
Latent Structure of Proposed DSM-5 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms in U.S. National and 
Veteran Samples,” Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy (2012, September 3): 1-13. 
13 The ‘B cluster’ of diagnostic criteria focus on intrusion symptoms, mood, dissociative symptoms, 
avoidance symptoms, and arousal symptoms. Intrusion symptoms (recurrent intrusive memories, 
distressing dreams, dissociative reactions, intense psychological distress in response to external cues 
that symbolize the event) will be of particular interest here.  
14 For chilling accounts of the experience of re-living combat trauma, see: David Finkel, The Good 
Soldiers (New York: Picador/Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2010), and David Finkel, Thank You For Your 
Service (New York: Sarah Crichton, 2013). The former was written while Finkel was on assignment 
with the soldiers of battalion 2-16 during their deployment to Baghdad and the latter as he traveled 
home with those who survived and documented their re-entry back into civilian life. For an account 
of combat experience from a clinical point of view, see also Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: 
Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York: Scribner, 2002).  
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 There are many inroads to adapting to trauma and PTSD, and the methods are 
expanding and multiplying quickly.15 In this work, I focus on the potential for narrative to 
heal trauma.16  By providing a way for the victim to render the traumatic event(s) in a 
coherent story to an empathetic audience, trauma narratives can make it possible for the 
event to become recognizable as something from the past, rather than something that the 
victim has to continue reliving. Further, the external perspective that must be inhabited in 
order to narrate an event allows the victim to determine what the event means within the 
larger narrative of her life.17 In this way, narrative can be seen as an adaptive tool that helps 
victims of trauma cope with their wounds.  
 As with physical wounds, the goal with narrative adaptation is not to eradicate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 There are currently many alternative treatments being studied. These range from traditional 
therapeutic methods (e.g., psychotherapy, psychopharmacotherapy, cognitive-behavioral therapy) to 
more experimental and creative methods (e.g., eye movement desensitization and reprocessing or 
EMDR therapy, therapy using controlled doses of methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA, 
virtual reality graded exposure therapy, hypnosis, creative therapies). For an excellent book-length 
work on the various methods, see: Edna Foa and Terence Keane, Effective Treatments for PTSD, Second 
Edition Practice Guidelines from the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (New York: Guilford, 
2008). For a brief discussion of the some of the more recent experimental and creative methods, see 
Judith Cukor, et al., "Emerging Treatments for PTSD," Clinical Psychology Review (2009): 1-12.  
16 Given the several different potential therapies, it may seem strange to focus on narrative therapy, 
which is grounded in traditional psychotherapy or what was first called the talking cure. There are 
three reasons that I have chosen to focus on narrative therapy here. The first is that it is currently the 
only therapy that has been officially recommended by the Institute of Medicine (for more statistics, 
facts, and current studies, see the National Institute of Mental Health website. See bibliography for 
full web address). The second is that many of the alternative therapies, though they are founded in 
psycho-pharmaceutical methods or non-narrative methods, also rely on some form of narrative 
therapy in addition. Further, since I have chosen to focus here on the diagnostic cluster that has to 
do with re-living traumatic experience, which is something that is deeply enmeshed with traumatic 
memory, it seems appropriate to focus on the therapeutic method that addresses this particular set of 
symptoms and experiences directly. For an excellent discussion of the history, importance and 
current relevance of the talking cure see: Kevin Aho and Charles Guignon, "Medicalized Psychiatry 
and the Talking Cure: A Hermeneutic Intervention," Human Studies 34, no. 3 (2011): 293-308. 
17 For three influential works on the importance of narrative in trauma see: Susan J. Brison, Aftermath: 
Violence and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Cathy Caruth, 
Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Shoshana 
Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: 
Routledge, 1991). 
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trauma, but to make it possible for the victim to function in spite of it. It is important to 
note that the argument here is not that narrative is the only way to adapt to trauma, or even 
that it works in every single case. (While narrative therapy is currently very highly regarded as 
an adaptive tool, it often occurs in conjunction with other types of therapy for success.)  
However, because narrative can be quite effective, I examine it as an adaptive tool to trauma 
and attempt to understand why it works when it does. The examination is motivated in no 
small part by the fact that narrative therapy currently remains the most well-researched of 
the many different therapies that help victims with PTSD adapt and cope.  
 As noted above, this project is methodologically interdisciplinary.  It looks to the 
fields of psychology, neuroscience, and the philosophical discipline of phenomenology in 
order to understand the nature of psychological trauma and how those who have been 
traumatized can adapt or learn to adapt.  
 Each of these fields has a unique perspective from which to see trauma. Psychology 
provides an important diagnostic structure from which to recognize and categorize traumatic 
experience. The criteria for diagnosis of PTSD, elaborated by psychologists, outline access to 
services and delineate the symptoms that define PTSD. Psychology is the field that originally 
discovered what we now call trauma, so it provides a rich historical perspective replete with 
important case studies and data for examination.18 The focus of the psychological viewpoint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The history of trauma can be traced back to Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer’s early work on 
hysteria. Hysteria referred to a set of psychological symptoms that occurred in the aftermath of 
sexual assault. See Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, trans. Nicola Luckhurst 
(London: Penguin, 2004). The term was renamed ‘shell-shock’ in 1915 when veterans came home 
from war with symptoms similar to those typical in hysteria, and was termed ‘posttraumatic stress 
syndrome’ in 1981. For a concise treatment of the history of trauma in psychiatry, see Bessel A. van 
Der Kolk, “The History of Trauma in Psychiatry,” in Handbook of PTSD: Science and Practice, ed. 
Matthew J. Friedman, Terence M. Keane, and Patricia A. Resnick (New York: Guilford, 2010), 19-37. 
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is an array of symptoms, and a central goal is the determination of diagnostic criteria and 
symptom relief. From the data compiled by numerous first-hand accounts, psychologists 
sort out the typical and treatable so as to understand how psychological abnormalities 
originate and how their symptoms might be alleviated.19  
 The perspective of neuroscience can enhance the foundation set up in psychology by 
providing theories to help detail just what is happening to the brain and body during the 
initial trauma and the experience of traumatic memory.20 This perspective complements and 
expands on the accounts from psychology and phenomenology by outlining the biological 
mechanisms that underlie trauma, traumatic memory and the healing process. The 
neuroscientific account is particularly important here given the considerable amount of 
recent progress that has been made in understanding the brain. Brain imaging can help 
illustrate why a particular set of symptoms is so often associated with the experience of 
trauma from a neurobiological perspective. By revealing the biological mechanisms at work 
both in trauma and in adaptation to trauma, neuroscience provides a scientific basis for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
It is interesting to note an issue of gender disparity here. While the study of PTSD has waxed and 
waned with the study of combat trauma (which has historically affected men more than women), the 
study of PTSD in the context of other types of trauma – especially sexual assault – was largely 
ignored.  
19 For a thorough discussion on the limits of psychology see: Frank C. Richardson, Blaine J. Fowers, 
and Charles B. Guignon, Re-envisioning Psychology: Moral Dimensions of Theory and Practice (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1999). 
20 To be sure, neuroscience has a value of its own. Of particular interest here are the ways in which 
neuroscience connects with and enhances the phenomenological and psychological accounts of 
trauma. See for example: R.A. Lanius, R. L. Bluhm, and P. A. Frewen, "How Understanding the 
Neurobiology of Complex Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Can Inform Clinical Practice: A Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Approach," Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica (2011): 331-348. See 
also: Leon A. Schein and Steven R. Lawyer. "Neurobiology of Trauma," in Psychological Effects of 
Catastrophic Disasters: Group Approaches to Treatment, ed. Leon A. Schein, Henry L. Spitz, Gary M. 
Burlingame, Phillip R. Muskin, and Shannon Vargo (New York: Haworth, 2006), 61-82. 
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understanding and treating trauma.21 This scientific basis for understanding trauma and 
PTSD can also aid in re-categorizing and de-stigmatizing trauma. I will argue that the 
biological explanation of PTSD suggests that it is best understood as an injury stemming 
from a normal biological response, rather than a self-originating mental illness. Furthermore, 
recent discoveries about the plasticity of the brain help explain both how memory formation 
and how healing might be possible.22  
 The term ‘phenomenology’ is currently used in three different ways. It may refer to 
the historical movement in philosophy that emphasized the study of human consciousness 
begun by Edmund Husserl. Second, ‘phenomenology’ may refer to someone’s first personal 
experience, as in ‘the phenomenology of perception.’ Third, ‘phenomenology’ may refer to a 
method of analysis that prioritizes the first-personal character of experience.23 In this work, 
the second and third meanings of ‘phenomenology’ are most commonly invoked, as a main 
focus of this work is to identify the perspective of first-personal, conscious experience; what 
it is like to live through traumatic events, and what it is like to re-live those events through 
dissociation or flashbacks.24 Phenomenology also provides an embodiment theory, a theory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Of interest here is Dan Siegel’s work on interpersonal neurobiology. Siegel’s work focuses on the 
plasticity of the brain and the potential for healing through empathetic relationships. See The 
Developing Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010). See also, Marion Solomon and Dan Siegel, 
Trauma: Attachment, Mind, Body, and Brain (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003). Though 
Siegel is a psychiatrist, he sees his own work as interdisciplinary in nature, as it coincides with many 
social sciences.   
22 Joseph LeDoux’s work in neuroscience has been instrumental in understanding and treating 
trauma. See: The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996); and, “Emotion Circuits in the Brain,” Annual Review of Neuroscience (2000): 155-184.  
23 See Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou and Walter Hopp, Philosophy of Mind and 
Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2015), 1-2.  
24 Part of the goal of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work in the Phenomenology of Perception was to argue 
against the empiricist and intellectualist reductive account of human behavior (trans. Colin Smith, 
London: Routledge, 2002). Though his criticisms are many, they are organized around a theme: the 
traditions that espouse mind/body dualism are methodically incorrect. Rather than viewing life as it 
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that stresses the synthetic character of experience, fusing mind and body, rather than 
dividing them. This conception of embodiment allows for an understanding of trauma as an 
embodied injury, rather than one of the mind disjoined from the body or vice versa.  
 Rather than focus on the various ways that different phenomenologists might 
respond to the issue of trauma and PTSD, I have chosen to focus specifically on the thought 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach brings a critical 
perspective to the scientific point of view (here I mean to invoke the third usage of the word 
‘phenomenology’). Wary of psychological or scientific accounts that presume the reducibility 
of human behavior to mechanisms that are not themselves experienced, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that in order to gain a full understanding of any human phenomenon, one must 
return to the phenomenon as it is lived.25  Take for example his remarks about the way a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is, they attempt to dissect behavior and action in an attempt to understand them outside the context 
from which they arose. There are two mistakes in this method; first, it is based on the incorrect 
assumption that the phenomenon that was dissected is the same as what gets reconstructed. Merleau-
Ponty points out that the reconstructed phenomenon is wholly distinct from the original experience 
because the kind of analytical reflection required for the dissection of phenomena yields an entirely 
new experience. Second, this methodology treats the world as fodder for scientific experiment and 
nothing further. It is, “to treat the scientist’s knowledge as if it were absolute, as if everything that is 
and has been was meant only to enter the laboratory” (Phenomenology of Perception, 160). In other words, 
it banishes lived experience in favor of scientific explanations of those experiences. According to 
Merleau-Ponty, the solution is to shift focus back onto the lived being as a whole. “Scientific 
thinking, a thinking which looks on from above, and thinks of the object-in-general, must return to the 
‘there is’ which underlies it” (Ibid., 161). Some may argue that blending psychology, neurobiology and 
phenomenology together is a project that Merleau-Ponty would reject. I maintain that Merleau-Ponty 
did not intend to disregard psychology altogether in his phenomenology, but to refuse to let a reductive 
psychology be the only viewpoint on human existence. Further, it should be noted that Merleau-
Ponty does not necessarily have to get rid of reflection altogether in his method. It has been argued 
that Merleau-Ponty actually puts a certain emphasis on reflection and that he does not intend to 
jettison all reflection. See Raymond Herbenick, “Merleau-Ponty and the Primacy of Reflection,” in 
The Horizons of the Flesh, ed. Garth Gillan (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), 92-
113.  
25 It should be noted that Merleau-Ponty does not use the same terminology for trauma and 
posttraumatic stress disorder because much of this terminology originated after he wrote. However, 
the symptoms that he describes are quite similar to the current designation of PTSD in the DSM V.  
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victim suffering from hallucinations should be approached. “When the victim of 
hallucinations declares that he sees and hears, we must not believe him, since he also 
declares the opposite; what we must do is understand him.”26 This perspective is not one that 
simply examines the patient externally with the goal of cataloguing and treating symptoms.27 
Instead it is one that attempts to understand the phenomenon from the inside. The 
phenomenological method used by Merleau-Ponty to understand psychological phenomena 
is particularly relevant within the discussion of trauma, as the diagnostic criteria often point 
to experiences that are re-lived.28 If we want to understand trauma deeply, we must try and 
understand the phenomenon of re-living an event. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology provides a rich understanding of the way that a mental illness unfolds from 
the point of view of the victim without focusing exclusively on behaviors as symptoms, or 
disorders generally.  
 Though each of these fields has been studying trauma independently, work that 
brings them together into one philosophical framework is much less prevalent.  Moreover, 
most work in this regard pair psychology and neuroscience or psychology and 
phenomenology, without bringing all three to bear on the study of trauma.29 Examining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 393, my emphasis. 
27 For an excellent article on the benefits that the phenomenological viewpoint can bring to 
psychology, see Kevin Aho, "Medicalizing Mental Health: A Phenomenological Alternative," Journal 
of Medical Humanities 29, no. 4 (2008): 243-59. 
28 Though there are symptoms related to PTSD that do not pertain to directly re-experiencing the 
initial event (i.e., problems with concentration, hypervigilance, depression), there is an entire cluster 
of symptoms (B cluster) that is focused on re-living the event. It is this cluster of symptoms that is of 
special importance here (American Psychiatric Association, DSM V, 265-290).   
29 As far as the combination of psychology and neuroscience, a relevant literature review of work 
combining neuroscience and psychology around the topic of PTSD, see, Alastair Hull, 
“Neuroimaging findings in post-traumatic stress disorder,” The British Journal of Psychiatry (2002): 102-
110. Also of note is J.F. Peres, et al., “Traumatic Memories: Bridging the Gap Between Functional 
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trauma from these three different perspectives – obviously within the limits of current 
progress made in each field – is a project that stands to give us a more complete 
understanding of trauma and adaptation.  Moreover, only an understanding on this order can 
provide a responsible basis for normative considerations of trauma, e.g., considerations of 
how trauma should be characterized, how those suffering from trauma should be treated, 
what sorts of treatments should be countenanced.  Synthesizing these perspectives with a 
view to achieving this more complete and ultimately normative understanding is a 
distinctively philosophical task.  
 This work is philosophically grounded in several ways, but above all in its attempt to 
secure phenomenologically grounded categories and concepts to understand and treat 
trauma. 30 It is distinctly interdisciplinary because it seeks to put the disparate fields of 
psychology, neuroscience and phenomenology in conversation with one another with the 
goal of a more complete, systematic understanding of trauma and adaptation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Neuroimaging and Psychotherapy,” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 42, no. 6 (June 
2008): 478-488. This work links neuroimaging with traumatic memories. The most relevant work 
recently done in phenomenology and psychology around the topic of PTSD is Stolorow’s 
aforementioned books: World, Affectivity, Trauma and, Trauma and Human Existence. See also: Andrew 
Sims and David Sims, "The Phenomenology of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Symptomatic 
Study of 70 Victims of Psychological Trauma," Psychopathology 31, no. 2 (1998): 96-112; and A. Ehlers, 
A. Hackmann, and T. Michael, “Intrusive Re-Experiencing in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: 
Phenomenology, Theory & Therapy,” Memory, 12, no. 4 (2004): 403-415.  
30 Most obviously, this work is philosophically motivated in its use of the phenomenological 
perspective. The use of this perspective is not accidental, but has normative roots. Namely, the 
phenomenological perspective (the way that Merleau-Ponty envisions it) seeks to remind us of the 
importance of the lived experience. This is not to say that psychology or neuroscience ignore the lived 
experience, but that a rich understanding of the lived experience is not the goal of psychological or 
neuroscientific inquiry. Scientific analysis towards the synthesis of typical symptoms organized into a 
cluster to form a disorder towards the final goal of symptom reduction is distinct from 
phenomenological analysis of the lived essence of a particular phenomenon. Further, this work is 
intended to be a groundwork for a future normative analysis of trauma and adaptation. This later 
work cannot be done without a meta-analysis of the nature of both trauma and adaptation in order to 
provide scaffolding for normative claims.  
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 The history of the study of trauma has been circuitous and somewhat fragmentary.31 
In chapter one I review how trauma has historically been defined, understood and 
researched in psychology, neuroscience and phenomenology.32 In order to understand the 
progress that has thus far been made and the progress that still remains to be made, I first 
trace the roots of the study of trauma through psychology. I then describe how trauma has 
been situated and examined in neuroscience.  Finally, I begin to outline what 
phenomenology can add to the analysis of trauma and PTSD. My intention in this chapter is 
to lay the groundwork for showing that each of these disciplines – not least by enhancing 
and challenging one another – contributes a necessary perspective to our understanding of 
the human experience of trauma. 
 In chapter two, I go on to explore the phenomenon of trauma by examining one of 
its most prevalent features, traumatic memory. I argue that the experience of remembering a 
traumatic event is psychologically, phenomenologically and neurologically distinct from that 
of remembering non-traumatic events. In this chapter I explore the sui generis nature of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Herman notes that when there is a concentration of traumatized people, such as in times of war, 
terror, or deep economic decline, there is an upsurge in the study of trauma. When these episodes are 
over and times are calmer, the topic is neglected and forgotten. When the cycle repeats, the study of 
trauma must be rediscovered again. The problem is not that we are unaware of trauma or its 
devastating effects. It is that the study of trauma has been episodic, inconsistent, and for that reason, 
incomplete. Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 7.  
32 The way in which these terms are used here is worth noting. I use psychology as an umbrella term 
to refer to the scientific study of human behavior and mental function. I am choosing here not to 
make a distinction between psychiatry and psychology, though by modern standards, Freud 
(discussed below) would have been considered a psychiatrist. Though these distinctions are certainly 
important, the history of trauma within psychology involves and includes psychoanalysis and 
psychiatry, and so the distinctions between them are not relevant to this discussion. Neuroscience is 
used to refer to the scientific study of the nervous system. The terms neuroscience and neurobiology 
are used interchangeably. Phenomenology here is restricted to the study of human consciousness 
from a first-person perspective that comes primarily from the work of Merleau-Ponty. Though 
phenomenology is a much broader field, and there are many ways in which it could be used to better 
understand trauma, an analysis that takes into account every relevant work in phenomenology is 
beyond the scope of this work. 
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traumatic memory from the perspectives of psychology, phenomenology and neuroscience. I 
argue that the perspectives of psychology and neuroscience, when combined with that of 
phenomenology, yield an understanding of trauma that stretches from the most basic 
synaptic level of brain function to the first personal lived experience without reducing it to 
any particular part of the phenomenon in its entirety. First, I examine the psychology of 
traumatic memory in order to provide a basic framework for the concept of traumatic 
memory as a central symptom of PTSD. Next, I detail some of the basic neuroscience of 
memory in order to understand the mechanism of traumatic memory on the brain level, a 
mechanism that provides a likely model for explaining the origin of these symptoms. Finally, 
I introduce the phenomenological perspective to illustrate how the psychological and 
neuroscientific theories bear out in first-hand, lived experience, and what the 
phenomenological perspective can add to the discussion. 
 In chapter three I further develop a phenomenological account of trauma by utilizing 
Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of injury and adaptation as embodied phenomena. Building from 
the argument made in the previous chapter that traumatic events challenge structures of 
meaning for the subject, I begin the chapter with an analysis of the case of Johann 
Schneider, a combat veteran mentioned frequently throughout the Phenomenology of Perception. 
The analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s commentary on Schneider’s case contributes to an 
expanded understanding of embodiment, while also revealing the impulse to adapt. I then go 
on to focus on adaptation to injury as an essential part of the phenomenon of trauma. I 
argue that the understanding of traumatic injury and adaptation offered by Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological perspective can both explain the genesis of traumatic symptoms and 
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make inroads into treatment possibilities. This discussion of the phenomenology of 
adaptation to injury, in addition to the arguments made in chapter two, supplies the 
foundation for the proceeding examination of narrative as a model for adaptation in the case 
of trauma. 
It is not enough to point out that there is an impulse to adapt to injury (and indeed 
that PTSD is itself a result of attempted adaptation), we must go one step further and also 
consider what makes an adaptive method successful. I do this in chapter four by isolating 
narrative as one particular method of adaptation to PTSD for analysis. I begin the chapter by 
grounding the discussion of narrative in psychology. I argue that there are some crucial ways 
in which the recent advent of narrative therapy in psychology represents a turn toward a 
phenomenological approach. I then go on to examine some important debates that surround 
narrative in philosophy in general. Engaging with these debates, I suggest jettisoning theories 
tying narrative to self-identity in favor of understanding narrative as an embodied and 
interpersonal tool with a crucial relevance to our lives, especially when facing trauma. Finally, 
I turn to neuroscience, illustrating that what is theoretically established in psychology and 
philosophy is shored up by recent neuroscientific research.  In addition to corroborating the 
present study’s contention that narrative can function as an adaptive tool for trauma, this 
research helps us understand why this is the case. 
This work has potential applications in each of the fields with which it engages. The 
field of phenomenology has referenced combat trauma, but never focused single-mindedly 
on it. Psychology and neuroscience have focused on combat trauma, but never with the 
added perspective of phenomenology. Perhaps the most important application however is a 
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practical one. As noted at the outset, the definition of trauma has shifted over time from one 
of physical injury to one that also encompasses psychological injury.  The importance of the 
following study of psychological trauma and adaptation is, among other things, to establish 
the need to transform our definition of trauma one more time. Through the lens of 
psychology, phenomenology and neuroscience, we can come to define trauma as a kind of 
mental injury that is legitimate, that comes about as a result of a normal reaction to abnormal 
circumstances, and that calls out to be addressed and healed, just like a broken bone.  
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Chapter One: From Hysteria to PTSD: The History of the Study of Trauma in 
Psychology, Neuroscience & Phenomenology 
 
 This chapter reviews how trauma has historically been defined, understood and 
researched in psychology, neuroscience and phenomenology. Each of these three fields has 
made important contributions to the study of trauma, but the three different viewpoints are 
rarely combined. The purpose of the review is to illustrate the merits of doing so. i.e., to 
make the case – in initial, broad outline – for bringing all three of these viewpoints to bear 
on understanding trauma and adaptation to it. Generally speaking, the study of trauma in 
psychology has led to the classification of typical symptoms of trauma, which can give us a 
preliminary understanding of what being traumatized entails in terms of behavior, as well as 
a general idea of what kind of events might lead to this behavior and cause it to become 
chronic (as in the case of posttraumatic stress disorder). By understanding the mechanisms 
in the brain that underlie these symptoms, neuroscience provides important insight into why 
certain types of experience lead to psychological suffering and also how those physiological 
mechanisms might be manipulated to alleviate symptoms. Phenomenology, the study of 
human conscious experience from the first person perspective, allows access into the lived 
experience of trauma and traumatic memory, which can help us understand more deeply 
what it means to have experienced trauma, what it is like to have been changed by traumatic 
experience and what it is like to begin to adapt.  
 The history of the study of trauma has been circuitous and somewhat fragmentary. 
In order to understand the progress that has thus far been made and the progress that still 
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remains to be made, this chapter first traces the roots of the study of trauma through 
psychology. It then describes how trauma has been situated and examined in neuroscience.  
Finally, it shows what phenomenology can add to the analysis of trauma and PTSD. It is my 
intention to show that a thorough understanding of the human experience of trauma 
requires all three of these viewpoints, which enhance and challenge each other.  
 
1.1 History of the Study of Trauma in Psychology 
 
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), currently 
understands trauma to have occurred when one has been exposed to actual or threatened 
death, serious injury or sexual violation.33 The presence of a certain set of symptoms that fall 
within diagnostic clusters indicates when the exposure to such an event has become chronic, 
leading to posttraumatic stress disorder.  
 There are four general diagnostic clusters: re-experiencing, avoidance, negative 
cognitions and mood, and arousal. Re-experiencing is meant to capture any kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 As mentioned in the introduction, the DSM is a manual published by the American Psychological 
Association in order to classify and define mental disorders and is currently in its fifth edition. More 
detail about its inception and revision relating to PTSD will appear later in this chapter. At present, it 
is worth noting that the previous edition of the DSM used a broader definition of trauma as anything 
that caused intense fear, helplessness or horror. The American Psychological Association (APA) 
states that the definition was changed because the previous definition “proved to have no utility in 
predicting the onset of PTSD” (DSM 5 PTSD Fact Sheet, April 2013, 
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/ 
PTSD%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf). Beyond concerns about the definition reliably leading to the correct 
diagnosis, some worry that this new definition may be too restrictive. Tying the disorder to a certain 
set of events may leave out those who find themselves experiencing the symptoms of PTSD in the 
absence of an event that matches the definition. See for example, Miller, et. al., “Prevalence and 
Latent Structure,” 3-8. 
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unintentional and intrusive memories of the event.34 Some examples are flashbacks, 
nightmares, or intrusive thoughts about the event that produces the psychological distress. 
Negative cognitions and mood refer to any lasting feelings of shame, blame of self or others, 
isolation surrounding the event as well as a distorted sense of self, a diminished interest in 
activities, or an inability to remember the entire event or part of it. Avoidance refers to 
activities that someone may perform in an attempt to keep herself from re-experiencing the 
event. Going to extreme lengths to avoid public transportation after being involved in a bus 
accident would be an example of avoidance. Arousal is marked by hyper-vigilance, 
aggression, or self-destructive behavior in the absence of an actual threat. Always being ‘on-
guard,’ startling easily and being constantly alert of fluctuations in one’s surroundings are all 
examples of arousal. These two symptoms may be interrelated, e.g., one may find oneself 
startling each time a bus goes over a bump, and may then avoid public transportation 
because of this. 35  
 Each of these symptoms can be part of a normal reaction to stress. Anyone may 
have nightmares after an unpleasant experience, feel shame about something that they have 
done – or that has been done to them – in the past, avoid activities that proved to be 
previously uncomfortable, or find themselves on high alert in the presence of something that 
they fear. Having these symptoms independently of each other, or experiencing them briefly 
from time to time does not suggest PTSD. A diagnosis of PTSD is only given if an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The re-experiencing criteria will be discussed in further detail in chapter two.   
35 American Psychiatric Association, DSM V, 265-290.  
  
21 
individual’s life is significantly challenged due to the presence of at least one symptom from 
each cluster for a period longer than one month.36  
 According to psychology then, one is suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder if 
and only if her response meets these diagnostic criteria. These criteria are meant, at least in 
part, to be exclusionary: to differentially diagnose PTSD. When PTSD first appeared in the 
DSM in its third edition, its authors had in mind things like torture, war, and natural 
disasters as traumatic stressors.37 Colloquially, we might hear one say that they are suffering 
from PTSD as a result of a divorce, job loss, or other personal crisis. Though individuals 
may indeed be experiencing some of the symptoms described above, they are not considered 
to formally have PTSD unless they meet all criteria.38 In order to understand how the 
American Psychiatric Association arrived at this definition, it is helpful to begin with the 
history of trauma in psychology.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 It is interesting to note that a preliminary definition of trauma must include both the event and the 
individual’s response to that event. This suggests that what makes something traumatic is not simply 
the nature of the event, but the way that the individual responds to it. This point may seem trivial, 
but it accounts for the enormous variance in responses to identical or similar events, explaining why 
two people can live through the same event but only one may go on to suffer chronically. This issue 
will be discussed further in section 1.34, which focuses on the relevance of phenomenology to the 
understanding of trauma. 
37 Matthew J. Friedman, “PTSD History and Overview,” U.S Department of Veterans Affairs 
National Center for PTSD, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/PTSD-overview/ptsd-
overview.asp. 
38 This may seem a small point, but describing what is not PTSD is an important part of defining what 
PTSD is. Though the increased awareness of PTSD is beneficial in the sense that the more that 
people are aware of it the more likely they are to be accepting of those who have it, it is important to 
realize that PTSD is a serious condition and not meant to be a diagnosis that fits every kind of 
uncomfortable feeling one may have over the course of their lives. Not everyone is clinically 
traumatized by every unfortunate event that they experience. For more on the importance of using 
this diagnosis discriminately, see Bessel van der Kolk & Lisa M. Najavits “Interview: What is PTSD 
Really? Surprises, Twists of History, and the Politics of Diagnosis and Treatment,” Journal of Clinical 
Psychology: In Session 69, no. 5 (2013): 516-522. 
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 The history of trauma begins with the clinical fascination with hysteria in the late 
1800s.39 Hysteria was thought to be an emotional disorder that afflicted women and 
originated in the uterus.40  Symptoms of hysteria were wide-ranging and included 
unexplained emotional outbursts, sudden muteness, partial paralysis, amnesia, muscle 
spasms, chronic vomiting, anorexia and seizure.41 Jean-Martin Charcot was credited by Freud 
as the first physician who gave any serious credence to the hysterical patient, most of whom 
were previously dismissed as insane and incurable. Charcot’s fascination with hysterical 
patients led to the creation of a comprehensive list of symptoms that accompanied the 
disorder. His research became well known to the public, as he held frequent Tuesday night 
lectures in which he would bring the hysterical patient to the stage to display her symptoms 
for scrutiny and discussion.42 Charcot brought hysterical patients into the psychiatric 
landscape and helped redefine them as legitimate patients.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Historians of trauma universally recognize that what was once called hysteria is now referred to as 
PTSD. It is worth noting that though the most well known proponents of the study of this disorder 
were Jean-Martin Charcot, Sigmund Freud, Pierre Janet and Josef Breuer, the fascination with 
hysteria was not restricted to professional neurology and psychiatry. Over 20% of all psychiatric 
dissertations in the late 19th century focused on hysteria in one sense or another, a percentage this 
high has not since been replicated on any other subject. See, Mark S. Micale, “On the 
‘Disappearance’ of Hysteria: A Study in the Clinical Deconstruction of a Diagnosis,” Isis 84, no.3 
(1993): 496-526. 
40 Where this theory originally came from is unclear. Though it was long thought that the term 
originated with Hippocrates, the term cannot be found in any Hippocratic writings. See, Helen King, 
“Once upon a text: Hysteria from Hippocrates” in Hysteria Beyond Freud, ed. Sander L. Gilman, Helen 
King, Roy Porter, G. S. Rousseau, and Elaine Showalter (Oakland, CA: University of California 
Press, 1993), 3-90. For our purposes, the exact origin of the term is not as relevant as its continued 
use in the late 19th century. 
41 See Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, 3-17. 
42 Judith Herman aptly called these Tuesday night lectures “theatrical events” that were not just 
attended by physicians and students, but also many other members of society who were also 
fascinated with hysteria. Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 10-11. This certainly raises the question of 
whether Charcot was making these hysterical patients legitimate, or further delegitimizing them by 
turning them into a spectacle. Setting aside questions about the ethics of his treatment of these 
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 Charcot was primarily interested in documenting hysteria and cataloguing its 
symptoms, but Pierre Janet, Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer (along with other followers) 
were determined to discover the cause of the disorder. In 1893, Freud and Breuer together 
published “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary 
Communication,”43 in which they theorized that the cause of hysteria was past trauma. The 
first example they refer to is a hypothetical one in which an upsetting emotion experienced 
during a dinner leads to persistent stomach upset.  
We may take as a very commonplace instance a painful emotion arising during a 
meal but suppressed at the time, and then producing nausea and vomiting which 
persists for months in the form of hysterical vomiting.44  
 
We might imagine, for example, that someone received news of a death in the family during 
a business dinner. Given the setting, they may have decided to suppress their emotional 
response in the name of formality. This might then lead to several months of nausea around 
dinnertime. In other words, Breuer and Freud speculated that hysteria could be understood 
as a pathology in which the body enacts negative emotion that arose but did not find 
expression. Breuer and Freud discovered that in conversation the patient always traces the 
symptoms back to a precipitating traumatic event or series of events that were too 
emotionally overwhelming to process. This evidence led them to their etiological theory: an 
inability to cognitively process an event because of an excess of emotions leads to chronic 
somatic symptoms. This theory led to the hypothesis that if one could process the original 
trauma and give voice to the initially suppressed emotions, the symptoms would then cease.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
patients, Charcot should be credited with bringing them into the psychological landscape in a new 
way.  
43 This “Preliminary Communication” would later become the first chapter of Studies on Hysteria. 
44 Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, 4.  
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 Working separately, Pierre Janet came to the same conclusion that hysterical 
symptoms could be associated with past traumas. He was the first to connect the theory of 
dissociation to traumatic memories, which explained the altered state of consciousness that 
hysterical patients were often found to experience.45  He also noticed that patients who had 
experienced trauma in the past would often respond differently to situations in the present.  
A loud banging noise might regularly elicit severe and disproportionate anxiety or anger in a 
hysterical patient, whereas the non-hysterical individual would find the noise unremarkable. 
His theory was very similar to Freud and Breuer’s. Janet speculated that intense emotions 
have an effect on the mind’s ability to process an event and they lead to a different kind of 
memory, one that is somatic rather than cognitive, and is manifested in dreams, hyper-
aroused states and flashbacks. 
 Had the history of trauma continued to proceed the way that it began in the 1890s, 
there is no telling how far the study might have progressed towards understanding and 
treating trauma. However, the promising study of trauma came to a screeching halt almost as 
soon as it had begun for all three theorists. Charcot’s work faced scrutiny when it was 
suggested that the subjects of his Tuesday night lectures were acting rather than experiencing 
true symptoms. Freud rejected his own work in 1897 and Breuer fled from the study of 
hysteria after a patient referenced in Studies on Hysteria became intensely attached to him. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Dissociation is currently defined as a group of psychological phenomena that involve some level of 
detachment from reality (excluding psychosis). Dissociation occurs on a wide spectrum and can 
include a number of widely experienced phenomena such as daydreaming while bored, or having a 
sense of amnesia while driving at one end of the spectrum, and a persistent sense that the world is 
unreal or the fragmentation of one’s identity into separate identities at the other end of the spectrum. 
Janet’s work is central to our current understanding of the symptoms involved in PTSD, but it was 
also central for the development of Multiple Personality Disorder (which is now known as 
Dissociative Identity Disorder). See, Onno van der Hart, Paul Brown, and Mariëtte Graafiand, “The 
Dissociation Theory of Pierre Janet,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 2, no. 4 (1989): 397-412.  
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Freud and Breuer abandoned their patients mid-treatment, repudiated their own work, and 
the study of trauma fell out of favor.46  
 The two prefaces to Studies on Hysteria, which saw a second publication in 1908, are 
markedly different, the second filled with hesitation and reticence from both Freud and 
Breuer. After carefully explaining that he has had no part in the second release of the book, 
Breuer is sure to explain that he has had “no active dealings with the subject” since the 
publication of the Preliminary Communication in 1893. Freud explained “the developments 
and changes in my views… have been too far reaching for it to be possible to attach them to 
my earlier exposition without entirely destroying its essential character….” His language here 
seems designed to put a gulf between his past and present thinking on the subject. He 
further relegates his ideas as immature beginnings: “I regard them not as errors, but as 
valuable first approximations to knowledge.”47  
 The reasons that Freud and Breuer turned away from their initial research and 
findings remains a subject of some controversy. It has been suggested by historians of 
psychology that this turning away could be credited to personal concerns rather than clinical 
ones. Judith Herman, prominent contemporary trauma theorist, criticizes Freud, arguing that 
he did not turn away from hysteria because he had progressed beyond it, but that he had 
concerns that were more personal and political in nature. She notes that the vast majority of 
hysterical patients had sexual trauma in common. Herman explains just what this meant to 
Freud.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 15-20. 
47 Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, xxxii, xxxiii. 
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To hold fast to his theory would have been to recognize the depths of sexual 
oppression of women and children… To ally himself with such a movement was 
unthinkable for a man of Freud’s political beliefs and professional ambitions.48  
 
In other words, it was not that Freud felt himself to be incorrect in his theory, but precisely 
the opposite. It was what being correct meant to Freud (and Breuer) that was so 
problematic. The theory that Freud and Breuer abandoned their patients because of personal 
and political conflict rather than theoretical advancement seems to bear out empirically. 
After all, some of the central ideas contained within Studies on Hysteria (the idea of the 
‘talking cure’, for example) remain mainstays of psychoanalytic theory today.  
 This intense fascination with trauma, followed by an abrupt turning away is a pattern 
that has repeated itself throughout the history of the study of trauma. This pattern has not 
gone unnoticed. In 1947, Abram Kardiner, a pioneer in trauma theory, lamented that trauma 
is “not subject to continuous study, but only to periodic efforts which cannot be 
characterized as very diligent.”49 Herman calls the study of trauma one of “episodic 
amnesia.”50 It is not that the study of trauma falls out of favor due to a lack of interest, or 
that there are periods in time in which trauma does not occur (though there are certainly 
times when more people face trauma) but that, as she says, “the subject provokes such 
intense controversy that it periodically becomes anathema.”51  
 Regardless of the precise reason for this turning away, studies about hysterical 
trauma halted until the First World War, when soldiers all over the world began coming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid., 19. 
49 Abram Kardiner and H. Spiegel, War Stress and Neurotic Illness (New York: Hoeber, 1947), 1. 
50 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 7. 
51 Ibid.  
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home from the war displaying symptoms of hysteria.52 Plagued by bouts of altered 
consciousness, emotional outbursts, paralysis, amnesia and muteness, soldiers forced the 
discussion of these symptoms back into the psychological landscape.  Since hysteria was 
typically reserved for women who had experienced sexual assault in childhood, these 
soldiers’ symptoms posed a classification problem. Rather than find similarities in these 
psychological states that seemed to result from both combat and sexual assault, theorists 
looked for causal differences. It was thought that the symptoms in soldiers were 
physiologically based, a result of physical rather than psychological trauma. One such theory 
gave way to the popular term ‘shell-shock,’ i.e., the theory that repetitive exposure to 
exploding shells caused minor concussions resulting in the symptoms.  Though the theory 
itself was quickly abandoned due to the presence of soldiers who exhibited the relevant 
symptoms but were not exposed to concussive blasts, the term ‘shell-shock’ continues to be 
used colloquially.53  
 Without a clear physiological cause of the symptoms that plagued soldiers, and 
without any way of understanding why some came back from war altered and some did not, 
blame was shifted onto the character of the soldier himself. Perhaps because of the origin of 
the disease as something that afflicted women, the pathology came to symbolize weakness or 
femininity. In 1922, the British Medical Journal summarized recent findings relating to shell-
shock. Their research found that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Van der Hart, Brown, and Graafiand, “Trauma-Induced Dissociative Amnesia,” 392-398.  
53 This term is largely credited to Charles Myers, who wrote about the phenomenon of shell-shock in 
“A Contribution to the Study of Shell-Shock” in 1915 (The Lancet, February 13, 1915). Myers recants 
his work in 1919 with another essay in the Lancet called “The Study of Shell-shock” (The Lancet, 
January 11, 1919). 
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A large number of shell-shock cases in a battalion was a sign of poor morale… a 
poor morale and a defective training are one of the most important, if not the most 
important etiological factors: also that shell-shock was a ‘catching’ complaint.54  
 
In other words, shell-shock was simply a result of human failure, a failure on behalf of 
certain military leaders to correctly train and control their troops, and a failure of certain 
soldiers to uphold their heroic nature. Many who suffered were assumed to be lazy 
malingerers, exaggerating their symptoms for sympathy. This belief led to treatments that 
used humiliation and violence to snap soldiers out of their altered states and to turn them 
back into heroic men.  
 Lewis Yealland, a Canadian psychiatrist, was a proponent of such treatment. He 
believed that patients could be brought out of their symptoms through aggressive counter-
suggestion. Mutism, for example, was treated in three different ways. The clinician would 
either utter provocative statements to the patient, which would elicit an angry response, or 
surprise him with loud noises, which would shock him out of his silence. If this did not 
work, a spatula would be pushed into the back of the throat. The most severe cases were 
treated by the application of strong electric shocks directly to the throat.55 Treatment was a 
mix of humiliation, shame, and physical violence.  
 Take for example, the following case study published in Yealland’s “Hysterical 
Disorders of Warfare.” Yealland describes patient A1 as someone whose mutism did not 
succumb to several types of treatment.56 After nine months of treatment that included 
electric shocks applied to his throat, cigarettes extinguished on his tongue, and hot plates 
placed at the back of his throat, patient A1 remained mute. Yealland reports that, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “Shell-shock,” The British Medical Journal 2, no. 3216 (1922): 322-323. 
55 Lewis Yealland, Hysterical Disorders of Warfare, (London: Macmillan, 1918), 3-5. 
56 Ibid., 1-30. 
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determined to heal the patient, he told him, “You will not leave this room until you are 
talking as well as you ever did; no, not before… you must behave as the hero I expect you to be.”57 
Yealland then applied an electric shock to the throat so strong that it sent the patient reeling 
backwards, unhooking the battery from the machine. Yealland strapped the patient down 
and continued to apply shock for an hour, at which point patient A1 finally whispered “Ah.” 
After another hour, the patient began to cry and whispered, “I want a drink of water.”58 
Yealland interpreted this breakthrough to mean that the soldier was suffering from weakness 
rather than a true psychological injury or disorder. Patients who could not be cured were 
classified as chronic malingerers, attempting to garner sympathy or evade service.59 Implicit 
in this understanding of shell-shock is the idea that it was a disease of manhood60 rather than 
an illness that came from witnessing, being subjected to, and partaking in violence. 
 Predictably, the next wave of the study of trauma came when the Second World War 
saw another influx of soldiers dealing with the same symptoms. It was Abram Kardiner, 
working in the psychiatric clinic of the Veterans’ Bureau who synthesized past efforts on the 
topic into what we now understand to be PTSD. In his influential book The Traumatic 
Neuroses of War, Kardiner drew heavily from the original writings on hysteria from 19th 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid., 9, my emphasis. 
58 Ibid., 7-15. 
59 Ibid., 237-248. 
60 These treatments of trauma, though thought to be acceptable and effective, were unsurprisingly 
controversial. For example, in the opening scene of Stanley Kubrick’s anti-war film “Paths of Glory,” 
a General approaches a dazed soldier and asks him, “Are you ready to kill more Germans?” When 
the soldier stumbles over his answer, another soldier tries to explain that he’s a bit shell-shocked. The 
General responds, “I beg your pardon, Sergeant, there is no such thing as shell-shock!” He then turns 
to the first soldier, “Get a grip on yourself, you’re acting like a coward. Snap out of it coward! 
Sergeant, I want you to arrange for the immediate transfer of this baby out of my regiment. I won’t 
have our brave men contaminated by him!” (Stanley Kubrick, Calder Willingham, and Jim 
Thompson. Paths of Glory, directed by Stanley Kubrick [1957; Beverly Hills, CA: Universal Artists, 
1999], DVD). 
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century France, rather than try to distance himself from the storied history of trauma. The 
result was a definition of trauma that was both revolutionary and grounded in history. It is a 
definition that has dramatically shaped the way that we see trauma today.  
 As noted above, Kardiner was aware of the fact that trauma had been a subject that 
was periodically forgotten and then reclaimed. He was also very aware that there were 
significant negative social effects associated with being diagnosed with a mental disorder that 
had previously been reserved for emotionally unstable women.  
The victim of such a neurosis is, therefore, without sympathy in court, and… 
without sympathy from his physicians, who often take… ’hysterical’ to mean that the 
individual is suffering from some persistent form of wickedness, perversity, or 
weakness of will.61 
Refusing to believe that the cause of shell-shock or traumatic neuroses was the character of 
the soldier, Kardiner speculated that the root of traumatic neurosis was a result of a kind of 
psychological injury, an injury to one’s ability to adapt.  
Trauma means injury. When used in a psychological sense, this connotation of injury 
must be altered, for we must define what is injured; here we encounter some 
difficulty. Properly speaking we would say that an adaptation is injured, spoiled, 
disorganized, or shattered. 62  
 
In a theory that harkened back to the work done by Charcot, Freud, Breuer, and Janet, 
Kardiner postulated that the shock, horror, and violence of war could lead to the constant 
reliving and re-experiencing of the original experience in the patient. According to Kardiner, 
trauma brings about  
… a remarkable qualitative change in adaptation. The subject acts as if the original 
traumatic situation were still in existence and engages in protective devices which 
failed on the original occasion. This means in effect that his conception of the outer 
world and his conception of himself have been permanently altered.63 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Kardiner and Spiegel, War Stress and Neurotic Illness, 406. 
62 Abram Kardiner, Traumatic Neuroses of War (Mansfield, CT: Martino Publishing, 2012), 74. 
63 Ibid., 82. 
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In other words, traumatic situations can cause a breakdown in the adaptive methods used to 
survive. This breakdown results in a significant disruption for the individual in terms of his 
sense of himself and his relationship to the external world. What this breakdown consists of 
can be understood in the context of operant conditioning.  
 Alongside clinical research with traumatized patients was a movement to understand 
behavior surrounding the fear response. The fear response is central to understanding 
trauma and PTSD. It is believed to have evolved as a set of protective reactions in response 
to real or perceived danger.64 When the brain receives signals that indicate threat, it responds 
by initiating a set of reactions that make it possible for the organism to better handle that 
threat. This is not a result of conscious exertion, in fact, the response happens before 
conscious input is possible. When startled by a loud noise for example, the heart rate might 
elevate, and the senses become sharpened. This behavior is typical; the brain has received 
stimuli that suggests a threat, processed the stimuli, and initiated the response. Later – after 
the threat has subsided – the response ends. When the brain is overwhelmed by a threat or 
the threat is consistently repeated, problems can arise in this process. Signals received by the 
brain become misunderstood, reacted to inappropriately, and sometimes cannot be 
terminated.65 It is this kind of malfunction that is thought to be the root of PTSD. For 
example, a veteran who cannot tolerate sitting with his back exposed in a restaurant because 
this leaves his body vulnerable to attack experiences a heightened fear response that has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 128-134. 
65 Ibid., 256-261. More detail about the neurological functioning behind this will be given in the next 
section. 
  
32 
gone haywire and cannot be shut down. In order to see how and why this occurs, it is 
necessary to understand the way that the brain can be conditioned to fear.  
 In the early 1900s, Ivan Pavlov famously discovered that the salivary reflex in dogs 
could be conditioned by repeating a specific sound each time food was presented. It was 
originally thought that the salivation response would only occur in the actual presence of 
food. That is, salivation was thought to be stimulated by food and would not occur in the 
presence of any other stimuli. What the experiment showed was that eventually, the dogs 
would salivate in response to the noise regardless of whether food was present. This seemed 
to prove that the salivation response in the brain could be conditioned to a previously 
neutral stimulus, which in turn suggested that the brain’s automatic responses, though not 
conscious, could be trained.66 This discovery laid the foundation for further understanding 
of the fear response.  
 In 1920, the psychologist John Watson conducted an experiment in which he created 
a fear of rats in an eleven-month old boy. When the little boy played with a rat, happily at 
first, Watson would make a clanging noise. The boy quickly came to associate the loud and 
upsetting noise with the rat, and went from playing happily with it to refusing to go near it 
and crying when it was nearby. In other words, the brain of the boy had learned or created a 
fear response where one did not previously exist. Watson theorized that upsetting external 
stimuli were the source of traumatic neuroses, and that repeated exposure to threatening 
stimuli could come to shape future behavior.67  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ivan Pavlov, Conditioned Reflexes (New York: International Publishers, 1928), 47-75. 
67 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 231-237; John Watson, Behaviorism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1958), 159-166; John Watson and Rosalie Rayner, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions,” Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 3 (1920): 1-14.  
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 The connection to PTSD - and combat trauma related PTSD in particular - is clear 
A soldier who is repeatedly exposed to a loud noise connected to the very real threat of a 
bomb or gunfire experiences a series of automatic responses each time. Gradually, his brain 
becomes conditioned so that all loud noises represent the threat of death. Though he may 
rationally know that he is no longer in battle, his body cannot stop the heightened automatic 
fear response to external stimuli that is not threatening. When the response spreads, it is 
called “kindling.”68 The adaptive behavior is what saves his life while in combat, but if it 
cannot be shut down as a result of conditioning, it tortures him when he gets home. This 
provides a possible explanation of the origin of PTSD in soldiers that is quite different from 
Yealland’s belief that the symptoms were a result of a weak will.  
 While Kardiner and others were working to understand and treat combat trauma, 
there was a push in the United States for a unified nomenclature of mental disorders so 
clinicians could better treat their patients. Attempts to gather data on the symptoms and 
prevalence of mental illnesses had begun in the 1880s. At the time of WWII, there were 
three competing manuals for the categorization of mental illnesses, which led to 
discrepancies in diagnosis and treatment.69 In 1952, the first version of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) was released by the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) in an effort to synthesize these manuals into one comprehensive text to 
use to commonly refer to psychiatric disorders.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Bessel A. van der Kolk, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and the Nature of Trauma,” State of the Art: 
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 2, no. 1 (2000): 14. 
69 The three manuals were the Standard Classified Nomenclature of Disease, the Armed Forces 
Nomenclature, and the Veterans Nomenclature. See Arthur C. Houts, “Fifty Years of Psychiatric 
Nomenclature: Reflections on the 1943 War Department Technical Bulletin, Medical 203,” Journal of 
Clinical Psychology 56, no. 7 (2000): 935-967. 
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 The DSM has been the definitive guide for classifying, understanding, and 
diagnosing mental disorders in the United States since this first edition in 1952. Currently in 
its fifth edition (published May 18, 2013), the DSM is widely used by students, clinicians, 
researchers, pharmaceutical companies, health insurance companies, the legal system, policy 
makers, and the general public. Though widely referenced, the DSM and its categories have 
been debated and contested since its first iteration. Each revision of the DSM has been 
accompanied by years of discussion and debate about the way that classifications are made, 
what is included, and what is removed or left out.  
 The category of PTSD, largely based on Kardiner’s work, did not enter the DSM 
until its third iteration in 1981, precipitated by a large-scale investigation of the lasting effects 
of war during and after the Vietnam War.70 This was 88 years after Freud and Breuer first 
theorized that somatic symptoms could be caused by traumatic events, 59 years after soldiers 
first began coming back with shell-shock, and 36 years after the end of WWII. Though 
PTSD has been recognized as a legitimate psychological disorder for over 30 years, its 
history is marked by amnesia and controversy, which still continues today. One example of 
current controversy surrounding PTSD is the debate that is taking place within psychology 
about whether or not PTSD should be renamed “posttraumatic stress injury.” Proponents of 
the change, emphasizing the fact that the symptoms of PTSD are caused by an external 
event or events and that there is stigma attached to being diagnosed with a mental illness or 
disorder, seem to be aligned with Kardiner.71  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Wilbur Scott, “PTSD in the DSM III, a Case in the Politics of Diagnosis and Disease” Social 
Problems 37, no. 3 (1990): 294-310. 
71 This debate largely took place at the 2012 APA annual meeting, where it was decided that ‘injury’ is 
too imprecise a word. For an excellent summary of the argument for changing the name, see Frank 
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  The study of combat trauma in psychology is at least 120 years old. The perspective 
provided by psychology is essential for categorizing and understanding trauma and PTSD. 
However, the study of trauma within psychology is not without flaw. An examination of 
combat trauma that did not take seriously the history of trauma in psychology would be 
misguided, but an examination of combat trauma that only takes seriously the concept of 
trauma in psychology is incomplete.  
 
1.2 Trauma in Neuroscience 
 
 While psychology has laid the groundwork for the study of trauma and PTSD, the 
field of neuroscience has made its own contributions to the understanding of trauma. While 
psychology can tell us that victims of trauma sometimes experience symptoms such as 
flashback memories, neuroscience can theorize about how these somatic symptoms are 
occurring by tracing those responses to their origin in the brain and body.72 A better 
understanding of the brain and how it functions in response to extreme fear, anxiety and 
stress helps us understand how these symptoms can become chronic for some people. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ochberg, “An Injury, Not a Disorder” Military Review (2013): 96-99. In the fifth edition of the DSM 
PTSD remains a disorder.  
72 Neuroscience is concerned with the brain, but I am referring to both the brain and the body here 
intentionally, primarily because the brain regulates so many of the functions of the body through the 
autonomic nervous system and the somatic nervous system. As we will see, many of the symptoms 
of PTSD originate in automatic responses in the brain, which then trigger responses in the body. 
This will be expanded upon in much more detail in chapter two. To give a brief overview, when the 
amygdala (thought to be the fear center of the brain) is activated by a reminder of a past trauma, it 
sends signals to produce higher levels of the stress hormone cortisol. This in turn causes symptoms 
such as rapid heart rate, hypervigiliance, etc. Therefore, when we refer to symptoms that we think of 
as ‘bodied’ we are also referring to the brain. Addressing and dismantling the dichotomy between the 
brain and the body is part of the work of phenomenology, as will be discussed later. 
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Further, understanding the mechanisms at the root of these symptoms can aid in the 
development of effective treatments. This section will discuss some of the advancements 
that have been made in understanding fear, trauma, and PTSD on a neurological level, with 
the aim of showing how this information complements psychological theory.   
 The history of the study of trauma in neurology also begins with hysteria. As 
discussed in Section I, Charcot believed that the symptoms could be traced to a physical 
abnormality somewhere in the nervous system; a lesion or tumor somewhere in the nervous 
system must be to blame for hysterical symptoms. The problem with this theory was that 
neurologists could not find any lesions, tumors, or other physical sources of the disease. The 
lack of physical evidence to support Charcot’s theory became “the problem of the missing 
lesion.” This is one of the reasons why Charcot’s research into hysteria yielded a catalogue of 
symptoms rather than the discovery of a cause. 73  
 Though our psychological understanding of trauma is in many ways indebted to 
neuroscience because of Charcot’s work, the isolated study of the brains of traumatized 
individuals did not occur until very recently.74 The fact that a strong correlation could not be 
drawn between the physical brain and the symptoms of hysteria led to the belief that hysteria 
and later posttraumatic stress were primarily psychological problems and not neurological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For a thorough history of the study of hysteria see also, Ilza Veith, Hysteria: The History of a Disease 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). 
74 As Bessel van der Kolk notes, “As of 1999, there have been seven published studies utilizing 
neuroimaging of patients with PTSD” (van der Kolk, “PTSD and the Nature of Trauma,” 7-22). 
There were, of course, enormous advancements being made in neuroscience in general after Charcot. 
Some of this research was based on victims of bodily trauma (Phineas Gage for example). The topic 
of the psychological trauma as a neurological issue was not taken up again until after Vietnam. More 
recently, as an interest with neuroimaging in general has grown, and ten years of war and traumatized 
veterans, the number of imagining studies has increased. For details, see K.C. Hughes and L.M. Shin, 
“Functional neuroimaging studies of post-traumatic stress disorder,” Expert Review of Neurotherapeutics 
11, no. 2 (2011): 275-285.  
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ones.75 In fact, much of the research that has contributed to theories about the traumatized 
brain has been specifically focused not on the problem of PTSD itself, but rather on how 
the brain functions in relation to emotions in general, and more specifically those of fear and 
anxiety, like associative learning of fear responses. This research has then been applied to 
victims of trauma, and later combined with technological advances in neuroimaging, leading 
the way for theories about the way that the brain is implicated in the initial traumatic event, 
in subsequent traumatic symptoms, and in adaptations to these symptoms.  
 Very generally speaking, the nervous system – which includes the brain, spinal cord, 
peripheral nervous systems, etc. – is thought to be a system that enables us to maintain 
relative homeostasis in our internal environments so that we can survive in a variety of 
different contexts and external environments.76 It has been theorized that there are three 
interdependent systems in the brain that enable this process. The first is the brain stem and 
the hypothalamus, which are tasked with maintaining internal equilibrium (body 
temperature, for example). The second is the limbic system, thought to be in charge of 
regulating the balance between internal and external states (emotions and memories seem to 
be regulated by the limbic system).77 The third is the neocortex, which manages our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 With the exception, of course, of traumatic brain injury, which is considered to be a physical injury 
that is sometimes comorbid with PTSD. See, for example, David Trudeau, et al., “Findings of Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury in Combat Veterans With PTSD and a History of Blast Concussion,” The 
Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences (1998): 308-313. 
76 Paul MacLean, The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Function (New York: Plenum, 1990). 
77 The limbic system is the subject of intense debate in neuroscience. Originally, it was thought to be 
the center of emotion regulation and long-term memory formation. In 1990, neuroscientist Paul 
MacLean published an influential book called The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Function 
in which he defended a model of the brain that developed three distinct systems in evolution. 
According to MacLean, the brain is made up of the reptilian complex, the paleomammalian complex 
(limbic system), and the neomammalian complex (neocortex). Each of these systems had a sort of 
position in an evolutionary hierarchy, so the reptilian complex was responsible for behavior at the 
  
38 
interactions with the outside world (sensory perception, language). In our normal everyday 
lives, we receive signals from the external world (and from our internal states).78 Those 
signals are received by the brain, which is then tasked with choosing an appropriate 
response, initiating that response, and then terminating the response when appropriate.79   
 As we develop, given that we are striving for a state of consistency and balance 
(homeostasis), we  learn to behave more or less predictably based on exposure to certain 
stimuli. Fear responses are activated in the presence of real or perceived threat, joy 
responses are activated in the presence of happy events, and so on. We learn the difference 
between a variety of types of stimuli so that we can respond efficiently and effectively to the 
world. According to the neuroscientific perspective, then, some emotions can be very 
generally understood as conditioned responses of the nervous system to stimuli.80 Though 
we think of our emotions as conscious entities, and though emotions can sometimes be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
instinctual level, the limbic system was responsible for behavior on a higher emotional level, and the 
neocortex was responsible for the highest level of behavior on the rational level. See MacLean, Triune 
Brain in Evolution, esp. 15-18 & 247-268. MacLean’s triune model has since been refined, and portions 
of it disputed. His understanding of the limbic system has been disputed most notably by Joseph 
LeDoux, who believes that the term is obsolete and refers to a complicated system that is not as 
unified as it once appeared to be. Much of the debate centers around which sections of the brain 
should be included as part of the limbic system, and not about whether or not the limbic system plays 
an important role in our emotional lives. See LeDoux, “Emotion Circuits in the Brain,” 155-184. The 
idea that the limbic system is at least partially responsible for the regulation of emotions and 
formation of memories still persists.  
78 MacLean, Triune Brain in Evolution, 273-293.  
79 van der Kolk, “PTSD and the Nature of Trauma,” 13. See also, Antonio Damasio, Descartes' Error: 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Grossett & Putnam, 1994); Jaak Panksepp, Affective 
Neuroscience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
80 Emotions, of course, are much more complicated than this. There is a distinction in neuroscience 
between emotions that occur pre-consciously and those that are conscious. The emphasis on 
emotions in the neurology of trauma and PTSD is on those that are pre-conscious. This is not to say 
that emotions are never conscious or rational, or that they are not subject to reflection or conscious 
manipulation. See Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 11-21. See also, Bessel van der Kolk, “Clinical 
Implications of Neuroscience Research in PTSD,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1071 
(2006): 277-293. 
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regulated through conscious thought, emotions and consciousness are not necessarily 
synonymous.81 
 In the case of PTSD, it is theorized that the traumatic event can be what causes the 
interruption of normal brain activity specifically in regard to the way that memories are 
created. Neuroimaging studies have shown that when traumatic memories are triggered by 
visual or aural cues, activity in portions of the brain thought to control the fear response are 
heightened, while activity in portions of the brain thought to be connected with translation 
of experiences into language are significantly decreased.82 What this suggests is that traumatic 
memories are somatic, not semantic, and that when an individual with PTSD is reminded of 
the traumatic event or events, they relive the event rather than remember it. This can occur 
as a result of fear conditioning – or as a result of the way that traumatic memory becomes 
coded in the brain, or some combination of the two. What it shows is that what Freud and 
Breuer believed about hysteria – namely, that a shocking, threatening or overwhelming 
experience could lead to chronic somatic symptoms – is supported by neuroscientific 
research.  
 From a neuroscientific perspective, when someone has PTSD, what has been lost is 
the ability to maintain homeostasis.83 Part of what is contributing to the symptomatology of 
PTSD is that the traumatic event or events have interrupted the brain’s capacity to organize 
and respond to external stimuli. This suggestion seems to corroborate Kardiner’s definition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 For an excellent and brief discussion of emotions and consciousness, see LeDoux, The Emotional 
Brain, 11-21. 
82 Ibid., 17. This important finding is explained in more detail in chapter two. 
83 Some, like Bruce McEwen, might argue that there is allostasis – a new, differently regulated state – 
rather than the loss of the ability to regulate homeostasis; see Bruce McEwen, “Stress, Adaptation, 
and Disease: Allostasis and Allostatic Load,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 840 (1998): 
33-44. 
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of trauma as an injury that occurs when a particular “adaptation is injured, spoiled, 
disorganized or shattered,” leading to the alteration of the subject’s “conception of the outer 
world and his conception of himself and his resources as related to it.”84  
 In this way, it is clear that the psychological and neuroscientific understandings of 
trauma and PTSD can complement one another. Neuroscience shows that we are not fully 
in control of our emotional responses consciously, which is a piece of knowledge that 
immediately accomplishes two important things regarding our understanding of PTSD. 
First, it delegitimizes claims that those who suffer from PTSD are weak-willed or lazy, that 
they have some choice over their response. Second, it helps us understand how the 
traumatic response causes disruptive symptoms that force the victim to chronically relive the 
event.  
 When it comes to healing from trauma, the neuroscientific research about the way 
that the brain works is also relevant. It used to be the case that individuals with a PTSD 
diagnosis were thought to be basically hopeless. It is easy to see how that is the case even 
with the limited information here. If the traumatic response is automatic and not conscious, 
how can it possibly be stopped? It is thought that the answer may partially lie in what we 
already know about trauma. The fact that the brain can respond immediately to an incredible 
variety of external stimuli and then later reassess and assign meaning to those stimuli using 
logical and rational thought shows that a key part of brain function has to do with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Kardiner, Traumatic Neuroses of War , 74 & 82. 
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adaptation and flexibility. If the fear response can be conditioned, it is perhaps possible that 
the brain can also be conditioned to adapt to trauma.85  
 Though emotional responses can be automatic and somewhat out of our conscious 
control, it does not necessarily follow that once traumatized an individual remains 
permanently so. The rational part of the brain is not entirely subordinate to the emotional 
system. Instead, they exist in a dynamic relationship, each informing the other. If we can 
draw on the potential capacity for changeability of the brain matter that we can see in brain 
development (neuroplasticity), we may find that we have more control over the traumatic 
response than we think.  
 
1.3 The Phenomenology of Trauma 
 
 Psychological and neuroscientific perspectives on trauma typically center on 
cataloguing, explaining, and alleviating symptoms. For the most part, they are based upon a 
fundamental understanding that trauma related disorders are illnesses to be treated. Though 
these perspectives are essential, there is a risk inherent in viewing human experience solely 
through the scientific/clinical lens. This risk consists in reducing human experience and 
behavior to what can be explained scientifically. As the review just completed makes clear, it 
is certainly the case that psychological and biological systems are in play when someone is 
traumatized, or reliving a traumatic memory. It is also vitally important to try and understand 
what those systems are and how they work in the presence of traumatic stress. However, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See, for example, Lanius, Bluhm, and Frewen, "How Understanding the Neurobiology,” 331-348. 
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reduce human experience to a series of predictable behaviors or a series of automatic 
responses is to ignore the importance of meaning, which as I will argue, is central to both 
the initial trauma and the healing process. It is to ignore the first person yet contextual 
perspective of lived experiences, which is vitally important when it comes to understanding 
any human phenomena, perhaps especially trauma. Phenomenology, specifically that of 
Merleau-Ponty, can be used to restore this valuable first-person perspective to the 
understanding of trauma.  
 
1.31 Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
 In the preface to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty begins with the 
question, “What is phenomenology?” Situating himself among those who founded and yet 
did not define phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty sets this task for himself.  
Phenomenology is the study of essences… the essence of perception, or the essence 
of consciousness, for example. But phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts 
essences back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of 
man and world from any starting point other than that of their facticity.86  
 
Rather than moving away from experience and toward what can be generalized, 
phenomenology aims to give an account of “space, time and the world as we ‘live’ them.”87 The 
phenomenological stance holds that to understand or give an account of human existence 
requires a return to the world as human beings experience it, rather than dealing only with 
the experience of the world that has been analyzed or crafted into data. To this end, one of 
the central tasks that Merleau-Ponty gives to phenomenology is to provide a way of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, vii. 
87 Ibid., my emphasis.  
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describing human experience without reducing it to mere causal explanation or scientific 
data.  
 In this way, phenomenology can be seen, at least in part, as a movement away from 
Cartesian dualism. Cartesian dualism draws a sharp distinction between the mind and body, 
and creates a hierarchy within the split: the mind is of primary importance because it is the 
seat of the subject, whereas the body is a mere object, another thing in the world to observe 
and quantify. If the mind is the primary thing of which an individual can have clear and 
distinct knowledge (as Descartes argues in his Meditations), then the reflective mind becomes 
the framework for the entire human experience. 
 According to Merleau-Ponty, the seed that Descartes planted blossomed into a set of 
philosophical beliefs that are grounded in two deeply problematic ideas. The first is that the 
mind is really distinct from the body and the body is of secondary importance. Merleau-
Ponty argues that we don’t simply have bodies, but that we are embodied.88 To draw a divide 
between mind and body is to subsequently hold that the mind is the place of the subjective 
world and that the body is a part of the objective world. The second is that we arrive at truth 
only through scientific or intellectual analysis of experience rather than experience itself.  
 
1.32 Critiques of Dualism and Merleau-Ponty’s Embodiment Theory 
 Merleau-Ponty uses the simple example of a mosquito bite to show how problematic 
it is to hold that bodily experience is secondary or irrelevant. When an individual gets stung 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See also Hubert Dreyfus, “The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Embodiment,” The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (Spring 1996). In this article, Dreyfus traces 
embodiment through The Phenomenology of Perception. This article is especially relevant to this work 
because Dreyfus goes on to discuss the neural basis of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodiment. 
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by a mosquito, he reminds us, the body of that individual does not need to be addressed as if 
it were an objective piece of the world distinct from the mind. One doesn’t need to go 
looking for the bite as if they were looking for a dent in a car. 
[The individual] finds it straight away, because for him there is no question of 
locating it in relation to the axes of co-ordinates in objective space, but of reaching 
with the phenomenal hand a certain painful spot on his phenomenal body, and because the hand 
as a scratching potentiality and the place stung as a spot to be scratched a directly 
experienced relationship is presented in the natural system of one’s own body. The 
operation takes place in the domain of the phenomenal; it does not run through the 
objective world…quite simply he is his body and his body is the potentiality of a certain world.89  
 
The mind and the body, on this account, must be connected in one system. Consciousness 
cannot be split from the body, but both depend on and extend throughout the body and, 
through the body, to its environs, with which it is in constant interplay.  We engage with the 
external world through our experience as embodied beings whose world is presented and 
shaped not simply for and by the mind, but also the “natural system of one’s own body.”90 
According to Merleau-Ponty, it is untenable to separate the mind from the body because 
“the body is our general medium for having a world.”91  
Embodiment also means something over and above the fact that the world is 
experienced from the perspective of a body. It also means that the world and its possibilities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 105-106. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 146-147. There is an interesting question of whether or 
not Merleau-Ponty has taken Descartes a bit too literally regarding his mind/body dualism. 
Descartes’ correspondence with Elisabeth of Bohemia, and subsequently his work The Passions of the 
Soul, seem to suggest that perhaps Descartes was not as committed to the mind/body dualism found 
in the Meditations. See Elisabeth of Bohemia, “Correspondence to Rene Descartes,” in Women 
Philosophers of the Early Modern Period, ed. Margaret Atherton (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 
1994), 11-21; and Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 32-47 & 100-125. Though it may be true that Descartes’ thought 
progressed substantially after the publication of the Meditations, it should be noted that Merleau-Ponty 
is not simply taking issue with Descartes as an individual thinker, but with the intellectualist and 
empiricist traditions that sprung out of his work. 
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are shaped in part by the body. Hubert Dreyfus helpfully distinguishes between two different 
understandings of embodiment within the Phenomenology of Perception.92 The first is quite 
simply the fact that human beings engage with the world as a particular body that has a 
particular shape and particular capacities.93 The way that one experiences the world is going 
to be different based on the particular body that they experience the world through.  
The second has to do with the way the world is transformed to us as we obtain 
certain habits and/or skills. This second understanding of embodiment has to do with the 
way that certain acts can become automatic, or bodied, as we become more skilled at them. 
Driving is one example that Dreyfus cites as something that we are taught how to do and 
gradually become proficient and then skilled at, so that eventually we are able to drive 
without having to explicitly think about. (In fact, in some cases, explicitly thinking about 
what we are doing can actually make it more difficult to do.) When we have become expert 
at a particular skill we are able to skillfully cope with the variations that we encounter. The 
more experienced a driver is, for example, the more likely it is that she can successfully avoid 
a traffic accident, no matter what the other drivers on the road are doing. A novice driver, 
on the other hand, will have a much more difficult time avoiding an accident given certain 
circumstances (or at the very least will be much more overwhelmed by the situation). As 
Dreyfus points out, “such skillful coping does not require a mental representation of its goal. 
It can be purposive without the agent entertaining a purpose.” In other words, much of our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Dreyfus, “Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty.” 
93 Dreyfus points out here that within this conception of embodiment there is a critique of Sartre’s 
conception of freedom. As he says, “Merleau-Ponty points out in his critique of Sartre’s extreme 
view of freedom that mountains are tall for us, and that where they are passable and where not is not 
up to us but is a function of our embodied capacities” (Dreyfus, “Current Relevance of Merleau-
Ponty”). Merleau-Ponty’s view then is that the way in which we are embodied is not simply a matter 
of opening up to the world, but also of being limited.  
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behavior does not originate in the mind as an intentional act that is then completed by the 
body, but rather is embodied.94 What we see in Dreyfus’s example of skilled coping is that 
the mind and body coexist in dynamic interaction between each other and the external 
world.   
 To give an example from the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty considers a 
case in which a young woman who has been forbidden from seeing the man that she loves 
loses her ability to speak. He argues that her inability to speak is not conscious. She is not 
consciously performing and acting out as one might think, rather her consciousness is 
extending through her bodily interaction with the world. She cannot speak because the way 
that she would like to interact with the world has been interrupted. As he explains,  
…the body does not constantly express the modalities of existence in the way that 
stripes indicate rank, or a house-number a house: the sign here does not only convey 
its significance, it is filled with it; it is, in a way, what it signifies…95 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 It is Dreyfus’ contention that this second understanding of embodiment is underdeveloped in the 
Phenomenology of Perception and that we need a more robust understanding of this unintentional 
behavior. In the article cited here, he gives several examples that both honor and expand upon 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of action. This project has seen more progress in the exchange between 
Dreyfus and Komarine Romdenh-Romluc. Romdenh-Romluc agrees with Dreyfus, but feels that he 
does not adequately take account “the power to reckon with the possible… the capacity to access 
motor-skills over and above those that are made available by one’s actual environment and current 
task” (Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, “Merleau-Ponty and the Power to Reckon with the Possible.” 
In Reading Merleau-Ponty, ed. Thomas Baldwin [New York: Routledge, 2007], 57). She expands on his 
account by showing the ways in which Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment and philosophy of action can 
account for non-intentional and non-purposive acts, such as mindlessly making a cup of tea while 
thinking about what to eat for dinner. This is possible because of the individuals’ ability to both (and 
simultaneously) complete actions with expertise without thinking (make a cup of tea), and to reckon 
with a possible future that does not yet exist (in this case a future in which lunch will be made and 
eaten). Her contention is that what Dreyfus does not take into account is that if we needed to be 
absorbed in what we were doing, it would be impossible to do two things at once. Though giving a 
full account of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of action is beyond the scope of this work, it is especially 
relevant here because as we will see, one of the things that plagues veterans with PTSD is precisely 
that they have become so expert at watching for danger that they cannot stop. For Dreyfus’ reply, see 
also Huberty Dreyfus, “Reply to Romdenh-Romluc,” in Reading Merleau-Ponty, ed. Thomas Baldwin 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 59-69. 
95 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 186.  
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The body is not a puppet responding to orders from the brain, the real meaning of our 
actions are not revealed when we understand what is going on neurologically. Rather, 
consciousness and body coexist in the human being and inform one another. The body does 
not stand for, or represent what is happening in consciousness; it is a vital part of 
consciousness. This is why individual meaning then becomes essential in understanding 
trauma and developing adaptive methods for treating it. 
 Take for example the treatment implemented by Lewis Yealland detailed in 1.1 
above. Yealland, and many others, believed that the brutal treatment of soldiers was 
successfully shocking traumatized soldiers back into themselves. This is based on the idea 
that these symptoms represented a false self, a diminished self, a weak self – a self that 
needed to be replaced by the real self, the heroic self, the true self. In detailing a particularly 
productive morning, Yealland claims that he treated six mute patients in the space of a half 
an hour. The first patient responded to loud coughing in his ear, the next to the forcing of a 
tongue depressor to the back of his throat, the next three to strong electric shocks to their 
throats; and, “the sixth, on hearing the others fell from a chair, striking his head on the floor, 
and began to talk.”96 Yealland thought that he had returned the soldiers to their real state of 
being (the heroic, moral, true state) when they began to speak in response to his treatment. 
He believed that brutality was not only justifiable, but a necessary means of reaching the 
puppet master behind the pathological symptoms. What is perhaps more likely is that the 
brutal treatment created new and vivid meaning for the soldier: speak now or continue to 
submit yourself to bodily harm. The sixth soldier fell out of his chair, perhaps in horror at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Yealland, Hysterical Disorders of Warfare, 3-4. 
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the way his fellow patients were being treated and in fear for his own life, and began to 
speak, perhaps not because he had been cured, but because he had been terrified. This 
highlights precisely what Merleau-Ponty was worried about. Namely, when we reduce human 
phenomena to the necessarily generic perspective of a scientific explanation, we risk a 
detrimental oversimplification that can come to bear on treatment. Therefore, to separate 
the mind from the body as if they are two distinct entities is to risk missing something 
important about what it means to exist in the world as a bodied being.    
 
1.33 Critiques of Scientism and Reflection 
 The second problematic idea that arose from Cartesian dualism is the idea that the 
truth of lived phenomena is accessible only through detailed examination and intellectual or 
scientific reflection. Put in another way, this is the idea that the truth of the human condition 
lies in reflection upon existence, rather than in the experience of existence itself. Merleau-Ponty 
argues that reflection upon experience does not give way to the objective truth of that 
experience. Rather, reflection and analysis of experience give way to scientific data, which is 
important, but typically does not give an exhaustive account of any phenomena as it is lived. 
The view that the truth of human experience is gained from reflection and analysis is 
problematic because it treats the world as fodder for scientific experiment and nothing 
further. It takes “the scientist’s knowledge as if it were absolute, as if everything that is and 
has been was meant only to enter the laboratory.”97 It is presumptuous – and, I submit, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” trans. Carleton Dallery, in The Primacy of Perception: and 
Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics, ed. James M. Edie, 
authored by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 160. 
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the understanding and treatment of trauma, dangerous – to assume that the scientific 
viewpoint on any human phenomena is the only legitimate one. To assume this is to banish 
lived experience in favor of scientific explanations of experience. 
 The Müller-Lyer optical illusion provides a simple example of Merleau-Ponty’s point 
(see Figure 1).98 In this illusion, two lines appear to be two different lengths, because the fins 
on one arrow point inward, while the fins on the other arrow point outward.  
 
Figure 1 
The first time a subject encounters this vision, she reports that the arrow with outward 
facing fins is longer than the other arrow. This is perception (A). Upon reflection, the 
subject can examine the arrows more closely, perhaps measure them, and will then realize 
that despite appearances; the arrows are actually the same length. This experience is 
perception (B). According to Merleau-Ponty, a mistake is made when one assumes that 
perception (B) is a corrected version of perception (A), rather than understanding them to be 
two distinct experiences. The kind of analytical reflection that is necessary in perception (B) 
does not make perception (A) incorrect; it provides us with an entirely distinct, entirely new 
perceptual experience. “Reflection,” then, does not make fuzzy perceptions more clear, 
rather it “obscures what we thought was clear.”99 At the time of perception (A), the subject 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 6-12. 
99 Ibid., 10. 
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was unaware that the perception was an illusion. Finding this out upon investigation does 
not correct perception (A), but provides a new perception altogether. Further, assessing the 
accuracy of perception (A) and perception (B) does not touch the experience of perceiving 
these two lines. As Merleau-Ponty remarks, “The two straight lines… are neither of equal or 
unequal length; it is only in the objective world that this question arises.”100 In other words, 
this analysis does not give an account of the experience of perceiving. Rather, it takes 
perception out of the lived world and attempts to place it into the objective world.  
 This, then, is where Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology begins; in the stance that there 
is something irreducible about human experience, what Thomas Nagel influentially dubbed 
the “what it is like” phenomenon, that appears to elude standard causal explanation in 
science, when that phenomenon is reduced, qua explanandum, to a calculable object. In the 
Phenomenology of Perception, perception acts as a kind of proof of the existence of a non-
objective reality as Merleau-Ponty points out numerous occasions in which perception defies 
reduction. In one such example, Merleau-Ponty invites the reader to imagine walking along a 
shore and coming upon a ship that has run aground. The ship and its masts and funnel are 
fixed in the objective world; they are there. One’s individual perception of that ship, 
however, is much less fixed and objective. There is a point at which one is at such a distance 
that the perception of these pieces of the ship are not yet integrated. It might be clear that 
there is a ship run aground, but the masts might not yet be visible as they are buried within 
the perception of the forest behind them. As one approaches them, eventually “there will be 
a moment when these details somehow become part of the ship, and indissolubly fused with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 6. 
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it.”101 An intellectualist variety of reductionism is inclined to explain this experience by 
appealing to the intellect’s powers of actively analyzing and synthesizing (judging); an 
empiricist variety of reductionism appeals to sheer processes of association that happen to 
congeal into a unified entity. What Merleau-Ponty wants to assert is that this work is done by 
perception itself; it is neither the product of neither an intellectual synthesis nor an imaginative 
association of impressions. The perception of the ship is the perception of one unified, 
meaningful object that originally presents itself as such; it emerges neither from an analysis 
of a disconnected or confusing perception nor from some imaginative association of 
impressions. Instead, as he says, the mast and the funnel simply become a part of the ship at a 
certain point. The ship, though it may remain aground, somehow seems to emerge from the 
shore and the forest behind it as one meaningful object for perception. 
 This reframing done by Merleau-Ponty not only allows us to reconsider specific 
instances of perceptions, but also enables us to come to a new understanding of perception 
in general. As Merleau-Ponty explains, perception “lay[s] the foundations of, or inaugurate[s] 
knowledge.”102 It is the job of phenomenology, then, to begin from a different viewpoint, 
from the memory that the human being is a living, embodied, and worldly center of 
experience, and, as such, not the object of scientific inquiry. Herein lies, for Merleau-Ponty, 
the importance of including the phenomenological method in scientific endeavors.  As he 
says in “Eye and Mind,”  
Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from above, and thinks of the object-
in-general, must return to the there is which precedes it; to the site, the soil of the 
sensible and humanly modified world such as it is in our lives and for our bodies — 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid., 17 
102 Ibid. For an excellent discussion of what he calls Merleau-Ponty’s “living perception,” see 
Lawrence Hass’ Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 53-70. 
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not that possible body which we may legitimately think of as an information machine 
but this actual body I call mine, this sentinel standing quietly at the command of my 
words and acts.103  
 
Rather than take a reductive account of any human phenomena, phenomenology urges 
science to remember where human phenomena originate and to return there.  
One might ask why it is helpful to look at the science behind a human phenomenon 
like trauma if the phenomenological perspective is going to point out the limitations of 
scientific objectification and return us to the essence of the phenomena. Though Merleau-
Ponty is certainly criticizing a particular type of scientism, by no means does he intend to 
jettison science entirely in favor of phenomenology. Much of Merleau-Ponty’s work, in the 
Phenomenology of Perception and the Structure of Behavior especially, references and makes good 
use of science, and in particular psychology and neuroscience. Johann Schneider, a combat 
veteran studied by the psychologists Kurt Goldstein and Adhemar Gelb, serves as Merleau-
Ponty’s primary case study in the Phenomenology of Perception. Though he is often critical of the 
way that psychology and neuroscience try to reduce Schneider’s symptoms (as discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter), he also treats the science and the phenomenological 
perspective as inherently complementary.  
 Numerous observations by Merleau-Ponty bear out this claim. To begin with the 
quote above, note that Merleau-Ponty does not suggest that scientific thinking be replaced by 
phenomenology, but rather that phenomenology can remind science of the importance of 
the lived experience of the subject. The Phenomenology of Perception contains a similar 
sentiment.  
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I cannot conceive of myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of 
biological, psychological or sociological investigation. I cannot shut myself up within 
the realm of science. All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, 
is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some experience of the 
world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless.104  
 
In other words, though scientific exploration is certainly important, what Merleau-Ponty is 
particularly concerned about is the regard for science as the ultimate and sole source of 
knowledge about human behavior. This regard concerns him because any knowledge of the 
world is, as he sees it, ultimately grounded in, as he puts it, “some experience of the world.” 
It is not scientific investigation as such, but the reduction of human life to causal 
explanations that arise from these investigations that is problematic. Attempting to 
understand a human being as merely a biological or psychological object for scientific inquiry 
disregards something foundational about human existence. Phenomenology, then, is a body 
of thought aimed at shifting focus back onto the lived being as a whole. “Scientific thinking, 
a thinking which looks on from above, and thinks of the object-in-general, must return to the 
‘there is’ which underlies it.”105  
 Although the phenomenological method is distinct from those of psychology and 
neuroscience, this distinction does not entail that they are incompatible. Take, for example, 
Pavlov’s dogs. Though we can explain the dogs’ behavior by explaining the brain response, 
what is happening for the dog is not simply brain activity. Even the Pavlovian response 
cannot be reduced to automatic responses in the brain. Pavlov created new meaning from 
neutral stimuli for those dogs; to them, the noise meant that food was on its way. What is so 
compelling to the dog is not the brain activity, but the meaning that has been created around 	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the sound and the future promise of food.106 The phenomenological viewpoint here does 
not contradict the scientific one; it simply adds a new level of understanding.  
Further, the claims in the Phenomenology of Perception are not all negative. Beyond the 
goal of criticizing reductionist claims, Merleau-Ponty also intends to give a positive account 
of perception as the fundamental basis of experience. As he explains,  
Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up 
of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed 
by them. 
 
A central claim of the Phenomenology of Perception then is the idea that perception is not just one 
facet of human experience. Rather, it is the condition for the possibility of experience. Doing 
justice to the specific perceptual experience of any human phenomenon becomes essential if 
one hopes to reach a thorough understanding of that phenomenon.  
 The importance of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological perspective lies in its capacity 
to provide important insights into any human experience that is also examined from a 
scientific point of view. Such a perspective zeroes in, for example, on what it is like for 
someone to suffer from cancer. Awareness of how cancer changes one’s lived experience 
can impact treatment in several different ways. While the surgeon removing the tumor does 
not need to know how having that tumor has changed the way that the individual feels in the 
world in order to operate successfully, the first-person experience of having brain cancer is 
still valuable for care. Further, we can hardly claim to fully understand the phenomenon 	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world. Merleau-Ponty uses an example of the way that an insect is affected by an injury. See Merleau-
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without considering what it is like. In the case of trauma, where what has been compromised 
is not just one’s body or brain, but as Kardiner said, “his conception of the outer world and 
his conception of his self,” it is vital to consider the meaning for the individual that underlies 
traumatic experience. In order to successfully understand trauma and PTSD, it is essential to 
know what it is like for the individual who suffers from it. The phenomenological 
perspective allows for focus on (a) how symptoms are appearing and interrupting the 
victims’ daily interactions with the world; (b) how overwhelming it felt and why (rather than 
a simple account of what the trauma entailed); and (c) what it means to have been 
traumatized and what it means to relive the trauma.  
 The difference made by the phenomenological approach to trauma becomes evident 
in the attempt to define it. Thus, Merleau-Ponty defines trauma in terms of how it is 
experienced in time by the individual. “Time in its passage does not… close up on traumatic 
experience; the subject remains open to the same impossible future, if not in his explicit 
thoughts, at any rate in his actual being.”107 The emphasis here is not on what happened, but 
what it was like to experience the event from the perspective of that particular individual. It 
seems reasonable to assume that Merleau-Ponty might define a traumatic event as one which 
is so upsetting in that it does not fade into the past but remains somehow always in the 
present, rather than an event that meets certain objective criteria for terror. No matter how 
much time passes, the event remains meaningfully present for the individual. This is not 
incompatible with the psychological definition of symptoms, but it is very careful not to 
reduce the experience to the impersonal level of scientific explanation.  
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1.34 Stolorow’s phenomenological contribution to trauma studies 
 Phenomenology, with a focus on lived-experience and the interaction between mind 
and body can help us understand trauma, and also re-define it. The risk inherent in in 
reducing human behavior to the purview of scientific explanation extends to the way that 
trauma is defined. If the definition arises out a method that is purely scientific and excludes 
phenomenology, the risk is that the definition will be useful for the scientist, and not the 
patient. This can be understood by briefly looking at the way that Robert Stolorow, a 
contemporary phenomenologist and psychoanalyst, defines trauma.  
 For Stolorow, trauma is marked by two key factors. The first is the experience of 
unbearable emotions, and the second is the lack of a relational home to help integrate these 
intense emotions. As he says, trauma is “an experience of unbearable affect… constituted in 
an intersubjective context in which severe emotional pain cannot find a relational home in 
which it can be held.”108 In other words, trauma cannot be defined by a particular type of 
event that is universally recognized as traumatic, but rather the effect that the event has on 
the individual and whether or not the emotions are recognized and understood by another 
person. An event is traumatic when it produces an unbearable affect that the individual 
cannot tolerate on his own and does not get noticed or empathized with by anyone else.  
 This is because when the emotions surrounding a particular event cannot be 
tolerated, they also cannot be integrated into the past, and so the event and the intense 
emotions that surround it remain in the present. Or as Merleau-Ponty put it, “time in its 	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passage… does not close up on traumatic experiences.”109 What is essential to integrating 
traumatic events into the past and therefore successfully adapting to them is a relational 
home, an intersubjective space where another person can help the individual bear those 
emotions and successfully put the event into the past. When a relational home is not 
available, the individual is forced to carry the weight of the trauma alone, which is what 
Stolorow believes is part of the cause of chronic somatic symptoms. What cannot be 
contextualized and understood remains in the present, not simply in the mind but also by 
way of bodily symptoms.  
 Stolorow’s phenomenologically informed definition accomplishes three important 
things that the psychological definition in the DSM does not. First, since it is focused on the 
firsthand experience of the victim rather than the event itself, it is more accessible. As it 
stands currently, should an individual present all of the necessary symptoms of PTSD but 
not have had “exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violation,” 
they do not have PTSD according to the DSM. This excludes those who present with 
symptoms corresponding to the diagnostic clusters of PTSD from being diagnosed 
correctly. Since health insurance is tied to the DSM definitions of mental disorders, it also 
prevents them from receiving the kind of help that they need.  
 Examples of the failure of the DSM to properly account for individuals suffering 
from trauma are numerous. To give one illustration, a recent study showed that roughly 75% 
of individuals who are subjected to consistent bullying in the workplace (defined as 
“exposure to persistent or recurrent oppressive, offensive, abusive, intimidating, malicious, 
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or insulting behavior by a superior or a colleague”) often end up with symptoms of PTSD.110 
The study discusses the fact that these individuals, despite having the symptoms of PTSD, 
are not typically diagnosed with the disorder since they have not been exposed to the kind of 
trigger specified in the DSM. It also discusses the importance of being diagnosed correctly 
with PTSD rather than misdiagnosed with “paranoia, manic depression or character 
disturbance which may give rise to further stigmatization.”111 When the cause of the 
symptoms is thought to be internal and self-caused, rather than external, the individual being 
diagnosed is in some way blamed for the problem. Stolorow’s definition allows the 
individual to be the barometer of the threat of the event. Rather than detailing what types of 
events can be traumatic, Stolorow’s definition focuses on the experience of the individual. 
His phenomenologically based definition of trauma as unbearable affect could very well 
preclude situations like the one above, where individuals are misdiagnosed to their harm.  
 The second thing that Stolorow’s definition of trauma accomplishes is that it 
provides one explanation for why several people can experience the same event but not all 
end up suffering from PTSD long term. This phenomenon has been a consistent problem 
surrounding combat trauma since World War I. The fact that not all soldiers came back with 
PTSD is part of the reason why it became possible to blame the soldiers themselves for their 
own suffering, and it remains one reason soldiers have shame about their diagnoses.112 The 
definition put forth by Stolorow focuses on the firsthand experience of the victim rather 
than the event, and therefore is less exclusionary and arguably more accurate than the DSM 	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definition. It is not the event itself that leads to PTSD, it is the way that the event is 
responded to, how it impacts the victim, how threatened and overwhelmed he feels, what it 
was like to experience it.  
 One may argue that the DSM definition of a traumatic event is exclusive and specific 
for good reason. Opening the definition of a traumatic event to the individual’s subjective 
experience could lead to an over-diagnosis problem, and also to the minimization of the 
experience of those who have been subjected to the threat of bodily harm or death. If 
anyone can decide what is traumatic, people could claim that they have PTSD from anything 
that felt overwhelming. The idea that there would be no diagnostic difference between 
someone who has been at war and someone who has been through an unpleasant divorce is 
certainly problematic.  
 These are important claims to be taken into consideration, but the use of Stolorow’s 
definition of a traumatic event as unbearable affect does not necessarily exclude the DSM. 
Instead, it could be used in conjunction with the clusters of symptoms specified by the 
DSM, so one would not be able to be diagnosed with PTSD simply because they felt 
overwhelming emotion, but would have to also be suffering from at least one symptom 
from each symptom cluster for a significant amount of time. In other words, rather than 
replace the psychological definition with the phenomenological one, they could be blended 
to make diagnosis and treatment more effective and accurate. What Stolorow’s definition 
would add to the DSM definition of trauma then, is an emphasis on individual meaning. The 
main locus of examination is the traumatic event, and the personal experience of reliving 
that event. Rather than focus on whether or not an event counts as traumatic, the 
  
60 
phenomenological approach focuses on what it is like to feel those symptoms and how they 
change the victim’s life.  
 The third thing that Stolorow’s definition accomplishes is that it provides one basis 
on which healing can begin. By focusing on the lack of empathetic response in the 
experience of trauma, Stolorow’s definition suggests that providing a relational home for 
unbearable affect can be an inroad towards healing. The idea is that the traumatic event, 
marked by unbearable emotion, is intensely isolating. What can be enormously helpful 
towards contextualizing and giving language to these difficult experiences is empathy. The 
recognition of the overwhelming emotions by another person demystifies them, makes them 
feel less isolating and unbearable, and allows for them to be put into language and 
subsequently put into the past.113 A case study grounded in this phenomenological method 
will illustrate how.  
 Russell Carr, the Chair of Psychiatry at Walter Reed National Military Medical 
Center, uses Stolorow’s understanding of trauma to develop short-term treatment plans for 
combat veterans. In a case simply titled “Mr. A in Iraq,” Carr describes treatment of a 
soldier who had been the perpetrator of extreme violence while deployed and was suffering 
from PTSD. Most notably, Mr. A suffered from persistent, vivid nightmares that were 
preventing him from adequate sleep.114  
 The nightmares and symptoms surrounded a specific event experienced on 
deployment. Mr. A and his unit were on a mission to take back a village from insurgents. 	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The village had been warned in advance and evacuated, so the unit was instructed to kill 
anyone that they encountered, as anyone who remained was assumed to present a significant 
threat. Mr. A was in charge of the machine gun on the top of one vehicle in their caravan. 
As they drove into town, they came across a car driving towards them. Following orders, 
Mr. A shot at the car. As they got closer, it became clear that the passengers were civilians. 
One of the three passengers was not immediately killed, and rolled out of the car and began 
to burn in the street. Mr. A then completed the kill by continuing to shoot the man. As the 
body burned, Mr. A began to smell burning flesh and started to feel hungry.  
 Carr discusses the way that the phenomenological viewpoint aided him in treating 
victims like Mr. A. Frustrated with the ineffective treatments for soldiers who were facing 
combat trauma, Carr came across Stolorow’s book, Trauma and Human Existence. Reading the 
book helped him reframe his sessions with his patients, and focus on “the patient’s 
subjective experience of the recent trauma itself….” For treatment, Carr began to use 
“empathetic introspection and the contextualization of affect.”115 What is distinctly 
phenomenological about this approach is that it is based on the idea that understanding and 
empathizing with the lived experience is central to healing.  
 By witnessing the lived experience of the individual as they recount the traumatic 
event and the way it made them feel, the therapist is living it alongside of them and 
providing a space in which the trauma can be relived in a more productive way. Carr 
explains that this may “lead the therapist into crying with the patient or offering a hand to 
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hold as they bear the pain together.”116 In this experience, the unbearable emotion finds a 
relational home in the empathetic reaction of the therapist. The traumatic event, when borne 
by another individual, can stop being isolating and purely bodied. It can then gradually be 
named, understood, and placed in the past so that the symptoms slowly diminish.  When 
successful, this helps integrate the emotional experience of trauma into the horizon of the 
individual so that they can continue interacting with the world similar to the way they did 
before the trauma. This does not mean that the trauma goes away, just that the traumatic 
experience gets re-ordered so that it stops monopolizing the present. To put it in Merleau-
Ponty’s terminology, a relational home provides an opportunity for the individual to force 
time to close on the event. As therapy ended for Mr. A, he noted that he was better able to 
focus on basic, everyday things rather than continue to smell burning flesh or feel 
responsible for the deaths of innocent people. The phenomenological perspective, in an 
important way, helped him adapt to his traumatic past.  
 These ideas are markedly different from the approaches used in psychology and 
neuroscience.117 Empathy demands first that one relate to and understand the first-person 
account of the victim personally; rather than categorizing or diagnosing symptoms and 
feelings, this approach requires ‘feeling with’. Contextualization of affect understands the 
emotional response as one part of a complicated horizon of meaning that can be vastly 
different for each person based on what the individual finds meaningful, rather than 
generalizing and reducing the response to a neural level. The phenomenological perspective, 	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corroborates this phenomenological method.  
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rather than being in contradiction to those of psychology and neuroscience, adds another 
layer of understanding and provides another goal to treatment. By focusing on the fact that 
the pain that is resulting from a past trauma is not just a symptom, but that the experience of 
the emotion is real and happening right now, the trauma is addressed in the past and the 
present. The patient is not just suffering from traumatic flashbacks, the patient is living the 
past trauma in the present, only this time they are not alone.  
 Phenomenology then, which focuses on the human experience as it unfolds in 
consciousness, offers a unique vantage point on trauma. By emphasizing the experience of 
trauma and PTSD from the perspective of the traumatized person, phenomenology allows 
us to gain a deeper understanding of what traumatic experience is like, and how adaptation 
to it may be possible through empathetic connection. It is not that the phenomenological 
approach is the only one that can help adaptation to trauma, in fact what I argue is that the 
best understanding of trauma makes use of all three of these perspectives, and that the 
phenomenological view is necessary for understanding and adapting to trauma.  
 When Mr. A has nightmares every night about killing an innocent family in battle, we 
can use neuroscience to understand that he is reliving this experience and that part of what is 
happening is that the fear center is being tripped by the memory and eliciting responses in 
the body. We can use psychology to analyze these symptoms and diagnose him with PTSD 
and suggest a method of treatment and some medicine that might alleviate some of the 
symptoms. We cannot, however, understand the depth of his experience without paying very 
close attention to his first-person experience of the event and the traumatic symptoms that 
follow. The most thorough understanding of trauma and adaptation requires all three 
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perspectives. Perhaps the phenomenological perspective will prevent the study of trauma 
from continuing to be episodic by yielding a definition and understanding of trauma and 
PTSD that takes the patient suffering from it into account.  
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Chapter Two: They Carry it With Them: The Psychology, Neurobiology & 
Phenomenology of Traumatic Memory  
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the phenomenon of trauma by examining 
one of its most prevalent features, traumatic memory. The experience of remembering a 
traumatic event is psychologically, phenomenologically and neurologically distinct from that 
of remembering non-traumatic events. This chapter will explore the sui generis nature of 
traumatic memory from the perspectives of psychology, phenomenology and neuroscience. 
The perspectives of psychology and neuroscience, when combined with that of 
phenomenology, yield an understanding of trauma that stretches from the most basic 
synaptic level of brain function to the lived experience itself. The psychology of traumatic 
memory is examined first in order to provide a basic framework for the concept of traumatic 
memory as a central symptom of PTSD. Next, the neuroscience of memory is examined in 
order to understand the mechanism of traumatic memory on the brain level, which gives a 
possible model to explain the mechanism of these symptoms. Finally, examination of 
traumatic memory from the phenomenological perspective helps illustrate how the 
psychological and neuroscientific theories bear out in first-hand, lived experience, and what 
the phenomenological perspective can add to the discussion.   
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2.1 Psychology and Traumatic Memory  
 
 As discussed in chapter one, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, currently in its fifth edition (DSM-V), organizes the symptoms of PTSD into 
clusters. In order to be diagnosed with PTSD, a patient has to have experienced at least one 
symptom from each of the clusters of symptoms for a period of longer than one month. The 
second cluster contains symptoms that pertain to the way that the traumatic event continues 
to be relived in memory.118 According to this cluster, traumatic memories are experienced in 
at least one of the following ways:  
1.) Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic 
event(s).  
2.) Recurrent distressing dreams in which the content and/or affect of the dream are 
related to the traumatic event(s).  
3.) Dissociative reactions (e.g., flashbacks) in which the individual feels or acts as if 
the traumatic event(s) were recurring. (Such reactions may occur on a continuum, 
with the most extreme expression being a complete loss of awareness of present 
surroundings.) 
4.) Intense or prolonged psychological distress at exposure to internal or external 
cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event(s).  
5.) Marked physiological reactions to internal or external cues that symbolize or 
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event(s).119  
 
These criteria describe different ways in which the past intrudes on the present. The first 
criterion refers to intrusive thoughts that may break through consciousness while awake, the 	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119 American Psychiatric Association, DSM V, 265-290. The first three symptoms listed here are 
directly concerned with memories that are represented in consciousness. The last two have to do 
with the experience of having a sense memory triggered by an external stimulus. This distinction will 
be made clear in section 2.2, which discusses the way that memories are coded in the brain, and 
explains the difference between explicit (conscious) and implicit (somatic, bodied) memories.  
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second to the way that the event(s) get reconstituted in dream life. The third criterion calls 
up situations in which the past overlaps and overtakes the present partially or completely. 
The fourth and fifth criteria focus on the ways that the psychological state that was 
characteristic of the original event can be recreated in the presence of things that remind one 
of the original trauma(s).  
 It is important to note that in each of these cases, the memory carries the original 
trauma with it in some way. As Bessel van der Kolk explains, “traumatic memories [are] 
retrieved (at least initially) in the form of mental imprints of sensory and affective elements 
of the traumatic experience.”120 The idea of a memory carrying elements of the original 
experience may not seem sufficient to establish a difference between traumatic and non-
traumatic memories, but there are three substantial dissimilarities to take note of. First, it is 
clear in this definition that traumatic memories are retrieved as sensory and affective 
elements, not alongside sensory and affective elements. The implication here (discussed in 
further detail in section 2.2 below) is that the traumatic memory is primarily (and sometimes 
only) sensory and affective and not available as the subject of conscious thought. Second, the 
sensory and affective elements in traumatic memory cause anguish. To give a 
counterexample one may have had a positive experience of listening to the album Kind of Blue 
while the windows were open, letting in the smell of rain. The olfactory memory of the smell 
of the rain might be elicited when “So What” comes on in a café years later. However, this 
memory is neither distressing nor is it retrieved only as sensory and affective fragments. It is 
likely (or at the very least possible) that one would be able to cognitively remember the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 van Der Kolk, McFarlane, and Weisæth, Traumatic Stress, 280. 
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original experience of first listening to the album and therefore understanding why the smell 
of rain seems to accompany the memory that has been triggered by hearing the album again. 
Third, traumatic memories are invasive. While the memory of the smell of the rain might be 
intense, and may appear unbidden, it is not intrusive in the same distressing way that 
traumatic memories are. As we will see below, traumatic memories can exercise intense 
power over normal brain function, effectively taking over the present moment. Traumatic 
memories, then, though they may retain some of the same features as non-traumatic 
memory, are psychologically distinct from non-traumatic memories in at least three ways: 
they are experienced as primarily sensory and affective and therefore not available 
cognitively, they are invariably distressing, and they are intensely intrusive.  
 Cases from the psychological literature can provide examples of how the symptoms 
of traumatic memory typically present themselves. Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay compiled 
accounts from the experience of his patients. One patient, a Vietnam veteran with PTSD 
describes the way that traumatic memory intrudes on his life in the following way:  
I haven’t spent a complete night in bed with my wife for at least ten years. I always 
end up on the sofa. It’s safer for her… After I couldn’t work anymore… I’d do this 
crazy shit at night. I once threw her out of bed so hard it broke her shoulder. I 
thought there was an NVA potato-masher [a grenade] come in on us. Another night 
I thought she was a Gook, and I had my hands around her throat before I woke up.121  
 
The symptoms described here are consistent with criteria one, three and four above. There 
are several notable aspects to this report. The first notable aspect is the longevity and 
intensity of the traumatic memory. Ten years after the event, the patient still has intense 
dissociative reactions that lead him to act and feel as if he is under attack, despite the fact that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, xvii.  
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he rationally knows he is no longer in Vietnam. His dissociation is so total that he cannot tell 
the difference between the past and the present. What this shows is that in some sense, 
traumatic memory is not simply memory in the sense of conscious recollection. Rather, it is a 
memory marked by an intense experience of reliving. As Shay puts it, “Traumatic memory is 
not narrative. Rather, it is experience that reoccurs.”122 Shay of course does not mean that the 
past literally reoccurs. Instead, the memory of a traumatic event causes the individual to 
experience the present moment as if it were the past. For this patient, the lines between the 
past and present are blurred. So vivid is the memory in the traumatized patient that he 
becomes entirely convinced that he and his wife are under grenade fire, or that she is an 
enemy combatant. Even the most intensely positive memories do not have this kind of 
power.  
 To take another example, Abram Kardiner describes the rotating nightmares of one 
of his patients, who had been home from war for more than eight years. One variation is as 
follows.  
I am in the yard while playing the water hose upon the flagstones. Water stops 
running. After a while it begins again. Then the neighbor from whom I borrowed the 
hose comes out and reproaches me, finally swears at me, and then strikes me. Then 
all the neighbors come running out, and they chase me all over. Then I awaken in a 
sweat, feeling as though I had the life pounded out of me. 123   
 
This account is consistent with criterion two above. Here it is notable that the subject 
material of the dream is not directly related to the traumatic experience of combat. Rather, 
here it is the affect of combat, feeling under attack, exhausted, beaten down, that is 
represented (and/or re-presented) in the dream. What is being re-lived here is the emotion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Ibid., 172. 
123 Kardiner, Traumatic Neuroses of War, 91. 
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that accompanied the original trauma rather than its content. While anyone could have a 
distressing dream like this one, this situation has become chronic. The patient has a 
distressing dream of some kind nearly every night, and has for the past eight years.  
 Traumatic memories are marked by relentless, persistent, invasive and evocative 
instances of reliving that take hold of the present. This sets them far aside from the most 
vivid of non-traumatic memories. It seems possible, for example, to have quite intrusive and 
vivid positive memories that are experienced as some kind of reliving. The smell of freshly 
baked bread might bring one back to one’s childhood. This memory might enact itself within 
the subject quite disruptively. One might imagine walking into a café with a business partner 
for a lunch meeting and becoming thoroughly distracted by the sudden memory triggered by 
the smell of the bread, so much so that it becomes difficult to carry on the conversation 
without effort. However, the subject of this kind of memory will not mistake her business 
partner for her mother, the cafe will not become her childhood home. The past, though it may 
briefly enter into the present, does not take over the present. Though vivid, the memory is 
not relentless, violent, or upsetting. It can be referred to consciously, and it can be dismissed 
(though it may take some effort). In traumatic memory, the past is not recollected 
consciously, it is instead relived in these sense that the memory carries the past somehow 
with it.  
 The symptomatology provided by psychology provides an initial framework for 
understanding traumatic memory. The neuroscientific examination of memory presented in 
the next section adds more detail to this framework by explaining why traumatic memories 
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are neurologically imprinted differently than non-traumatic memories and why the former 
can so forcefully take hold of the present.  
 
2.2 The Neurobiology of Traumatic Memory 
 
 Memory shapes human behavior. It is what enables us to get home each day after 
work, to avoid things that we learn to be dangerous, and it is central in helping us create and 
maintain connections with one another. As noted in the previous section, traumatic 
memories can become chronic symptoms, intrusive instances of reliving instead of 
opportunities of remembrance. It is not clear, however, why traumatic events tend to create 
memories that intrude on the present endlessly. Understanding some of the neuroscience 
behind the differences between traumatic and non-traumatic memories can help explain the 
etiology of these psychological symptoms.  
 It is thought that there are two systems that regulate the formation of memories in 
the brain.124 The hippocampal system is responsible for encoding and possibly storing what 
have been termed declarative or explicit memories. These are memories that the subject can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 See, for example: Joseph LeDoux, “Emotional Memory Systems in the Brain,” Behavioral Brain 
Research 58 (1993): 69-79; Bessel A. van der Kolk, “Trauma and Memory,” Psychiatry and Clinical 
Neurosciences 52 (1998): 52-64; Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in 
the Healing of Trauma (New York: Viking, 2014), esp. pp. 51-105 & 171-202. Stephen Porges’ work on 
the polyvagal theory is also helpful here: see Porges, “Orienting in a Defensive World: Mammalian 
Modifications of our Evolutionary Heritage. A Polyvagal Theory,” Psychophysiology 32 (1995): 301-318. 
This section will provide a simplified account of current work on memory within neuroscience. The 
views presented here are consistent with the current studies and commonly held theories in the field. 
There are of course debates and nuances within neuroscience regarding memory, and many more 
parts of the brain involved with memory creation and maintenance. These more detailed 
considerations will not be taken up here since the goal in the present context is to understand 
traumatic memory and distinguish between regular memories and traumatic memories, while 
providing an overview of the most prevalent scientific account of traumatic memory. 
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distinctly focus her attention on, recall consciously and refer to in thought or speech. The 
amygdala system, on the other hand, is responsible for non-declarative or implicit memories 
that have strong emotional resonance, which are not (and sometime cannot be) consciously 
recollected. For example, you might have an explicit memory of going to dinner with a 
friend last night. This explicit memory is a distinct episode from the past that you can bring 
into conscious attention. If asked about the meal the next day, you would be able to focus 
your attention on the events of yesterday, recall what you ate for dinner, and details from the 
conversation that you had over the meal.125 Implicit memories, on the other hand, are not 
brought into conscious attention, though they shape much of our behavior. If you drove to 
the aforementioned dinner, it is likely that you did not have to specifically recall each lesson 
from driving school in order to operate your vehicle. When you looked at the menu to find 
something to order, it is likely that you did not have to recite the alphabet and sound out 
each of the words in order to understand the names of dishes. The lessons that you learned 
in order to drive and to read are implicit and do not need to be brought into consciousness 
in order to shape behavior.   
 Research has shown that these two systems can operate independently. In a well-
known case, Édouard Claparède, a French doctor, demonstrated this condition by 
experimenting on a patient with amnesia. Claparède’s patient could not form new conscious 
memories. Each time she met with the doctor, he had to re-introduce himself to her, and she 
had no memory of their previous conversations. One day, Claparède greeted her with a tack 
in his hand that pricked her when they shook hands. The next day, though the patient still 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 This may require some effort sometimes, but the memory is at least potentially available for 
recollection in the case of explicit memory. 
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did not consciously remember Claparède, she refused to shake his hand, and continued to 
refuse to do so despite never being able to remember why.126 Though she could not call into 
consciousness the memory of being pricked with the pin, the memory was implicitly 
operating somewhere in her mind and shaping her behavior. Research like this has led 
neuroscientists to theorize that the amygdala system is responsible for implicit memories that 
have emotional content, while the hippocampal system is responsible for explicit memories 
that do not have felt emotional content.  
 Even if there presumably are two different memory systems that can operate 
independently of one another, this does not mean that implicit and explicit memories are 
mutually exclusive. In a healthy brain, there are many ways in which implicit and explicit 
memories coincide. For example, if when you went to dinner with your friend you had an 
argument that ended your friendship, you likely have both explicit and implicit memories of 
this. When explaining what happened the next day, you can consciously bring the event into 
your mind and describe details about the meal and the conversation. It is also likely that as 
you do that, you feel some of the same emotions that you felt last night. You may feel as 
upset and frustrated in your remembrance of the argument as you did during the argument 
itself. The memories of the event and the memories of the emotions that you felt last night 
can be attributed to the hippocampal system. The past emotions that you currently feel in 
the present (despite the fact that the argument is not currently happening) can be partially 
attributed to the amygdala system. In this case you have both implicit and explicit memories 
of the same event. Joseph LeDoux aptly remarked that the difference is that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 180-182. 
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hippocampal system creates “a memory of an emotion,” while the amygdala system holds 
“an emotional memory.”127 These two types of memory can connect, as we’ve just seen, but 
this does not mean that they are fused together. If you are deeply upset by the loss of 
friendship, you may find yourself feeling nauseated when eating the same sort of meal that 
you had that night – without consciously thinking about the argument or the loss. Here the 
implicit memory is present but the explicit memory is absent. As time goes on, and you tell 
the story several more times, you might become able to tell the story without feeling any of 
the emotions that you previously felt. In this case, the explicit memory is present while the 
implicit memory fades. The ability to connect implicit and explicit memories helps enable us 
to assert some measure of control in our emotional lives. It is what enables us to change our 
perspective or assign new meaning to a past event. The dynamic interaction between the 
hippocampal and amygdala systems and the rest of the brain is what makes this possible on 
the neurological level. Problems occur, however, when the hippocampus is not involved in 
the memory creation, which is thought to be the case in severe cases of trauma. 
 To understand how this can happen, it is necessary to briefly explore how explicit 
and implicit memories are formed in the brain. As mentioned in passing in chapter one, 
there are several regions of the brain that are thought to be responsible for responding to, 
organizing and crystallizing an experience into a memory. The amygdala is thought to be 
responsible for the initial emotional response to the event, processing of basic social signals, 
and superficial assessment of meaning. The medial prefrontal cortex is thought to complete 
many higher cognitive functions, such as the integration of social signals. The brain stem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Ibid., 182. 
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controls the release of hormones to the central nervous system regulating things such as 
heart rate, temperature and respiration based on signals that it receives from the amygdala. 
Finally, the hippocampus sorts the information sent by the amygdala and organizes it in 
relation to previous information. It is accordingly thought to be responsible for giving the 
subject a sense of her position in space and time, and, hence, to be critically involved, as 
noted above, in the subject’s recall and relation to facts and autobiographical detail.128  
 When an event occurs, the amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex ascertain what 
is happening and what the body’s response should be, sending this information along to the 
brain stem, which responds by activating the body accordingly through use of the hormone 
system. The information is then sent to the hippocampus that sorts it in relation to data that 
already exists. The job of the hippocampus in this regard can be likened to a filing system; 
the event occurs and the hippocampus organizes it, labels it, and files it away accordingly. 
When the event gets processed in these regions of the brain, it can become a distinct file that 
the subject can pull out and refer to in relation to the other events or files that the brain has 
already processed. Experiences that follow this particular course become explicit memories 
that the subject is able to bring to her attention and focus on, refer to, and think through. 
The formation of explicit memory requires the intervention of the hippocampus. When the 
hippocampus is not involved, which is sometimes the case in a traumatic event, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Needless to say, this sketch is a simplification of the immensely complex processes that comprises 
learning, memory, and retrieval. These simplified definitions and explanations are intended to give a 
broad understanding of the role that the brain has in processing trauma, not to exhaust the data and 
knowledge about the processes of the brain. For excellent explanations of basic brain function, see 
Siegel, The Developing Mind and LeDoux, The Emotional Brain. 
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memories can still be stored by the mind, but they do not get encoded explicitly, and 
therefore cannot be brought forth as objects of attention.129 
 Bessel van der Kolk defines a traumatic event as “an inescapably stressful event that 
overwhelms people’s existing coping mechanisms.”130 When an event elicits an especially 
strong emotional response in the amygdala (i.e., one in which one feels significant threat), 
the neurobiological process focuses on adapting to that threat in the present. As a result, the 
hippocampal processes are overridden because forming higher-level autobiographical 
memories of the event is less important than survival.131 Though this can become 
problematic, the process by which information bypasses certain sections of the brain is an 
evolutionarily adaptive one. When the subject is experiencing an event that is threatening, 
the amygdala sends information to the brain stem that the body is under attack. The brain 
stem responds by sending a signal to release stress hormones (norepinephrine, cortisol) that 
prepare the body to deal with that situation. Both of these hormones have functions that 
increase the chance of survival for the individual, but decrease the likelihood of the creation 
of an explicit memory.132  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 179-224. As we saw above, implicit memories are not necessarily 
negative. When someone learns to play the piano, or drive, this memory still gets encoded in the 
mind. Over time, these memories get encoded implicitly rather than explicitly. When people refer to 
a musician’s ability to play without thinking as ‘muscle memory,’ or the ability one has to drive to 
work ‘without thinking’ these are examples of implicit memory at work. They shape the function of 
the individual, but are not brought to attention. In fact, since the hippocampus is thought to develop 
at age two, anything learned in the first year of life (which typically includes walking and talking at 
very basic levels) is encoded as implicit memory that is called upon for the rest of one’s life. We 
cannot, however, remember facts or retain any sense of autobiographical memory until the 
hippocampus is developed. 
130 van der Kolk, McFarlane, and Weisæth, Traumatic Stress, 279. 
131 LeDoux, “Emotion Circuits in the Brain,” 155-184. 
132 J. Douglas Bremner, “Does Stress Damage the Brain? Understanding Trauma-Related Disorders 
from a Mind-Body Perspective,” Directions in Psychiatry (2004): 167-176; J.D. Bremner, et al., “Deficits 
in Short-term Memory in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” American Journal of Psychiatry 150, no. 7 
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 Norepinephrine can be likened to a fire alarm; when it ‘goes off’ or is released in the 
body, the senses are sharpened in order to perceive the specifics of the situation better, the 
heart rate and blood pressure are heightened to guarantee faster response time, and the body 
is prepared to respond to the threat quickly and effectively. In order to accomplish these 
enhancements, parts of the brain that are responsible for higher-level discernment, 
recognition and cognition are temporarily diminished or shut down when norepinephrine is 
released into the system.133 Cortisol aids in this process by re-prioritizing the bodily 
functions, redistributing energy in order to ensure effective and efficient response. Bodily 
functions that are not necessary in the moment are suppressed, so that the rest of the body 
can have the fuel that it needs to act. Some of the functions that get shut down are the 
immune system, the reproductive system, digestion, and the sensation of pain or fatigue.134  
 These are essential survival processes, and in the moment of a threat they are 
necessary. However, they are only beneficial in moderation. A small amount of 
norepinephrine is a good thing when it is necessary. If one is being attacked, for example, 
heightened senses and quicker bodily response time can be very important. However, when 	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Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Related to Childhood Abuse,” Psychoneuroendocrinology 28 
(2003): 733-750. 
133 See, for example: J. Douglas Bremner, “Traumatic Stress: Effects on the Brain,” Dialogues in 
Clinical Neuroscience 8 (2006): 445-461; Lisa Shin, et al. “Regional Cerebral Blood Flow During Script-
driven Imagery in Childhood Sexual Abuse-Related PTSD: A PET Investigation,” American Journal of 
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134 See, for example, R.M. Sapolsky, “Why Stress is Bad for Your Brain,” Science, 273, no. 5276 (1996): 
749-750; R.M. Sapolsky, et. al., “Hippocampal Damage Associated With Prolonged Glucocoricoid 
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too much norepinephrine is released, or it is released chronically, the brain can become 
overwhelmed and freeze, or shut down in situations when it is not helpful or necessary.  This 
process contributes to the experience of students who ‘choke’ during an exam, or individuals 
who ‘freeze’ when attempting to give a speech or performance in public.135 Their bodies are 
so flooded with norepinephrine that the parts of their brain that are associated with language 
retrieval and movement are effectively off-line. The same is true of cortisol; in moderation it 
can be lifesaving, but in excess it can be seriously problematic. Chronic suppression of 
essential bodily processes when one is not actually under attack (as is the case in PTSD) can 
be incredibly destructive to the body. Chronically high cortisol can cause digestive disorders, 
sleep disorders, heart disease, immune system failure, and thinning of the bones, among 
other things.136  
 Perhaps the most important result of this increase in hormone levels for the present 
discussion of memory is the effect on the hippocampus. Increased hormone levels in the 
trauma response effectively shut the hippocampus down, as the organizing of data is less 
important than responding to that data in the moment. When the hippocampus is partially 
or completely shut off in order to promote more expedient processing in the brain, an 
autobiographical ‘memory’ that the subject can recognize as a memory does not get fully 
formed. What does become encoded is an implicit memory, or a set of somatic bodily 
responses; i.e., increased heart rate, heightened senses, hyperarousal, and so on.  
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 These bodily responses and emotions that are attached to the implicit memory can 
be triggered when the subject is reminded of the original event. When this occurs, she feels 
the emotions and goes through the bodily responses as if she were experiencing the event all over 
again. Claparède’s patient illustrated this same result (though her brain injury was 
physiologically based and not caused by psychological trauma). For her, the memory of 
being pricked by a tack is implicit because she does not have access to the part of her brain 
that creates new explicit memories. When Claparède offers his hand to shake, the implicit 
memory brings forth an emotion of fear in the patient though she is not consciously aware 
of where the fear comes from. The same thing is happening in Shay’s patient who mistakes a 
noise for grenade fire and his wife for an enemy combatant; because of the way that the 
memory was encoded in his brain, he cannot distinguish between the past experience of war 
and the present reality of being home and in bed. Though he may be rationally aware that he 
is not in Vietnam, past events come crashing in and take over in the form of implicit, 
somatic memory.   
Part of the reason that this experience of memory can be so vivid and intrusive is 
due to the fact that an implicit, emotional memory overwhelms the ability to create and refer 
to an explicit conscious one. As van der Kolk explains,  
Neuroimaging research has shown that as people are reliving their trauma, the brain 
areas most involved in formal cognition are deactivated. So neuroscience research 
shows that when people are reliving, they cannot think rationally because the critical 
frontal lobe areas necessary for executive functioning go offline, and only the 
primitive fear, arousal, “my body’s in danger,” “I’ve got to run” parts of the brain 
light up.137 
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The implication here is that not only does the fear response inhibit the initial formation of 
the explicit memory, but that it continues to do so when the event gets relived through 
memory. Each time the event is triggered in the memory, the hippocampus is shut down all 
over again while the fear center is activated.138 If the fear response was deactivated and the 
hippocampus was able to go back online, an explicit memory could be formed that might be 
able to override the implicit memory that gets triggered.  
Experiences of traumatic memories are vivid and intrusive because of the strength of 
connection created by conditioned fear response. When the amygdala responds to a threat 
by eliciting all of the processes just described, the neural connectivity of the brain changes. 
As discussed in chapter one, the brain learns, in effect, to respond to the threat based on the 
sensory environment that the threat occurred within.139 When the environment, or a remnant 
from the environment such as a smell, taste, or sound is replicated, the fear responses get re-
activated. This explains why the implicit memory can be triggered by a singular sensory 
stimulus such as the sound of a car backfiring, which causes the initial response to recur, 
reigniting the somatic response executed in combat. The brain, as it were, ‘thinks’ that it is 
under attack again and responds as if the threat is real, sparking a set of adaptive processes 
evolved for survival. What makes the formation of an explicit memory especially difficult in 
cases where the brain has come to have a conditioned fear response is the tendency of these 
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responses to strengthen over time, rather than diminish.140 Neurological interventions to 
help victims heal from trauma attempt to reverse this phenomenon in the hope of two 
results, a diminished implicit memory, and a strong and consciously available explicit 
memory.  
 Neuroscientific research explains how and what traumatic events can become 
imprinted or encoded in the brain, as well as why these memories are primarily implicit and 
somatic rather than explicit and conscious. It is important to note, however, that the 
traumatic response occurs on a spectrum. In the most extreme cases, there seems to be no 
immediate access to the explicit memory of the event at all, there is only implicit affect and 
brain response. There are documented cases of patients who have no recollection of the 
traumatic event at all, but who still have significant psychological symptoms relating to the 
event. Bessel van der Kolk describes working with trauma patients who have no memory of 
surviving the traumatic event, but find themselves inexplicably recreating the circumstances 
surrounding the event.141 In one case, an individual who was a victim of a shooting but had 
no explicit memory of the event set up police to reenact an eerily similar scenario one year to 
the day later.142 Extreme examples like this one, though they may not be consistent with 
every individual experience with trauma and traumatic memory, still help illustrate the 
neurological basis of these symptoms of trauma.  
In less extreme cases, which are much more common, explicit memory and implicit 
memory of the event can both exist in a dynamic relationship. This can be likened to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 LeDoux points out that this phenomenon is called “the incubation of fear”; see LeDoux, The 
Emotional Brain, 203. 
141 van der Kolk, McFarlane, and Weisæth, Traumatic Stress, 283.  
142 Ibid. 
  
82 
example described above, when you have an argument with a friend over dinner. In this case 
you may feel the emotional response days and weeks later when you tell someone about the 
argument. Here the explicit memory is available, as you are able to focus consciously on the 
event and tell a story about it. The implicit memory is also available, which is why some of 
the feelings are elicited when you tell the story or think of it. The difference between the 
emotional memory of this argument and the emotional memory of a traumatic event is that 
when the latter is triggered, the amygdala sets off a series of reactions that send the brain and 
body into fear response. Neurologically speaking, the implicit memory takes over the present 
moment and the result is the explicit memory becomes unavailable (if there was an explicit 
memory to begin with). In this case it is not necessarily true that the explicit memory does 
not exist (though this is possible), but that the explicit memory is not available because the 
implicit memory has overwhelmed the brain system. Methods for disabling the fear response 
and creating and strengthening the explicit memory are discussed in the next chapters. 
 Since the experience of traumatic memory repeatedly leads the brain down the fear 
response path, the implications of chronic PTSD are wide reaching and can be devastating. 
Implicit memories of the traumatic event are not limited to nightmares and private thought 
processes, but can be triggered by many things and greatly diminish one’s ability to interact 
with the world. Patients with PTSD have to negotiate constantly between the past and the 
present, and the results of constant hyperarousal can be both physically and psychologically 
damaging. Completing normal day-to-day tasks can be nearly impossible given the impact of 
traumatic memory on brain function.  
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A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study from 2009 shows just how 
traumatic memory can impact the brain long term. The study, performed on veterans of the 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars who had been diagnosed with PTSD, examined the neural impact 
that trauma related triggers had on basic cognitive processing. The hypothesis was that the 
nature of intrusion in traumatic memory negatively impacts cognitive processing for the 
victim, making it virtually impossible to complete goal-based tasks that require working 
memory.143 The hypothesis turned out to be correct, as both the behavioral and fMRI results 
for the PTSD group showed that access to working memory was much lower than that of 
the control group as was subsequent ability to complete the goal based task when facing 
combat related triggers.144  
 In the PTSD group, three sections of the brain faced with a combat-trigger showed 
activity different from that of the control group. The amygdala (responsible for processing 
memory and emotional reactions), the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (responsible for 
planning complex cognitive behavior), and the fusiform gyrus (responsible for face and body 
recognition, processing of color information, and other types of recognition) were all 
affected differently. The amygdala showed increased activity in the PTSD group, suggesting 
a much stronger emotional reaction to the trigger, while the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
showed decreased activity, suggesting a decreased ability to recognize forms and individuals 	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and to access the short-term or working memory necessary to complete the task at hand (see 
Figure 2).145 This condition would make anything requiring the use of working-memory very 
difficult, and may lead to the kind of behavior that contributed to some of the prejudices 
about veterans being weak and lazy (as discussed in chapter one).  
 
Figure 2 
In more general terms, when a traumatic memory is triggered, the person traumatized can be 
- neurobiologically speaking - taken out of the present. When a traumatized individual is 
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reliving the traumatic memory, the working memory is inaccessible, leading to difficulties 
differentiating between the memory and the present, holding their environment in their 
mind, and recognizing familiar faces. We can see here quite starkly the way that the 
memories of the event continue to disrupt the mental structure of the individual.   
 The negative implications of these findings are both physiological and psychological. 
The failure of the mind to process a traumatic event in the way that it processes other events 
can lead to significant neurological injuries. It has been shown that patients who have been 
exposed to trauma and then become re-exposed through traumatic memory can come to 
have life long difficulties with learning and memory. Studies have shown that trauma and 
traumatic memory can actually damage the brain, reducing the volume of the hippocampus. 
This reduced volume is associated with symptoms that mimic early dementia.146 It is not 
simply the initial experience of trauma that is destructive. The experience of having the 
memory continuously intrude on the present is also physically damaging. 
 The neuroscientific examination of trauma and traumatic memory provides 
substance to the structure provided by psychology. It does this by establishing a model for 
explaining why traumatic memories can be experienced as instances of reliving as well as 
illustrating the implications of being chronically re-exposed to the event. What is still 
missing, however, is the first-person lived experience of trauma and traumatic memory. 
Understanding what it is like to experience the phenomena described here will help further 	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explain why traumatic events are so different from other life events, and just how one’s 
experience of the world can be so altered by trauma.  
 
2.3 Returning to the ‘there-is’: The Phenomenology of Traumatic Memory  
 
 As mentioned in chapter one, Russell Carr provides a practical example of the way 
that phenomenology can help deepen the understanding of trauma and traumatic memory. 
Carr, who is the head of outpatient behavioral health at Walter Reed hospital, was deployed 
to Iraq in 2008 to treat difficult cases of soldiers who were exhibiting symptoms of PTSD 
while still in combat situations. This meant that he was tasked with developing a short-term 
treatment plan that could be used for soldiers who were suffering but needed to return to 
combat. Carr quickly found that the standard interventions offered little help for these 
soldiers, and began looking to alternative sources. He happened to have brought Robert 
Stolorow’s book, Trauma and Human Existence, in which Stolorow turns to phenomenology to 
describe traumatic experience and its effects. Shortly after returning from Iraq, Carr wrote an 
article explaining how Stolorow’s work on the phenomenology of trauma “fundamentally 
changed his understanding of trauma and its treatment.”147  
 In the article, Carr argues that psychological interventions for combat trauma fail in 
part because they treat patients as a set of symptoms to fix, rather than as individuals who 
exist within a particular context. To put it in terms that Merleau-Ponty might use, the 
psychological viewpoint looked at the patients “from above,” and thinks of them as 	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“object[s] in general.”148 The phenomenological perspective provided by Stolorow allowed 
Carr to access his patients from a different viewpoint.  
Instead of seeing traumatized soldiers or Marines as having dysfunctional automatic 
thoughts, a shattered self, or a regressed ego, I was beginning to feel that their 
experience of the world and themselves had been shattered.149  
 
In other words, Stolorow was able to draw Carr’s attention to the importance of the patient’s 
lived experience of the recent trauma and the ways in which that experience had altered the 
patient’s beliefs about and experience within the world. Carr developed a successful short 
term treatment plan based on the concepts laid out in Trauma and Human Existence, and 
carried the book with him as he traveled between outposts and bases.  
 Carr presents anecdotal evidence for the point defended in section 1.34 of the last 
chapter, namely, that phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty conceives it, is compatible with 
psychology and neuroscience (and not meant to simply replace the two). That section also 
discussed specific tools that phenomenology has to offer to help us better understand 
trauma. His phenomenological approach can also help reframe and deepen our 
understanding of traumatic memory in particular, as can be gathered by returning to the two 
examples of traumatic memory discussed above, and casting a phenomenological spotlight 
on them.  
 In this connection it is worth noting, to start with, ways in which his 
phenomenological account anticipates key aspects of subsequent psychological and 
neuroscientific accounts. Though Merleau-Ponty was writing nearly forty years before 
neuroscientists differentiated between explicit and implicit memories and before psychology 	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created an entry in the DSM for PTSD, some of his language and examples are uncannily 
similar to the way that trauma and traumatic memory would come to be referred to in the 
future. As we saw in chapter one, Merleau-Ponty understands trauma generally as a temporal 
phenomenon. The result of a traumatic event is a memory that behaves as if it were an open 
wound, oozing into and infecting the present and future rather than healing over and 
receding into the past. As he says,  
Time in its passage… does not close up on traumatic experience; the subject remains 
open to the same impossible future, if not in his explicit thoughts, at any rate in his 
actual being. One present among all presents thus requires an exceptional value; it 
displaces the others and deprives them of their value as authentic presents.150  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of traumatic memory is similar to the description that we find in 
the DSM, and in the neuroscience literature. The main idea is that when the past is non-
traumatic, it ‘closes up’ or becomes a distinct memory that can exist as the purposeful theme 
of present consciousness.  By contrast, the victim of trauma sometimes does not gain control 
over the event as a distinct conscious memory. The past then does not recede, but remains 
open and continues to unfold in the present.  
 In similar fashion, Merleau-Ponty comes close to using the same language here that 
neuroscientists would eventually use to differentiate between implicit and explicit memories. 
When he says that the traumatic experience might not be available “in his explicit thoughts,” 
but might be manifesting itself “in his actual being,” he seems to be getting at the very same 
phenomenon described by neuroscience. The traumatic event remains present and shapes 
behavior even though it cannot be brought into conscious attention. In other words, since 
time doesn’t close on the traumatic memory, which would make it a distinct entity that could 	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be referred to and reflected upon, the past constantly threatens the present. Like a thriving 
weed that hoards the sunlight, letting other flowers die, the traumatic memory looms large 
and powerful.  
 Merleau-Ponty goes on to say that the traumatic memory “does not leave us but 
remains constantly hidden behind our gaze instead of being displayed before it.”151 Again, 
the language here foreshadows the understanding that neuroscientists would come to have. 
As shown in the previous section, neuroscience would come to understand that traumatic 
memories have a powerful ability to disrupt the brain, forcing the victim into the past and 
making it difficult to access the present. These similarities among the fields alongside 
Merleau-Ponty’s text lend further support to the claim that phenomenology is not in conflict 
with the sciences, but can work in concert with it.  
Yet Merelau-Ponty’s phenomenology, while complementary of psychology and 
neuroscience, is not reducible to them, and it accordingly adds another dimension to the 
discussion of trauma and traumatic memory.  One of the reasons that human beings cannot 
be reduced to scientific data is because to do so is to ignore what Merleau-Ponty would call 
their “being-in-the-world.” Just as there is not a strict divide between the mind and the body, 
there is not a strict divide between a human being and the world that she exists within. 
Instead, she exists in dynamic interaction with the world, having before her a particular 
horizon, or phenomenal field that she engages with. In the broadest terms possible, the 
horizon is what is available to consciousness. However, there is a crucial caveat: what is 
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perceived, what comprises the horizon, is shaped not just by objective truths in the external 
world, but also by meanings conveyed by and in pre-theoretical experience.  
Alphonso Lingis suggests that the kind of embodied being-in-the-world that 
Merleau-Ponty has in mind is one that is constituted by what he calls the interrogative mood 
by pointing out that the very perceptions that determine the situation are themselves in flux. 
Perceptions, their many contingencies, illusions, and contradictions shape the horizon of the 
being-in-the-world as one that is never fixed, never fully positively defined. As Lingis 
explains,  
What we perceive then is not a positive term existing in itself and supporting its own 
‘properties’; what we perceive is a contrast, a tension – not an adequation with our 
substance, but a difference from us, marked out in the continuous fabric of being, of 
‘flesh,’ of we too are a part.152  
 
In order to understand what this means in general and then specifically in regards to trauma, 
it is helpful to recall the constancy hypothesis and Merleau-Ponty’s stance on it.153 The 
constancy hypothesis is the claim that the inputs of consciousness have a constancy to them 
in their correlation such that the same stimulus will consistently produce the same reaction. 
Merleau-Ponty rejects the constancy hypothesis. He argues that the reaction that a stimulus 
produces is not only determined by the stimulus, but also by the individual perceiving it. As 
he says, the perceptual apparatus is not just a “transmitter.”154 When we look at something, 
we don’t simply see it. Rather, “it awakens resonances within our perceptive apparatus.”155 The 
resonances that are awoken are unique to each of us and to our horizons or phenomenal 	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fields. If a person begins struggling with insomnia, for example, it is likely that her 
perception of her bed will change as the meaning of it changes for her. What was once seen 
as a comfortable and warm place might start to actually look and feel like a prison. This 
shows that there is not constancy between the stimulus and the reaction that the stimulus 
produces. Experiences like this lead Merleau-Ponty to argue that “the immediate is no longer 
the impression, the object which is one with the subject, but the meaning, the structure, the 
spontaneous arrangement of parts.”156 In other words, the things that we perceive are 
perceived as this or that, i.e., as bearers of this or that meaning.  They are perceived as 
meaningful in some way. What they are perceived as depends on the experiential horizon in 
which they appear.  
 To look at a simpler example, Merleau-Ponty invites us to imagine a child who is 
attracted to the flame of a candle and touches it, burning himself. Merleau-Ponty points out 
that the child’s perception of the candle changes from something attractive to something 
repulsive after this experience. We might be tempted to say that what is going on here is 
related to a kind of perceptual mistake related to knowledge of the objective world: the child 
did not know that the flame would burn her, so she misperceived it as something that she 
could grasp. This is, however, not accurate according to Merleau-Ponty. It is not that the 
child had an incorrect perception, which has now been corrected since she has been exposed 
to the objective truth of the external world, but that her experience has colored her horizon 
such that the immediate perception of fire is now imbued with a different meaning. To put it 
another way, the resonances that it awakens were once attraction, and are now fear or 
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repulsion. Merleau-Ponty explains, “Vision is already inhabited by a meaning which gives it a 
function in the spectacle of the world and our existence.”157 In other words, it is incorrect to 
assume that we perceive things, and then reflect, and then establish meaning — but that we 
perceive things as meaningful. It is these perceptions that are imbued with meaning based on 
our experience that colors the horizon.  
 There is much more that can be said about these basic ideas in Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, and I expand on some of them in the following chapter. However, even 
this brief gloss on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception can be used to reframe 
the discussion of traumatic memory. The emphasis on meaning in perception helps to 
understand traumatic memory because it enables us to see that it is not simply that the 
trauma patient is misperceiving reality, but that their perceptual world has been stamped 
with the trauma that they have sustained.  
 To see this more vividly, we can take a look back at the examples from 2.1. 
I haven’t spent a complete night in bed with my wife for at least ten years. I always 
end up on the sofa. It’s safer for her… After I couldn’t work anymore… I’d do this 
crazy [stuff] at night. I once threw her out of bed so hard it broke her shoulder. I 
thought there was an NVA potato-masher come in on us. Another night I thought 
she was [the enemy], and I had my hands around her throat before I woke up.158  
 
To be sure, it is not objectively true that the veteran who hears grenade fire and then pushes 
his wife out of bed is actually under fire. However, it is not accurate to say that it is false 
either. The perception of gunfire and the chain of behavior that follows that perception are 
very real. To reduce the experience of traumatic memory to an incorrect perception misses a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 52. 
158 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, xvii. 
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vital part of the phenomenon as a lived experience.159 The traumatic memories that this 
patient is dealing with are not just a psychological symptom, or a neurological problem in the 
brain.  They are a sign that the traumatic events sustained have altered the fabric of his 
world, and that he perceives loud noises as threatening and his wife as the enemy. He is not 
addressing a world that does not objectively exist and is therefore false, he is addressing the 
world that the experience of trauma has created for him. His horizon has become one of danger.  
 This reframing is vitally important because failing to do so risks reducing the 
experience to a kind of misperception, a reduction that can lead to the conclusion that to fix 
the problem, the mistaken perception simply needs to be overridden. There are two 
problems with this conclusion. The first is that this approach does not work. When this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 It should be noted that the question of the truth or correctness of perception in philosophy is by 
no means limited to the experience of trauma. The discussion here is reminiscent of the discussion of 
hallucination and illusion as it relates to perception in philosophy. The fundamental question here is 
about the status of perception as a source of knowledge given perceptual ‘errors’ like illusions or 
hallucinations. Philosophers are often split into idealists or realists. Idealists believe that the objects 
that we perceive are mind-dependent (and therefore we do not have unadulterated access to the 
objective world). Direct realists (sometimes called naïve realists) counter that the objects that we 
perceive are not mind-dependent (and therefore we do have some access to the objective world). 
Indirect realists argue that what we perceive are sense data, not the objective world itself (which can 
only be perceived indirectly). The question is fundamental in epistemology, but is perhaps especially 
relevant in phenomenology.  
       In the case of the phenomenology of traumatic memory, it seems that indirect-realism might be 
the most appropriate camp, as Merleau-Ponty seems to be saying that it is not the case that the 
perception of gunfire is false, nor is it the case that it is objectively true. Rather, the gunfire is being 
perceived by an individual who perceives it to be real. The purely objective truth both matters and 
doesn’t - the fact that the individual perceives gunfire where there is none is a case in which 
perception does not match up with the objective world which suggests that he might have a problem. 
At the same time, it is not the case that there is no gunfire at all, and to say this seems to ignore 
something important about the individuals’ experience.  
       This issue has been discussed thoroughly throughout the history of philosophy with notable 
recent contributions by John McDowell, Alva Noë and Evan Thompson, among others. See for 
example, John McDowell, The Engaged Intellect (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). See 
also Alva Noë and Evan Thompson, Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). For an article on where Merleau-Ponty in particular might stand 
in regards to the issue of realism versus idealism, see Sean D. Kelley, “What Do We See (When We 
Do)?” in Reading Merleau-Ponty, ed. Thomas Baldwin (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23-43.   
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veteran is in the midst of a traumatic flashback, it is not a matter of simply convincing him 
that he is wrong about objective reality. Even if that is helpful or necessary in the moment, it 
does not treat the underlying problem. The second problem is that to reduce traumatic 
memory to a symptom or a synaptic mistake, is to ignore an essential part of what is going 
on for the patient. Again, the trauma has altered the fabric of his horizon; it is not just this 
particular instance of remembering that is a problem, but the very way that he perceives the 
world.  
 This is perhaps even more vivid in the second example from 2.1 above. 
I am in the yard while playing the water hose upon the flagstones. Water stops 
running. After a while it begins again. Then the neighbor from whom I borrowed the 
hose comes out and reproaches me, finally swears at me, and then strikes me. Then 
all the neighbors come running out, and they chase me all over. Then I awaken in a 
sweat, feeling as though I had all the life pounded out of me.160  
 
Again, it is not just this patient’s dreams that are the problem; it is that his combat 
experience has shaped the entire world into an attack. His horizon has been colored in such 
a way that he sees neighbors and mundane gardening activities as dangerous. It is not just 
that he was under attack in the past, and that the past sometimes inconveniently peaks 
through into the present. It is that the past experience has shaped his perception so that 
everything is a potential attack. In both of these cases, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
grants us access to another level of understanding, which reveals something deeper than 
psychology or neuroscience can account for; namely, that these soldiers are not simply 
suffering from their traumatic memories, but as Carr explains, “that their experience of the 
world and themselves [has] been shattered.”161  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Kardiner, Traumatic Neuroses of War, 91. 
161 Carr, “Combat and Human Existence,” 3. 
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 The long-term effects of trauma and traumatic memory are not only destructive 
neurobiologically, as we have seen above. What the phenomenological viewpoint reveals is 
that the persistence of traumatic memory can chip away at the victim’s sense of self, causing 
her to lose the feeling of authority over mental functions and over her body. Since the 
memory doesn’t get encoded explicitly, or filed away, the subject cannot relate herself to that 
memory or recognize it as autobiographical. When the memory is relived the present morphs 
into the past and then back into the present without conscious awareness. Veterans perceive 
riverbanks in Maine as riverbanks in Vietnam - full of complex systems of tunnels built by 
the enemy soldier.162 This is frustrating not because these things turn out to be false, but 
because the memory of them is so immediate, so vivid that there can be no distinction 
between the past and the present. As a result, victims become unable to trust their own 
perceptions in general. As one of Shay’s patients describes, “Nothing is what it seems. That 
mountain there — maybe it wasn’t there yesterday, and won’t be there tomorrow. You get to 
the point where you’re not even sure it is a mountain.”163  
 This loss of trust in one’s own perceptions is not limited to the objects that are or are 
not before one’s immediate gaze in the moment, but also extends to the lens through which 
one navigates the world. We can see this in the patient above who says, “Nothing is what it 
seems.” It is not simply the mind that is unsafe (as a Cartesian might conclude), but the 
world. In other words, after experiencing trauma and the subsequent irreality of a world in 
which one could be transported back to that awful moment at any moment, the knowledge 
that the world does not have a objective horizon that we can count on, is inescapable. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 170. 
163 Ibid. 
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forces a new perception of the world onto the individual. And this is perhaps the most 
profound injury that comes from trauma - the intractable loss of one’s blueprint of the 
world.  
 What psychology and neuroscience miss, then, is that a crucial part of what has been 
injured is not just the hippocampus, or the psychological mechanism that records events 
(though these things are also true), but a key part of what has been injured is the experiential 
horizon through which human beings meaningfully navigate the world. What is injured in 
trauma is the victim’s perception of the world – the injury is not that she perceives it 
incorrectly, but that it carries a terrible and powerful meaning that it didn’t before.  
 Recall Claparède’s pinprick experiment for example. Claparède might argue that his 
patient’s response to the pin is entirely reducible to a synaptic occurrence on the brain level, 
but this isn’t the whole story. The phenomenological perspective focuses on Claparède’s 
patient as a whole being who exits within a certain horizon that has been shaped by her 
experience. Her automatic fear response makes sense not just because of what is going on in 
her brain, but because we understand her to be an organism for whom bodily vulnerability and threat is 
an issue. The pinprick is meaningful to her body, and so her body responds to the possible 
threat not simply because of reflex but because she is a being who is present in a particular 
horizon that is perceived as meaningful. Understanding the full extent of her experience, 
then, requires that we resist the temptation to only use reductionist accounts but eventually 
return to the ‘there-is’ as Merleau-Ponty urges us.  
 In order to understand trauma and traumatic memory, then, we must return to the 
victim, to the essence of her lived experience. If the goal is a robust understanding of 
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trauma, it is not sufficient to rely on just the psychological (subjective) or neuroscientific 
(objective) explanation of what trauma is or why it operates the way that it does. The 
reduction of this complicated human phenomenon to any one of these perspectives on its 
own is deficient. It does not suffice to simply register that the victim experiences nightmares 
and intrusive thoughts. Registering these experiences by no means adequately explains what 
this experience is like and what it means for the individual.  
 Instead of examining human experience at the mechanistic level of explanation, 
Merleau-Ponty urges us look to the ‘there is,’ the phenomenon as it occurs and what sorts of 
webs of human meaning and intentionality comprise it. A full account of trauma then, would 
require a framework for understanding what it signifies to the victim of trauma, i.e., what it 
means for her in her environment (as a being-in-the-world). The phenomenological account 
expands the horizon back out from Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am,” to “The world is 
not what I think, but what I live through.”164 By focusing on the lived experience of trauma, 
we are better equipped to understand and treat those parts of traumatic experience that seem 
to lie just outside the grasp of science. Again, it is not the case that the phenomenological 
perspective should trump the psychological or neuroscientific. Rather, given the complicated 
nature of human phenomena, the phenomenological perspective stands to enhance our 
understanding by adding an account of the meaning and impact of the lived experience to 
the discussion. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xviii. 
  
98 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 By bringing psychological, neuroscientific, and phenomenological perspectives to 
bear on the phenomenon of traumatic memory, this chapter indicates the promise of 
combining these perspectives for the purpose of developing a robust account of a central 
phenomenon of PTSD. The psychological framework for understanding traumatic memory 
as distinct from non-traumatic memory sets parameters for discussing traumatic memory in 
neuroscience and phenomenology. Neuroscience provides a model of the brain and the 
mechanisms of memory that makes it possible to investigate the etiology of symptoms 
associated with memory in PTSD. Phenomenology provides the first-person lens supposed 
by the accounts of psychology and neuroscience and lays the groundwork for understanding 
trauma as an embodied experience. Together, these three perspectives provide a more 
complete account of trauma than any can provide in isolation.  
 The next chapter continues with the phenomenological perspective by examining 
adaptation to trauma as a part of the phenomenon of trauma generally. It will be argued that 
beyond giving us a deeper understanding of what traumatic experience and PTSD is like and 
what it means, phenomenology gives us tools for understanding the phenomenon of 
adaptation, which can then be explained or thematized by neurology and psychology.  
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Chapter Three: The Phenomenology of Injury & Adaptation 
 
 The goal of this chapter is to further develop a phenomenological account of trauma 
by utilizing Merleau-Ponty’s specific concepts of injury and adaptation. Building from the 
argument made in the previous chapter that traumatic events challenge structures of 
meaning for the victim of trauma, the first section (3.1) focuses on the case of Johann 
Schneider, a combat veteran mentioned frequently throughout the Phenomenology of Perception. 
This section draws on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Schneider to explore the role of 
embodiment in the experience of injury. The phenomenological perspective reveals an 
impulse to adapt that is folded into the experience of trauma and injury. The second section 
(3.2) examines adaptation to injury as an essential aspect of the phenomenon. I argue that 
understanding traumatic injury and adaptation from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
perspective aids in explaining the genesis of the symptoms of trauma and developing 
concrete approaches to treatment of it. This discussion of the phenomenology of adaptation 
to injury, in addition to the arguments made in chapter two, provides the foundation for 
arguing the merits of narrative as a model for adaptation in the case of trauma. 
 
3.1 Embodiment and Traumatic Injury: The Case of Schneider   
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology offers a way 
of reframing the discussion of traumatic memory by returning to the ‘there-is’ – or the lived 
experience – of the trauma. Rather than the scientific gaze, which looks on from above, a 
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phenomenology of trauma begins with the experience of trauma and traumatic memory as 
an experience that is lived through by a particular individual. It aims at understanding what 
these experiences are like for the victim, and revealing the way that trauma can color the 
victim’s horizon. When added to the perspectives of neuroscience and psychology, the 
phenomenological stance gives another vital dimension to our understanding of traumatic 
memory.  
Beyond reframing the discussion of traumatic memory, phenomenology can also 
provide a more thorough account of traumatic injury in general. This section further 
explores the phenomenology of trauma by focusing on the role of the embodied subject in 
the experience of traumatic injury.  By demonstrating that a crucial part of what has been 
injured is the victim’s way of being in and communicating with the world, this focus yields, I 
argue, a more thorough understanding of traumatic injury.  
With a view to avoiding mistakes made by reductionist accounts, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology focuses on human life as it is lived.  Doing so demands seeing an individual 
as embodied rather than as a disembodied consciousness (the Cartesian cogito). It is a chief 
aim of the Phenomenology of Perception to show the ways in which human phenomena defy 
reduction, and therefore can only be fully understood when the embodied individual and her 
horizon are taken into account. For example, when Merleau-Ponty references the child who 
gets burned by the flame of a candle and then comes to perceive fire as dangerous, it is 
revealed that perceptions are imbued with meaning based on the experience of a bodied 
being that engages with the world. In other words, instead of a dualistic understanding of the 
world in which there is a separation between the mind and body, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
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the body plays a fundamental role in consciousness. The mind and body are synthesized in 
his view, rather than divided, as an embodied experience shapes and is shaped the horizon.  
Critical of methods that attempt to reduce human behavior to simple causal 
relationships, Merleau-Ponty presents examples of cases that resist reduction in the 
Phenomenology of Perception. In addition to frequently involving patients who have suffered 
trauma, these examples present pathologies that challenge prevailing scientific explanation. 
These patients and their symptoms prove what Merleau-Ponty states in The Structure of 
Behavior; that “a specific disorder should always be put back into the context of the total 
behavior,” as injury and illness do not “directly concern the content of behavior but rather its 
structure.”165 In other words, symptoms cannot be separated from the larger context in which 
they appear, because all behavior emerges within contexts. In this way, Merleau-Ponty uses 
the paradigms of illness and injury to strengthen his claims about embodiment.  
Through his analysis of such cases, Merleau-Ponty also shows the way in which the 
phenomenological perspective can enhance our understanding of injury. As noted above, 
Merleau-Ponty concentrates his analysis on the case of Johann Schneider, a combat veteran 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Pittsburgh: Duquesne, 
1983), 64. It should be noted that there is an important distance between the Merleau-Ponty of 
Phenomenology of Perception (published in 1945) and the Merleau-Ponty of The Structure of Behavior, 
(published in 1942). Gary Brent Madison points out that in The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty 
“speaks the language of psychologists and scientists,” whereas in later works (such as “Eye and 
Mind”), Merleau-Ponty “has completely discovered his own tone of voice, one which is so foreign to 
scientists that it has made some people feel they are listening to a mystic of nature” (Gary Brent 
Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty [Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981], 1). The arc of 
Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to the scientific is worth noting in itself, but it also further bolsters the 
claim that the Phenomenology of Perception is not meant to be a rejection of the scientific, but instead a 
critical analysis of it.  
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who sustained injuries from mine-splinters in World War I.166 Merleau-Ponty discusses 
several different aspects of Schneider’s condition in order to point out how Schneider’s 
symptoms defy simple physiological or psychological explanation, while revealing altered 
ways that he exists in the world as an embodied human being, thanks to his injuries. As M.C. 
Dillon remarks, “Schneider led Merleau-Ponty to reconceive the body in terms that were 
neither exclusively mechanistic nor entirely intentional but somehow incorporated both.”167 
Before moving to Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Schneider, it is helpful to further consider 
what Merleau-Ponty means by embodiment. 
 
3.11 Embodiment revisited 
Embodied beings, as was discussed in chapter two, are said to be beings-in-the-
world. Being human necessarily entails existing within a certain physical context or situation. 
As Merleau-Ponty explains, being-in-the-world “anchors the subject to a certain 
‘environment.’ ”168 Existence, then, is not an objective and untethered phenomenon that can 
be sectioned off and examined in pieces, but instead is situational, contextual and therefore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 For a thorough summary and critical analysis of Schneider’s case, see Georg Goldenberg, 
“Goldstein and Gelb’s Case Schn: A Classic Case in Neuropsychology?” in Brain, Behavior and 
Cognition: Classic Cases in Neuropsychology, Volume II, ed. Chris Code, Claus-W. Wallesch, Yves Joanette, 
and Andre Roch Lecours (Florence: Psychology Press, 2013), 281-299. Beyond giving background of 
Schneider’s case, Goldenberg argues that the doctors that treated Schneider, Kurt Goldstein and 
Adhemar Gelb, manipulated the patient into expressing some of the symptoms that they cited, 
rendering the case invalid. Other theorists have suggested that rather than dismiss the research, that 
the case be re-examined in light of current research. See, for example, J.J. Marotta and M. Behrman, 
“Patient Schn: has Goldstein and Gelb’s Case Withstood the Test of Time?” Neuropsychologia 42 
(2004): 633-638. Regardless of any controversy that surrounds Schneider’s case, what is relevant here 
is Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of his symptoms, and not the validity of the symptoms themselves. 
Especially given the fact that the symptoms that Schneider displays are common among veterans 
with his injuries.  
167 Max C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 131.  
168 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 90. 
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must be considered as such. Experience cannot occur independent of a situation. Nor is it the 
case that embodied beings experience the objective, external world from a distance. Rather, 
embodied existence involves a kind of dynamic interaction with the world, and it is shaped 
both by the meaningful horizon created by past experience, and by the ways in which the 
body engages with the world in the moment. Merleau-Ponty explains further: 
When we say that an animal exists, that it has a world, or that it belongs to a world, 
we do not mean that it has a perception or objective consciousness of that world. 
The situation which unleashes instinctive operations is not entirely articulate and 
determinate… It presents only a practical significance; it asks only for bodily 
recognition; it is experienced as an ‘open’ situation, and ‘requires’ the animal’s 
movements, just as the first notes of a melody require a certain kind of resolution, 
without its being known in itself.169   
 
In other words, the boundaries between self and world are not as distinct as they might 
appear. As he says, “there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does 
he know himself.”170 Existing in the world necessarily entails a kind of belonging to it, 
engaging with it; and this belonging to and engaging with is necessarily bodied. Recall 
Claparède’s patient from the previous chapter. If we are to assume that a human being has 
an objective consciousness of the world that shapes her behavior, then it must be the case 
that Claparède’s patient refuses to shake his hand because she is consciously aware of the 
tack. However, as a result of her injuries, this cannot be the case. She flinches when Claparède 
reaches to shake her hand, not because she has conscious awareness of the outside world, 
but because she exists within a certain situation that is meaningful for her as an embodied being. 
To make use of Merleau-Ponty’s musical metaphor from the passage above, the presence of 
Claparède represented to her a dangerous sounding melody, which calls for a cautious 	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response. Claparède’s patient does not exist as a body or as a mind in the objective world, 
but as an embodied being-in-the-world. The contours of her experience are shaped both by her 
past and by numerous variables presented to her body in the present moment.  
To give a simple example, the perspective of the reader is shaped by her body as she 
reads. Her frame of reference will shift based on where her body is, how it feels, and what it 
needs. The experience will be different if she is comfortably sitting in her study, versus 
standing on the street in a snowstorm waiting for a bus, or sitting on an airplane during 
turbulence. It will be different if she is reading while tired, or hungry, or feeling anxious after 
an argument with a friend. To experience anything in the world is to experience it from a 
particular standpoint, or within a particular situation, and to attempt to understand the 
situation by separating it from the behavior that emerges is a mistake. Further, to assume 
that experience is a purely passive phenomenon is also misguided. We do not passively take 
in the external world; we exist within it, interact with it and are engaged with it by virtue of 
our embodiment. All the while, the boundaries between the embodied individual and her 
environment are not clear and distinct, but bleed together in the experience itself. Therefore, 
if a robust understanding of her behavior is the goal, it is necessary to take into account how 
she exists and experiences within her particular context and situation. Further, it is important 
to recognize the way that the context and situation and the individual’s place within it is ever 
shifting.  
This theory of embodiment shows the limitations inherent in attempting to 
generalize embodied behavior in the way that science often attempts. If Merleau-Ponty is 
correct about experience, any attempt to separate behavior from its embodied context will 
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always yield a somewhat distorted view. M.C. Dillon explains that for Merleau-Ponty, “the 
functioning of the lived body resists comprehension as long as its mind is conceived as 
disjunct from its flesh and the spheres of immanence and transcendence are regarded as 
mutually exclusive.”171 The lived body can only be clearly understood when it is taken as a 
unity that is always embedded within a particular environment.  
To illustrate this point, Merleau-Ponty discusses the ways in which even predictable 
bodily response to stimuli always reveals a being-in-the-world, embodiment within a 
particular environment. If two people are asked to draw a circle on a blackboard with a piece 
of chalk, they might execute the same action in two different ways. One might draw a circle 
with her arm extended, the other with her arm bent at the elbow.172 What this reveals is that 
even essentially predictable behavior admits to variety, and therefore behavior is only 
predictable to a certain extent. He extends this example to include reflexes: 
For the most part preferred behavior is the simplest and most economical with respect 
to the task in which the organism finds itself engaged; and its fundamental forms of 
activity and the character of its possible action are presupposed in the definition of 
the structures which will be the simplest for it, preferred in it.173  
 
In other words, even reflex response – perhaps the most simple and predictable kind of 
behavior – is still defined and shaped by the situation in which it emerges. What is simplest 
and most economical cannot be predicted without taking the particular embodied experience 
within a particular situation into account.174  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 132.  
172 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 148.  
173 Ibid., 147.  
174 The discussion of reflexes brings up the discussion of embodiment and agency. At the center of 
this discussion is the question of the extent to which individuals have ownership over their actions. 
The debate about the status of non-intentional movements and thoughts in particular has been 
recently taken up in the fields of phenomenology, cognitive science, and neuroscience. See for 
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To be in the world, then, is not just to be an intact subject who passively perceives 
the external world. To be in the world is to perceive things as meaningful. It is to exist as a 
body entangled within a particular situation and interacting with it. To fully understand any 
embodied experience, then, one must examine the particularities of it within the embodied 
context in which it occurs. If this is true of human experience in general, it is surely true of 
the experience of traumatic injury. This can be seen more vividly in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis 
of Schneider.  
 
3.12 The Schneider case 
In general, Schneider’s injuries seem to reveal the way that human existence is 
embodied, and to underscore that there are dimensions of human experience that are 
irreducible to the causal accounts given by science.175 At several points in the Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty points out the limitations of scientific explanation to grasp the 
extent and nature of Schneider’s symptoms. These symptoms can only be understood, he 
argues, by moving to the phenomenological perspective, the one that returns to the ‘there-is’ 
instead of looking on from above. Merleau-Ponty’s interest is not limited to Schneider’s 
particular case, but rather what this case can show us about human existence in general. The 
analysis of Schneider acts as a paradigm for embodiment by revealing the ways in which any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
example, Shaun Gallagher, “On the Possibility of Naturalizing Phenomenology,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Dan Zahavi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 70-
93, and see especially 82-87. For further discussions of embodiment and adaptation in Merleau-Ponty 
see also Kristen Brown Golden and Bettina Bergo, The Trauma Controversy: Philosophical and 
Interdisciplinary Dialogues (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2009).  
175 It is crucial to note that Merleau-Ponty is grappling with the state of science as it was in the mid-
nineteenth century. It is important to keep in mind the limitations of technology at this time, as well 
as the technological advancements that have been made since.   
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attempt to catalogue and generalize symptoms of traumatic injury encounter limitations 
when they do not take into account what it means to be in the world. Though Merleau-
Ponty was perhaps not specifically aiming for a phenomenology of trauma, it is possible to 
extract one from his discussion of Schneider. If it can be shown that Schneider’s injuries are 
better understood through phenomenology, it strongly suggests that the phenomenological 
perspective can enhance our understanding of traumatic injury in general. The analysis of 
Schneider helps us isolate what it means to be embodied and injured.  
One of the symptoms that interested Merleau-Ponty was what he called Schneider’s 
“sexual inertia.”176 After the war, Schneider became impotent, but the source of his 
dysfunction proved difficult to pinpoint. Schneider was not biologically impotent, but was at 
the same time incapable of seeking out or engaging in sexual activity. In other words, as a 
biological organism, Schneider was fully capable of sexual activity, but as a human being he 
was not.177 Merleau-Ponty describes the symptoms as follows:  
Obscene pictures, conversations on sexual topics, the sight of a body do not arouse 
desire in him. The patient hardly ever kisses, and the kiss for him has no value as 
sexual stimulation. Reactions are strictly local and do not begin to occur without 
contact. If the prelude is interrupted at this stage, there is no attempt to pursue the 
sexual cycle. In the sexual act intromission is never spontaneous. If orgasm occurs 
first in the partner and she moves away, the half-fulfilled desire vanishes. At every 
stage it is as if the subject did not know what is to be done.178 
 
What is somewhat baffling about Schneider’s symptoms here is that they do not align with 
scientific explanations of sexuality. A scientific account might postulate that sexual desire is a 
biological and physiological function wherein visual or tactile stimuli set off a series of bodily 
and synaptic events that lead to sexual desire, impulse and eventually activity. On this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 179.  
177 Ibid., 179-80. 
178 Ibid., my emphasis.  
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account, sexual dysfunction can be explained by a physical or psychological injury that 
thwarts the series of events and thus prevents the completion of the cycle. Schneider’s 
symptoms challenge this model of sexuality because he has no sexual impulse despite the fact 
that these areas in his brain and body are apparently intact and functioning.179 Merleau-Ponty points out 
that it is not the case that Schneider can no longer see sexual images, or feel erotic touch, but 
that he can no longer experience those images or tactile experiences as sexual. They no 
longer carry sexual value for him. He is incapable of sexual activity not because of some 
traceable malfunction180 in his body or in his brain, but because sex no longer holds meaning 
for him.181  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 It is worth mentioning that the Merleau-Ponty does not explain the specific scientific method for 
determining that Schneider is biologically sexually capable. However, the specifics of Schneider’s case 
are not as important as what Schneider is paradigmatic of, namely, that sexuality cannot be reduced 
to simple biological or psychological explanation.  
180 Though at the time this was not known, we now know that the overactivation of the stress 
response reduces reproductive physiology and behavior. However, Merleau-Ponty’s point still stands: 
Schneider was not consistently impotent or disinterested in sex, and thus the biological explanation 
does not fully explain his situation. 
181 It is difficult to grasp just what Merleau-Ponty means by ‘meaning’ in his work. Provisionally, it 
seems like there are two main aspects to the concept. First, and simply, it seems that meaning has to 
do with what a particular event or situation signifies for an individual. In this sense, meaning must be 
intimately related to experience and embodiment for Merleau-Ponty. Recall the simple example in 
section 2.3 of the child who is initially attracted to the flame of a candle, and then after getting 
burned by the flame comes to see it as something to avoid. It seems here that the meaning of the 
flame shifts with the child’s experience. What it signifies has changed based on his being burned. 
Second, ‘meaning’ seems to relate more abstractly to a sense of unity, or the way things pull together 
in perception and experience. In the discussion following a lecture that Merleau-Ponty gave in 1947, 
Jean Hyppolite remarked that Merleau-Ponty’s work contained, “an ontology of meaning… which 
constitutes the unity of man.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy of Perception and Its 
Philosophical Consequences,” trans. James M. Edie, in The Primacy of Perception: and Other Essays on 
Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics, ed. James M. Edie, authored by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 39. It should be noted 
that this remark was couched in a criticism of Merleau-Ponty’s work and the discussion strayed from 
the topic of meaning but it seems correct to say that meaning for Merleau-Ponty is tied in with the 
concept of unity. It seems that meaning has to be tied to unity (in order for something to have a 
meaning it has to be represented in a unified way), and that this coincides with Merleau-Ponty’s 
explanation of perception.   
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 To understand this further, consider a simple example from Schneider’s case. 
Merleau-Ponty notes that another perplexing symptom that Schneider presents with has to 
do with the difference between pointing and grasping. “The same subject who is unable to 
point to order to a part of his body, quickly moves his hand to the point where a mosquito is 
biting him.”182 In other words, if Schneider was asked to touch his ankle, he could not. In 
some important way, his ankle does not appear to him in consciousness. However, it is not 
the case that the ankle does not appear at all to Schneider, because if he has a mosquito bite 
he is able to scratch it, which requires that he locate it. According to Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological account is better able to explain these phenomena because it is 
“responsive to the need… for some standpoint capable of comprehending both the 
physiological stimuli of empiricism and the intentional objects of intellectualism”183 In other 
words, the only tools available to empiricism and intellectualism are physiology in the former 
and intentionality in the latter. The power of the phenomenological is that it combines the 
two, freeing itself from the restrictions of either side.  
To return to the example of Schneider’s sexuality, what the phenomenological 
standpoint can add is the idea that what has been injured is Schneider’s ability to decipher 
sexual meaning, or attach sexual value to anything in his horizon. Rather than seeking a 
physiological or intentional source to explain his sexual behavior, Merleau-Ponty locates the 
problem in Schneider’s being-in-the-world. As Merleau-Ponty explains, Schneider’s problem 
is that “he does not live” the situation, he “is not caught up in it.”184 The implication here is 
that in order to ‘live into’ a sexual encounter, Schneider must be able to experience a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 118. 
183 Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 134.  
184 Ibid., 181.  
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situation such that the object of his consciousness is himself in a (future) situation that is 
imbued with sexual meaning. Schneider cannot do this; his life has lost its sexual meaning 
because he can no longer imbue his experience with it. His perceptions have lost their 
“erotic structure, both spatially and temporally” because he has lost the “power of projecting 
before himself a sexual world.”185 The reason that Schneider’s symptoms cannot be 
explained by psychology or biology alone is because they have more to do with the way that 
Schneider exists within and engages with the world and less to do with a specific biological 
or psychological dysfunction.  
Schneider’s sexuality is especially relevant because for Merleau-Ponty, understanding 
the body in its sexual being “brings to light the birth of being for us.”186 If an investigation of 
perception can uncover the perceiver’s embodied relationship with her world, an 
investigation of sexuality can illuminate the embodied relationship that holds between the 
sexes (or between individuals by virtue of their sexual urges and behavior). Merleau-Ponty 
argues that an examination of sexuality is essential because it can help us “come to 
understand better how things and beings can exist in general.”187 Schneider’s sexuality is 
relevant because it shows sexuality in general to be paradigmatic of the embodied being-in-
the-world. Sexuality is, as Merleau-Ponty says, “one more form of original intentionality… 
Sexuality is not an autonomous cycle. It has internal links with the whole active and 
cognitive being.”188 In other words, sexuality shows human experience and existence to be 
necessarily embodied. It is an example that illustrates the way in which experience is always 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid.  
187 Ibid., 178.  
188 Ibid., 182.  
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presented within a context and cannot be reduced to its singular properties and effects. The 
fact that sexuality cannot be reduced to a definition of response (or failure to respond) to 
internal or external stimuli reveals the way in which human life is irreducible to mind or 
body, and rather emerges through the interplay between the two. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, 
“the life of the body, or the flesh, and the life of the psyche are involved in a relationship of 
reciprocal expression.”189  
The examination of Schneider’s sexual inertia, then, becomes a conduit for Merleau-
Ponty’s argument that human behavior cannot be reduced to simple scientific explanation. 
What Schneider illustrates in this particular case is that sexuality in general cannot be 
understood as automatic biological responses to stimuli. If sexuality is taken to simply be a 
response to stimuli and nothing more, a crucial step is missing - the meaningful connection 
between individuals, without which there would be neither stimulus nor response. An 
essential part of sexuality then involves the way that a person engages with the world, 
specifically, a capacity to project herself into a meaningful sexual situation – paradigmatically, 
with others. The viewpoint of phenomenology can better understand what is happening in 
this case because it examines the experience holistically. Through the exploration of 
Schneider’s sexual inertia, Merleau-Ponty seeks to describe human sexuality in general (and 
by extension human behavior in general) as an embodied phenomenon that defies atomistic, 
reductionist explanation. The analysis of Schneider’s sexual dysfunction then acts as an 
illustration of one of the ways in which human beings are embodied. It does this by helping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 185.  
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us begin to see that embodiment involves existing within and engaging with a particular 
situation.   
What Schneider’s sexual inertia suggests is that a full, four-dimensional (including 
time) understanding of any embodied injury requires looking beyond the generalizable 
symptoms and into the experience of the patient in her world.190 We cannot gain a full 
understanding of what is going on by tracing back to what is failing to occur in the mind or 
the body. Rather, a crucial part of understanding what has been injured involves taking into 
account Schneider as an embodied being-in-the-world who exists within a particular 
situation. Similar to the victim described in chapter two who comes to perceive the world as 
dangerous in light of his traumatic experience, Schneider isn’t just incapable of sexual 
intercourse, Schneider’s world has been altered in that his ability to perceive a situation as 
sexual has been extinguished. As argued in chapter two, this reframing may seem like it rests 
on a small distinction, and it does not enable us to remedy Schneider’s problem. However 
when this method is applied to our understanding of traumatic injury, it allows us to reframe 
and perhaps even redefine injury. 
Another symptom that is analyzed by Merleau-Ponty is Schneider’s aphasia, a 
language disorder marked by disturbances in comprehension or expression of language. 
Again using Schneider’s specific symptoms to make more general claims about human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 This is not to say that a full, three-dimensional understanding of an embodied injury is always 
necessary in the moment. It is tempting to say that there are injuries that happen to the body that are 
primarily and perhaps even strictly physical. A ruptured appendix might be one such example. In this 
case, it is not necessary for the emergency room doctor to assess the entire embodied situation of the 
patient in order to effectively treat her. However, it does not then follow that injuries happen to bodies 
in general and not subjects. Even the patient who suffers from the rupturing of a non-essential internal 
organ that previously had no impact on her bodied existence still experiences this within the context 
of a particular situation. Further, that rupturing doesn’t just happen to her appendix, it happens to her, 
and therefore could be meaningful to her as a being-in-the-world in many different ways. 
  
113 
beings, Merleau-Ponty argues that speech is an embodied, dynamic process. A reductionist 
account might hold that speech acts are a result of a series of synaptic connections in the 
brain. Though it is certainly true that brain synapses play an essential role in language and 
communication, to assume that speech acts are a result of these connections in the brain and 
nothing more is to obscure key aspects of the phenomena. Speech is undeniably partially a 
biological process involving synapses in the brain. However, it is also an act whereby a 
subject expresses herself. Merleau-Ponty argues that to understand speech as a mere 
function in the brain in which subjects learn to attach words to mental images is to strip 
speech of its power to express meaning. Language is another method through which the 
embodied subject exists in and communicates with the world. As Merleau-Ponty explains,  
The word, far from being the mere sign of objects and meanings, inhabits things and is 
the vehicle of meanings. Thus speech, in the speaker, does not translate ready-made 
thought, but accomplishes it.191  
 
Words inhabit things in the sense that for the speaker, the word is not separate from the 
perception of the object. Merleau-Ponty’s criticism begins with an analysis of the relationship 
between thought and speech. He argues that when someone opens her mouth and speaks, it 
is not necessarily the case that she has fully formulated a coherent thought and is now 
translating it from her brain to the world. Rather, thinking and speaking co-exist. When we see 
a chair, for example, we do not perform a linear set of actions in which the object of our 
perception is subsumed under the concept ‘chair’ and only then can be uttered. Rather, the 
speech act emerges from a connection between perception, meaning and articulation. Speech 
does not rest in the concept that it designates, but completes the speaker’s thoughts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 207.  
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Thought and speech exist in a kind of dialectic, they aid each other in their completion. 
Merleau-Ponty explains, words are “behind me, like things behind my back, or like the city’s 
horizon around my house, I reckon with them or rely on them, but without having any 
‘verbal image.’”192 In other words, it is not the case that words float around in the mind 
waiting to be attached to concepts. Rather, we exist within horizons, situations or contexts, 
and speech is an act by which we articulate, communicate, and signify meaning.  
 Further, the way that we articulate our experience is related to the way that our 
bodies engage with the world. Dreyfus gives a helpful example of how our experience as 
embodied beings creates an environment in which the word inhabits the object. As he says,  
Because we have the sort of bodies that get tired and that bend backwards at the 
knees, chairs can show up to us – but not flamingos, say – as affording sitting. But 
chairs can only solicit sitting once we have learned to sit. Finally, only because we 
Western Europeans are brought up in a culture where one sits on chairs do they 
solicit us to sit on them. Chairs would not solicit sitting in traditional Japan.193 
 
Though Dreyfus is making a point about embodiment, his point also applies to the way that 
language relates to the world. What the word inhabits will differ depending on the context in 
which it appears. In traditional Japan, the word ‘chair’ would not necessarily refer to the 
same object that it would refer to in the United States (translation issues aside). 
In Merleau-Ponty’s account, then, speech is not just a biological process and 
therefore cannot be dissected so easily. It is at once embodied and contextual, shaped by the 
ways in which the subject engages with the world and articulates her experience of it. 
Merleau-Ponty wants to jettison the reductionist explanation of speech in favor of one that 
defines speech as an act by which we engage with the world. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Ibid., 209.  
193 Dreyfus, “Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty.”  
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Merleau-Ponty argues that the complex relationship between thought and speech can 
be illustrated by examining Schneider’s aphasia, which has seemingly left him incapable of 
using or understanding certain words. If the reductionist view of speech that Merleau-Ponty 
is trying to disprove were correct, then a patient suffering from aphasia would completely lose 
the word that matched up with the mental image. What is peculiar about Schneider’s aphasia, 
however, is that he can use and recognize a specific word in one situation but not in another. 
What this reveals is that Schneider has not so much lost a capacity as he has lost an ability to 
put that capacity into use in some situations. As Merleau-Ponty explains, “what the patient 
has lost, and what the normal person possesses, is not a certain stock of words, but a certain 
way of using them.”194 In other words, it is not as if there is a set of index cards that went 
missing when Schneider was injured. It is not that the words are somehow gone. The 
problem lies in Schneider’s capacity to use the word to signify a particular meaning. Further, 
just because this symptom is rooted in speech, this does not mean that the body is not 
involved. Instead, as Merleau-Ponty explains, language is bodied.  
A contraction of the throat, a sibilant emission of air between the tongue and teeth, a 
certain way of bringing the body into play [which] suddenly allows itself to be invested 
with figurative significance which is conveyed outside of us.195  
 
Again, as was the case regarding his sexuality, the injury pertains to the way that Schneider 
exists in the world as an embodied being and therefore cannot be explained through 
scientific reduction.  
Current studies have corroborated Merleau-Ponty’s explanation of aphasia. For 
example, studies have shown that individuals can still recognize words from which whole 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 203, my emphasis.  
195 Ibid., 225.  
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phonemes are missing.196 In one study, the experimenters presented participants with 
sentences from which whole phonemes have been removed. Not only could the participants 
understand the sentence, they did not even realize the phonemes were missing. However, when given 
these words (with the phonemes removed) in isolation, participants were unable to 
understand the word and all of them realized the phonemes were missing.197 On the 
reductionist account of vision and language, these situations should be impossible. If 
understanding speech depended merely on the recording of stimuli, then the participants 
should have both been unable to understand the sentences and should have noticed the 
phonemes missing (as they did when given words without context).198 However, if we 
understand speech to be meaningful only in an embodied context, we can see how the 
horizons of meaning project into the future during speech and help us fill-in the missing 
sounds because of the meanings given by the context of these words.199 As Merleau-Ponty 
says, “we refute both intellectualism and empiricism by simply saying that the word has a 
meaning.”200 Rather than understanding language as expressing thoughts, we are to understand 
language as a way in which we exist in and interact with the world. Language is a way that we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 A phoneme is the smallest segment in a sound system of a language that can be contrasted with 
other segments. The sound /d/ that appears in both words wound and pound is an example of a 
phoneme. 
197 For a summary of these experiments, see D.W. Carroll, Psychology of Language, 4th Edition (Belmont, 
MA: Wadsworth/Thompson, 2004), 82-87. For a detail of the experiments see A.G. Samuel, 
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express ourselves, not a hidden meaning that a word contains, or an already formed but 
unuttered thought. Merleau-Ponty explains that speech “presents or rather it is the subject’s 
taking up of a position in the world of his meanings.”201 As we will see below, if language 
expresses the subject, there are times in which a failure to speak or an inability to speak also 
expresses the subject.   
Merleau-Ponty’s examination of Schneider’s dysfunctions in his speech and sexuality 
accomplishes two things. First, it provides a vivid illustration of the way that human beings 
are embodied beings in the world. Second and by extension, this analysis reveals something 
about injury. Namely, that injury happens to embodied beings, not just parts of bodies. It 
follows, then, that a robust understanding of injury must take the human being as a whole 
and her specific experience of her situation into account. What we see in the 
phenomenological analysis of speech and sexuality is that, “all human ‘functions’, from 
sexuality to motility and intelligence, are rigorously unified in one synthesis.”202 If all human 
functions are united in one synthesis, and if Schneider’s injuries can only be fully understood 
when examined from a phenomenological and holistic viewpoint, it follows that the 
phenomenological viewpoint could enhance understanding of any human injury. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, while it is true that the sciences provide very important information 
about an injury or disorder, they do not present the whole story. Merleau-Ponty holds that 
the reason that they do not is because they typically attempt to view injury on a level that is 
not itself directly experienced by the injured individual as part of her injury. Impotence is 
construed as a malfunction in the brain or the body. Aphasia is understood to be a result of 	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misfiring synapses. Traumatic memory is thought to be a problem in the amygdala and 
hippocampus. While by no means false, these biological explanations clearly fall short of 
giving us a full, four-dimensional account of what’s going on. Schneider and his symptoms 
are paradigmatic of Merleau-Ponty’s contention that looking at human beings with the 
scientific gaze from above treats the patient like an object. This gaze from above neglects to 
take into account the dynamism of existence – the importance of the situation and the 
particular subject within it – and accordingly fails to fully understand the phenomena.  
Though Merleau-Ponty intended his work to address how human behavior is 
understood in general as embodied rather than dualistic, his argument has important 
ramifications for understanding and treating trauma. What the phenomenological 
perspective adds is an appreciation of the need to understand what the original traumatic 
event(s) and the subsequent chronic symptoms mean to the person suffering from them. In 
both the case of Schneider’s sexual inertia and his aphasia, the phenomenological approach 
furthers the understanding of the injuries by emphasizing the ways in which they involve his 
being-in-the-world. Rather than focusing on symptoms and the etiology behind them, 
phenomenology attempts to investigate the contexts within which the symptoms appear. 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Schneider’s injuries yields important insights into the 
phenomenon of injury in general. On his account, injury cannot be understood as a 
particular malfunction of a part of the body or the brain. What we see so vividly in Merleau-
Ponty’s analysis of Schneider helps us understand that injury happens to the entire being, not 
just a single part. If, in keeping with this insight, we want to come to a robust understanding 
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of a particular injury, we must take into account the entire context in which it occurs – and, 
indeed, in some cases continues to occur.  
Phenomenology does more than provide a platform for understanding the nature of 
injury as a meaningful and personally embodied experience.  As discussed in the next 
section, it also provides a framework for understanding adaptation to injury as a key part of 
the phenomenon of trauma.  	  
3.2 The Reflected Room: The Phenomenology of Adaptation  
 
 In the most general sense, the capacity to adapt refers to an organism’s ability to 
cope with or adjust to fluctuations within her body and/or in her environment. It is a 
condition for the possibility of survival. For example, if we were not able to adjust our body 
temperature in accordance with the temperature in the environment, we would not survive. 
Adaptation, then, is an essential part of being a living animal. In order to understand the 
phenomenology of adaptation to injury, and specifically traumatic injury, it is necessary to 
first understand what adaptation means in general as a phenomenological concept. This 
section will first examine Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two examples of adaptation in an effort 
to better understand the concept and role of adaptation in general. Next, in order to return 
to the topic of traumatic injury as it relates to adaptation, the phenomenon of phantom limb 
will be examined. Finally adaptation will be considered as it relates to hysteria through an 
example from psychoanalysis.  
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3.21 Adaptation as a way of being-in-the-world 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, psychologist George Stratton conducted a series of 
experiments on vision. At the time, prevalent theories of vision held that the retinal image 
was inverted in order to perceive things as upright.203 In an attempt to test whether inversion 
of an image was necessary for proper vision, Stratton developed a lens that substituted “an 
upright retinal image for the normal inverted one.”204 Stratton first wore the lens himself and 
recorded his findings. In the beginning of his experiment, he noted that normal perception 
and movement was basically impossible, as everything in Stratton’s visual field (including the 
movements of his own limbs) appeared to be upside-down.205  
All images at first appeared to be inverted; the room and all in it seemed upside 
down. The hands when stretched out from below into the visual field seemed to 
enter from above. Yet although these images were clear and definite, they did not at 
first seem to be real things, like the things we see in normal vision, but they seemed 
to be misplaced, false, or illusory images between the observer and the objects or the 
things themselves.206  
 
When Stratton tried to move around in this surreal upside-down world, he found that he 
could only complete movements effectively when he did not rely on his vision at all, but 
instead relied on memory and touch, as one might when they move around in the dark. 
Stratton wore the lens for three days, and found that he gradually learned how to navigate in 
the upside-down world, and accordingly, the surreal feeling of things being misplaced, false, 
or illusory began to fade. 	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On the second day, Stratton reports that he began to realize that part of the difficulty 
he was encountering seemed to arise from the fact that visual and tactual contacts were not 
being reported “perceptionally together.”207 In other words, the reason that things appeared 
surreal and upside-down when he first put on the lens was because the visual world did not 
match the tactile one. He was receiving two contradictory sets of data. As a result of this 
experience, Stratton surmised that there were two distinct inputs for sense data – visual and 
tactile. The eventual adaptation of the subject to this reversed world, he argued, could only 
be explained through the idea that at some point during the experiment, the visual and tactile 
world merged resulting in the cessation of the false and surreal experience of the world.208  
 Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, Merleau-Ponty rejects Stratton’s explanation of 
the phenomenon, calling it “unintelligible.”209 It is unintelligible, he explains, because it 
demands a view of the world in which a person is perceiving (or misperceiving) “real space,” 
or one in which “the ‘upright’ and the ‘inverted’ are relationships dependent upon the fixed 
points chosen.”210 In other words, the problem with Stratton’s conclusion is that it focuses 
on the objective perspective of the external world rather than the perspective of the person 
living through the experience. Merleau-Ponty argues that the reason that a person eventually 
comes to be able to navigate the reversed world is not because her visual and tactile 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Ibid., 615.  
208 Due to the subjective nature and brevity of his preliminary experiment, Stratton performed follow 
up studies that included both a longer version of this same experiment as well as a few variations 
included mirrors instead of lenses in order to flesh out his hypothesis about the relationship between 
visual and tactile perception. See, George M. Stratton, “Vision Without Inversion of the Retinal 
Image,” Psychological Review 4, no. 5 (September 1897): 463-481. See also, George M. Stratton, “The 
Spatial Harmony of Touch and Sight” Mind 8, no. 32 (October 1899): 492-505.  
209 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 287.  
210 Ibid., 288.  
  
122 
perspectives integrate, but because in time, she becomes capable of adapting to her situation 
as a being-in-the-world.  
Citing a similar experiment done with mirrors, Merleau-Ponty explains the way that a 
subject adapts to the surroundings in the following way. 
After a few minutes… the reflected room miraculously calls up a subject capable of living in it. 
This virtual body ousts the real one to such an extent that the subject no longer has 
the feeling of being in the world where he actually is, and that instead of his real legs 
and arms, he feels that he has the legs and arms he would need to walk and act in the 
reflected room: he inhabits the spectacle.211  
 
What the scientific explanation offered by Stratton fails to do is take into account the subject 
as she exists within her world (thus, not a disembodied, Cartesian subject, but a person living 
through the experience). It is not that this experience happens to a body, or to a brain. The 
experience, like any human experience, happens within the unity of an embodied being-in-
the-world. The subject does not learn to integrate her senses. Rather, she eventually adapts in 
order to continue to engage with the world. Merleau-Ponty cites Stratton’s own research for 
proof of this. It is important to note, he says, that within Stratton’s description, the more 
active the subject is, the more quickly he adapts to his surreal feeling surroundings. This 
suggests to Merleau-Ponty that it is not a matter of letting two opposing representations 
integrate, but that, “it is the experience of movement guided by sight which teaches the 
subject to harmonize the visual and tactile data.”212 In other words, Merleau-Ponty agrees 
that more effective movement becomes possible when visual and tactile data harmonize.  
However, he suspects that this harmony emerges as a result of a person existing in 
and engaging with her world. The more she interacts with the world, the more possible the 	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world becomes for her. This may seem like a small distinction, but it is significant. Where 
Stratton holds that the world becomes navigable when two distinct faculties unite 
independent of the subject’s strivings, Merleau-Ponty holds that the experience of the 
subject – personal, lived experience – is always a unity. The drastic change in perception 
experienced by the subject who wears the glasses does not divide the visual from the tactile, 
but instead renders them dissonant. Harmony becomes possible again when the unified 
subject adapts to her surroundings and the reflected room emerges anew.  
 Stratton’s experiments then become another way for Merleau-Ponty to show how 
the empiricist and intellectualist traditions fail when they attempt to explain human 
phenomena while continuing to ignore embodiment. Merleau-Ponty’s interest in these 
experiments is notable for another reason as well. What they reveal is that being-in-the-world 
has a tremendous capacity for and impulse toward adaptation. Regardless of the accuracy of 
his conclusions, what is stunning about Stratton’s experiments is that when someone’s 
horizon or perceptual field is literally flipped upside-down, she can completely adapt within 
just a few days. When a person’s way of being in the world is completely reversed, she is 
capable of coping. This reveals what Merleau-Ponty elsewhere calls the “impulse of being-in-
the-world.”213 The impulse of being-in-the-world can be understood as the inclination to 
adapt when one’s typical modes of existence are thwarted or altered. It is what drives a 
person to move toward harmony when her situation becomes dissonant, and it provides 
crucial insight to the nature of injury.    
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 In order to explain this impulse of being-in-the-world, Merleau-Ponty discusses 
injury and adaptation on the miniscule scale of a simple insect. One of the most essential 
ways in which an insect engages with the world is through movement. If the ability to move 
is hindered in some way, the insect will attempt to make some adjustments so that it can 
continue to move. In fact, the way that the insect adjusts will depend on how its movement 
has been altered. For example, if the insect has one of its legs tied back away from use, 
Merleau-Ponty points out that it does not attempt to substitute a sound leg for the missing 
one. He argues that this is because the leg that cannot be used is not exactly missing. Instead, 
it “continues to count in the insect’s scheme of things… because the current of activity 
which flows towards the world still passes through it.”214 In this case, the body schema has 
been slightly altered, but not changed. The insect then adapts by “simply continuing to 
belong in the same world and move in it with all its powers.”215 The way that the insect 
adapts to these bodily challenges illustrates the way that the insect experiences the world as 
an embodied being. Though we would certainly not say that the insect is conscious in the 
same way that human beings are, the fact that it is somehow aware that the missing leg is not 
gone shows the prevalence of embodiment in the natural world. Even something as simple 
as an insect is embodied; and further; a crucial part of its embodied existence has to do with 
its specific situation and with the way that it engages with the world around it.  
If the same insect has one of its legs completely amputated, on the other hand, it does 
substitute a sound leg for the missing one. In this case, then, it seems that the insect has 
some bodily awareness that the missing leg is really gone this time; that it no longer counts in 	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its body schema, and so the method of adaptation is accordingly different. In either case, the 
adaptive mechanism reveals an inclination to continue being-in-the-world, to continue 
belonging to and engaging with the world in a similar way. Prior to the injury, the insect 
navigated through the world with the use of a certain number of legs in a certain order. Now 
missing one of those legs, the insect faces a problem; the context in which it once existed is 
the same, but the insect can no longer operate within it in the same way. Just as Stratton 
experienced with his inversion lens, the world suddenly becomes nearly impossible to 
navigate. However, when an embodied being has its embodiment challenged, there is an 
instinctual impulse to adapt. As Merleau-Ponty explains, “what is found behind the 
phenomenon of substitution is the impulse of being-in-the-world.”216 In other words, the 
instinctual action of attempting to correct for the injury in order to continue existing within 
one’s world represents a kind of urge, drive, or compulsion to adapt that is inherent in 
embodiment.  
It is tempting to say that adaptation is not unique to embodied beings. After all, 
inanimate objects adapt to force, but we would not say that they are conscious or embodied. 
They do not belong to a world or find themselves in a situation in the same way that animate 
beings do. To illustrate the difference between animate and inanimate objects, Merleau-
Ponty draws a distinction between the insect and a drop of oil. We can imagine placing a 
drop of oil on a table and then tilting the tabletop. The oil will predictably roll to the lowest 
edge, and thus seems to be adapting in a similar way that the insect is. There is an important 
difference, however.  
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The difference is simply that the drop of oil adapts itself to given external forces, 
while the insect itself projects the norms of its environment and itself lays down the terms of its 
vital problem.217 
 
There is no projection in the oil, the oil does not belong to an environment, and it does not 
have a vital problem. Indeed, only vital beings can have vital problems. To be sure, an insect is 
much more simple than a human being, and Merleau-Ponty is quick to point this out. That 
being said, there is an important way in which an insect is a being-in-the-world, and not just 
an object. A drop of oil cold be said to adapt to external forces because it moves when the 
table is tilted, but this is purely passive and involves no input on behalf of the oil. The oil 
moves or adapts itself only when it is acted upon. Further, the drop of oil never has a world in 
the same way that an insect does, and therefore cannot decide between two modes of 
adaptation. The insect belongs to a world, finds itself in a situation and actively responds to 
that situation based on the experience and needs of its body.  
As Merleau-Ponty explains, the insect finds itself “in an ‘open’ situation” which 
“requires the animal’s movements.”218 When the insect reacts to an injury by either 
substituting a missing leg or simply trying to continue to move about when a leg is tied back, 
there is a dynamic interaction with the world that cannot be present for an inanimate object 
like the drop of oil. Put another way, the drop of oil is acted on by external forces in the world; 
the insect acts within the world. The movement of the former is of necessity, while the 
movement of the latter is contingent. What is similar, then, for the human being and the 
insect, is that they are both embodied beings that belong to their worlds, and that when their 
being-in-the-world is interrupted through injury they will experience an impulse to adapt.  	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3.22 Adaptation and the phantom limb 
 Human adaptation to injury is admittedly much more complicated than insect 
adaptation to injury. Like the insect, though, a human being can adapt in various ways to 
injuries, some of which are productive and some of which are not. Merleau-Ponty uses the 
simple example of the insect to provide a way to understand a particularly complicated 
human adaptive phenomenon, phantom limb syndrome. This syndrome, common and well 
documented, occurs when an individual still feels sensation in a limb that has been 
amputated. Phantom limb syndrome is especially relevant to the current discussion of 
traumatic injury in adaptation for the following three reasons.  
First, it represents yet another example in which human phenomena simply cannot 
be understood through reductionist accounts. As Merleau-Ponty points out, phantom limb 
syndrome cannot be explained by the psychology or physiology of his day. Thus, he finds 
himself compelled “to form the idea of an organic thought through which the relation of the 
‘psychic’ to the ‘physiological’ becomes conceivable.”219 In other words, a syndrome like this 
can only be understood through the lens of phenomenology.  
 Second, phantom limb syndrome illustrates the way in which embodied beings tend 
to adapt to injury.  Not identifiable simply as a mistake in the brain, phantom limb syndrome 
represents an attempt on behalf of the amputee to continue interacting with the world in the 
way that she did prior to the injury. The sensations within the missing limb then can be 
understood as representing a refusal or inability to accept the radically different body schema 	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presented after the injury. This viewpoint enables a much different understanding of the 
phenomenon. As Merleau-Ponty explains:  
What it is in us which refuses mutilation and disablement is an I committed to a 
certain physical and inter-human world, who continues to tend towards his world 
despite handicaps and amputations, and who, to this extent, does not recognize them 
de jure…220 
 
In other words, the amputee experiences a phantom limb to replace the missing one perhaps 
in an attempt to adapt to an injury that has so drastically altered his body schema that he has 
become unrecognizable to himself. Presumably, phantom limb syndrome is so common 
because human beings are, as Merleau-Ponty points out, so committed to a certain physical 
reality.  
 Third, the way in which an individual adapts to an injury, consciously or 
unconsciously, bodily or psychologically, must be located within the context of the individual 
and what the injury means to them. What the injury and adaptive method mean are crucial 
pieces of the puzzle. As Merleau-Ponty explains,  
To have a phantom arm is to remain open to all the actions of which the arm alone 
is capable; it is to retain the practical field which one enjoyed before mutilation. The 
body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, 
to be invervolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain projects 
and be continually committed to them.221  
 
Injuries do not happen to limbs, they happen to people, and people who take themselves to 
be partially constituted by a particular body. In order to understand injury and adaptation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Ibid., 94.  
221 Ibid.  
  
129 
injury, the meaning of the injury and adaptive method to the individual must be taken into 
account.222  
Both the simple example of the insect and the far more complicated example of 
phantom limb syndrome illustrate several things about the way that traumatic injury can be 
better understood through the lens of phenomenology. The phenomenological lens allows 
us to focus on (a) the embodied character of the response to injury, (b) the adaptive 
character of that response (whether ultimately productive or unproductive), and (c) the 
particular situation, i.e., the context, of both the injury and method of adapting to it.  
 For Merleau-Ponty, to be in the world is to be more or less fragilely – indeed, 
mortally – anchored to a certain environment, to belong thus to a world, to find oneself 
within a particular situation.  This anchoring entails that adaptation is a vital part of 
existence. If human beings did not adapt to their ever-changing surroundings, survival would 
be impossible. It also follows that adaptive methods will differ, depending upon the person 
and her specific environment. However, as we see in the case of PTSD and phantom limb 
syndrome, it is not enough to just note that human beings adapt, it is also necessary to 
examine how. In doing so, important insights into the adaptive mechanisms that surround 
injury can be discovered. As discussed in chapter two, the traumatic response that leads to 
PTSD is itself an adaptive process. On a neurological level, the organism reorganizes 
functioning in order to better respond to terror as a result of an overwhelming situation. In 	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some cases, this reorganization promotes effective response and survival in the moment and 
the organism is able to return to normal functioning. In other cases, however, this series of 
adaptive responses shuts down important avenues to parts of the brain that are necessary for 
processing and recording the event. As we saw, this then results in the traumatic event being 
relived over and over in the brain and the body rather than consciously recalled the way that 
other memories are. In either case, the process was sparked by what Merleau-Ponty calls this 
“impulse of being-in-the-world.”  
Understanding the role of adaptation to trauma is vital. First, it allows the 
mechanism behind PTSD to be reframed as an adaptive, empowering one, rather than one 
that is indicative of cognitive failure or psychological weakness. This reframing seems to 
suggest that PTSD really is best understood as an injury rather than an illness, as it parallels 
adaptation to physical injury. Second, in some cases, understanding how a symptom might 
have originated from an impulse to adapt can lead to a deeper understanding of the 
symptom, which can positively impact treatment. Finally, understanding PTSD as rooted in 
the impulse to adapt can help radically reframe the way that we understand healing. To begin 
with, if PTSD is a result of adaptation to a terrifying situation in the world, it does not make 
sense to attempt to cure someone of it. One cannot be cured of their situation. Instead, 
treatment can become focused on using the adaptive impulse that is already there to adjust 
to the new situation in a more productive way. The way that adaptation can impact healing 
will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
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3.23 Adaptation and hysteria 
This section, the concluding section of this chapter, attempts to illustrate how a 
phenomenological conception of adaptation can reframe the understanding of the traumatic 
response.  It attempts to bring the nature of this reframing to light by examining Merleau-
Ponty’s analysis of a hysterical patient treated by Ludwig Binswanger.  
The case study involves a young woman who had been diagnosed with hysteria and 
admitted to Bellevue asylum in Switzerland in 1935. Her symptoms involved her mouth and 
throat; she could not speak or eat, and would often suffer from violent hiccupping attacks. 
In her patient history, Binswanger noted that she suffered from similar symptoms two other 
times in her life, once after a terrifying earthquake. The current episode seemed to have been 
set off when her mother forbade her from seeing her lover. The young woman had met a 
marine officer and wanted to marry him, but her mother thought him unfit for her.  
Merleau-Ponty explains that a Freudian analysis would “connect the symptoms to 
the oral phase of sexual development.”223 Under this account her muteness would be 
connected with her sexual being. The implication is that the symptom of muteness arises 
when her sexual desires are thwarted and cannot find outlet. Merleau-Ponty points out that 
to explain her symptoms this way is to reduce the girl and her symptoms to her existence as 
a sexual being. As we saw with his analysis of Schneider, sexuality is not a distinct biological 
function that can be stripped away from other human behavior. One does not have a sexual 
being and an expressive being and a physical being. Rather, each of these is one part of a 
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rigorous unity. The girl’s loss of her voice, then, does not just reveal something simply about 
her sexuality, but about her existence in the world in general. As Merleau-Ponty explains,  
What is ‘fixated’ on the mouth is not merely sexual existence, but, more generally, 
those relations with others having the spoken word as their vehicle. In so far as the 
emotion elects to find its expression in loss of speech, this is because of all bodily 
functions speech is the most intimately linked with communal existence, or, as we 
shall put it, with co-existence.224   
 
In other words, it is not implausible to speculate that the young woman’s symptoms have to 
do with her inability to be with her lover. However, to reduce her symptoms to her sexual 
being and not take into account what else the symptoms might mean is to risk missing a key 
part of the phenomenon. What her symptoms also accomplish, as Merleau-Ponty observes, 
is a breaking away, a cutting off from a world which feels unfamiliar and uninhabitable. In 
other words, rather than expressing an unexpressed sexual desire or drive, the young 
woman’s symptoms express her inability to communicate with the world in the way that she 
desires, and to coexist with her family and her lover. She loses her voice not because she 
suddenly loses access to words, or even that words cannot adequately express what she is 
experiencing, but because the impediment that is placed upon her interrupts her being-in-
the-world as a communicative being. She cannot communicate in the world in the way that 
she has grown accustomed to, and therefore adapts by shutting down communication 
altogether. Merleau-Ponty speculates further that the reason she experienced these same 
symptoms after the earthquake is because she felt a similar break with co-existence, sparked 
by the sudden and unavoidable presence of her own mortality.225  
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What Merleau-Ponty adds to Binswanger’s analysis of this young woman is the 
understanding that she was suffering from a rupture within her methods of communication 
with others in her world, and that this is a potential cause of her mutism. It is his 
phenomenological perspective, which sees the patient as a whole being within a particular 
context that allows him to expand on Binswanger’s analysis. Similarly, when Stratton put on 
his retinal image reversal lens, the world turned upside-down. He adapted to it by continuing 
to move about in the world however he could until it felt right side up again. As discussed 
above, his experience reveals the tremendous power within human beings to adapt. Noting 
the general impulse and capacity for adaptation does not, however, enable us to predict how 
adaptation will occur. It is just as possible to imagine an individual adapting to the reversal of 
their retinal image by freezing entirely, refusing to engage with a world that feels impossible 
to navigate. It is also possible to imagine someone closing their eyes and adapting by learning 
how to use the other senses to navigate the world that is no longer visually available. In each 
of these cases, the impulse of being-in-the-world, or the impulse to adapt is articulated in a 
different way depending on the particular person and her particular situation.  
There are several things that can be seen in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of this simple 
case study. The first is that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological perspective can reframe the 
discussion of hysteria and PTSD by focusing on what the symptoms mean to the particular 
subject experiencing them, rather than how they fit within a general diagnostic framework. 
In this case, it is not enough to know that the girl is experiencing these symptoms, and that 
they can be classified as hysterical. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis begins with her existence as an 
embodied being-in-the-world, and the result is an understanding of the symptoms that 
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comes from another perspective. When this new perspective is added to those that already 
exist, the result is a more robust and multidimensional understanding of the phenomenon.  
The second thing that can be seen here is the way in which traumatic injury reveals 
human beings to be embodied, and therefore traumatic symptoms cannot be reduced to 
scientific hypotheses. Unlike Schneider, the girl has not suffered from any physical injury, 
and yet her injuries are manifested in her body. This seems to show that if the goal is to 
come to a full understanding of traumatic injury that the embodied perspective must be 
taken into account. 
Finally, this case reveals the way in which a being-in-the-world has an impulse to 
adapt when its typical methods of engaging with the world are altered or thwarted. In this 
case, the girl adapts to her injury by losing her voice. Incidentally, in keeping with Merleau-
Ponty’s interpretation when the impediment is removed, and the young woman is again 
allowed to see her lover, she becomes able to speak and all other symptoms fade away. The 
world becomes possible for her again, and so she regains her ability to communicate with it.  
It is important to note that under Merleau-Ponty’s analysis it is not the case that the 
young woman chooses these symptoms, or willingly loses her voice. Rather, the symptoms are 
enacted by and in her body. He explains:  
The sick girl does not mime with her body a drama played out ‘in her consciousness’. 
By losing her voice she does not present a public version of an ‘inner state’… To 
have lost one’s voice is not to keep silence: one keeps silence only when one can 
speak. It is true that loss of voice is not paralysis… Yet neither is aphonia a 
deliberate or voluntary silence… The girl does not cease to speak, she ‘loses’ her 
voice as one loses a memory.226   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Ibid.  
  
135 
The symptoms are not choices she makes in order to manipulate the world back into what it 
once was. Rather, they represent her existence within her particular situation.227 It is the 
perception that hysterical or traumatic symptoms are a choice that leads to the mistreatment 
of so many traumatized patients. Recall the cases treated by Yealland mentioned in chapter 
one. Yealland believed that the symptoms did not authentically express the patients’ 
experience. He believed instead that the symptoms represented weakness, a lack of morale. 
This belief led him to treat his patients abusively, and when they were ‘cured’ of their 
muteness, he credited his own hypothesis for the success. Under Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, 
we can see that perhaps something different was going on. Merleau-Ponty might have 
surmised that the soldiers were mute because they could no longer communicate within a 
world that contained such atrocities as the ones they encountered and participated in at war. 
He might conclude that the halting and staccato movements of their bodies were a result of 
their inability to continue freely moving in a world that was so violent. He also might 
conclude that Yealland’s methods were successful because they presented a situation that 
was so terrifying for the soldiers that they abandoned their symptoms out of necessity, not 
because they had been woken up and reminded of their moral and heroic natures.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
 In the previous chapter, it was argued that the phenomenological perspective adds a 
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understanding trauma and traumatic memory. By taking into account the lived experience of 
the victim, and understanding traumatic memory as not just a problem in the brain, but a 
result of one’s horizon being altered due to traumatic experience, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological perspective allows us to reframe the discussion of traumatic memory in 
important ways.  
This chapter has expanded this discussion into one of traumatic injury in general by 
further examining the way that traumatic experience can alter one’s being in the world. 
Beginning with Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Schneider, it was argued that the 
phenomenological perspective can give insight into just what has been injured by taking into 
account the embodied person as a whole and the context in which the symptoms appear. In 
regards to the trauma response, taking into account both the generalizable symptoms 
exhibited as well as the specific context in which they arise and take form has crucial 
implications for understanding and treatment. It explains why two soldiers who experienced 
the same event during combat might both have PTSD but may exhibit symptoms from non-
overlapping DSM criteria.  
The final sections of this chapter rehearsed a key feature of a phenomenological 
perspective on traumatic injury, namely, the way that it entails an impulse to adapt to injury 
in order to mend the interruption in one’s being in the world. Understanding the trauma 
response as an attempt at adaptation allows us to reframe the meaning of PTSD from one of 
disease and mental illness to one that is founded in resilience and survival. This reframing 
yields a more positive understanding of the mechanism behind PTSD, which serves to de-
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stigmatize it for those who are suffering from it. As will be shown in the next chapter, it also 
enables us to rethink the nature of healing from trauma and PTSD.  
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Chapter Four: Narrative Adaptation to Trauma: A Phenomenological Interpretation 
 
 The previous chapter focused on the tremendous capacity to adapt to injury. And 
yet, victims do not always survive trauma. Elie Wiesel said of Primo Levi, a holocaust 
survivor who committed suicide at age sixty-seven, “he died at Auschwitz forty years 
earlier.” Present statistics show an alarming number of veterans committing suicide each 
day.228 At the same time, there are stories of incredible triumph over trauma. How, then, can 
we begin to understand what makes survival possible? It is not enough to point out that 
there is an impulse to adapt to injury (and indeed that PTSD is itself a result of attempted 
adaptation).  We must also consider what makes an adaptive method successful. This chapter 
approaches this question by examining narrative as one particular method of adaptation to 
PTSD.  
 The first section grounds the discussion of narrative by tracing the history of 
narrative as a therapeutic tool from its advent in the early 1800s to its contemporary usage. 
Mirroring the timeline of the history of the study of trauma in chapter one, I focus on 
seminal historical moments that are especially relevant regarding the use of narrative in cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Current data estimates upwards of 22 veteran suicides every day. There is some reason to believe 
that the actual number of suicides is higher, given some limitations of the data. For example, the data 
does not include suicides that by those who are not in the VA system because they were 
dishonorably discharged. This number also does not take into account the deaths of active service-
members, deaths by alcohol and drug overdose, or the deaths that occurred in Texas and California, 
as these states have not provided data. It is possible, indeed likely, that there are actually many more 
than 22 veteran suicides each day. See Janet Kemp and Robert Bossarte, “Suicide Data Report, 
2012,” Department of Veterans Affairs Mental Health Services Suicide Prevention Program (2013), 
http://www.va.gov/opa/docs/Suicide-Data-Report-2012-final.pdf. See also Janet Kemp, “Suicide 
Rates in VHA Patients through 2011 with Comparisons with Other Americans and Other Veterans 
through 2010,” Veterans Health Administration (2014), 
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of trauma. Along the way, I indicate crucial ways in which the progression of narrative 
therapy represents a phenomenological turn.229 The second section examines some 
important philosophical debates about the status and character of narrative in general. 
Engaging these debates, I contend that theories tying narrative to self-identity should be 
jettisoned in favor of understanding narrative as an embodied and interpersonal tool of 
crucial relevance to our lives, especially when facing trauma. The third section illustrates how 
recent neuroscientific research shores up the theoretical approaches discussed in the first 
two sections. The aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to corroborate to an important degree 
my central contention that narrative can function as an adaptive tool for trauma and (2) to 
develop a better understanding of how and why this is the case.230  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 It is worth recalling the three different uses of the word ‘phenomenological’ introduced in chapter 
one. First, ‘phenomenology’ can simply refer to the historical movement in philosophy that 
emphasized the study of human consciousness begun by Edmund Husserl. Second, ‘phenomenology’ 
can refer to someone’s first personal experience, as in ‘the phenomenology of perception.’ Third, and 
of most relevance here, ‘phenomenology’ can refer to a method of analysis that prioritizes the first-
personal character of experience. See Dahlstrom, Elpidorou, and Hopp, Philosophy of Mind and 
Phenomenology. When I say that narrative therapy represents a turn toward a phenomenological 
dimension, I mean to invoke this third usage. I argue that Kardiner’s work in particular laid the 
foundation for an understanding of combat trauma that takes the first-personal character of the 
experience as an essential starting point for treatment.  
230 There are two points of clarification that must be made before proceeding. The first is that, as 
with physical wounds, the goal of any trauma therapy is not to eradicate the trauma, but to make it 
possible for the victim to function in spite of it. The goal of setting a broken bone is not to erase the 
fact that the bone was broken, but to facilitate healing and prevent the injury from becoming worse. 
The same is true in the case of PTSD.  Though the victim may want to go back to a time before the 
trauma, or to forget that it ever happened, this is not a feasible goal. As described in detail in chapter 
two, an essential part of a traumatic injury is precisely an inability to forget what happened and a loss 
of pre-traumatized innocence. Rather than deny this reality, treatment of trauma must begin in an 
acknowledgement of it.    
       Second, it is important to note that the argument here is not that narrative is the only way to 
adapt to trauma, or even that it works in every single case. The argument is not that narrative therapy 
is necessary and sufficient for adaptation to trauma. Rather, I examine narrative as an existing 
adaptive tool and attempt to understand why it is effective when it is effective. Sadly, as statistics seem 
to point out, for some victims nothing proves adequate. One potential benefit of a deeper analysis of 
adaptive tools for trauma from the perspectives of phenomenology, psychology and neuroscience is a 
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4.1 Turning Toward the Phenomenological: The History of Narrative in Psychology  
 
 Though there are many varied therapies to help victims with PTSD adapt and heal, 
one of the most researched and statistically successful is narrative therapy.231 Narrative 
therapy is a method of psychotherapy whereby the patient and therapist work together to 
develop a rich and vivid account of the life story of the patient, with a focus on significant 
events.232 The theory behind this holds that human beings organize and understand their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
better understanding of precisely how narrative therapy works, which could potentially result in a 
more effective use of this adaptive tool.  
       Given the enormous amount of potential therapies, it may seem strange to focus on narrative 
therapy, which is grounded in traditional psychotherapy, or what was first called the talking cure. 
There are four reasons that I have chosen to focus on narrative therapy here. The first is that it is 
currently the form of therapy that has been officially recommended by the Institute of Medicine in 
cases of PTSD (for more statistics, facts, and current studies, see National Institutes of Mental 
Health, “PTSD Among Adults” and National Institutes of Mental Health, “PTSD.” The second is 
that many of the alternative therapies, though they may be founded in psycho-pharmaceutical 
methods or non-narrative methods, are seen as adjunctive therapies that also rely on some form of 
narrative therapy in addition. As Jonathan Shay points out, “virtually all treatment methods direct the 
survivor to construct a personal narrative at some time in his or her recovery.” See Shay, Achilles in 
Vietnam, 187-188. Further, since I have chosen to focus in this work on the diagnostic cluster that 
has to do with re-living traumatic experience, which is something that is deeply enmeshed with 
traumatic memory, it seems appropriate to focus on the therapeutic method that addresses this 
particular set of symptoms and experiences directly. Finally, the phenomenological perspective 
highlighted in the previous chapter focused on the importance of the meaning of the traumatic event 
to the subject. Though structures of meaning of course can operate on non-narrative levels, I will 
argue in the case of trauma the articulation of these structures of meaning through language in the 
presence of an empathetic audience can transform that meaning.  
231 See for example, Michelle van Etten and Steven Taylor, “Comparative Efficacy of Treatments for 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: A Meta-Analysis,” Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy 5 (1998): 126-
144. Also, see F. Neuner, et al., “Comparison of Narrative Exposure Therapy, Supportive 
Counseling, and Psychoeducation for Treating Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in an African Refugee 
Settlement,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 72, no. 4 (2004): 579-587. 
232 In many ways, this form of what was once called ‘talk therapy’ can be traced back to Freudian 
psychotherapy. Current theories and clinical practices in psychology tend to be based on the work of 
Michael White and David Epston, which will be discussed in more detail below. See Michael White 
and David Epston, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990).  
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lives by rendering events in story form. Given the assumption that stories make up the fabric 
of the history of personal consciousness, narrative therapists hold that the stories that we tell 
ourselves about the things that have happened to us determine the way that we see the world 
and interact with others in important ways. In other words, it is not just what has happened 
to us that is relevant, but the way that we interpret and understand what has happened.  
In their seminal work Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends, Michael White and David 
Epston give many examples of the power of narrative interpretation. In one such example, 
they describe a patient who arrives at a clinic in crisis. White and Epston invite us to imagine 
the way that the patient is treated and how this treatment might impact the story she tells 
about the event. In one imagined scenario, the patient is treated as if she is having “some 
sort of breakdown or regression.”233 The story that she will then go on to tell about this time 
in her life is likely negative - one in which she broke down, or was ill and weak. In an 
opposing paradigm, the same patient comes to a clinic with the same symptoms, but her 
crisis is interpreted as a “rite of passage” instead of a breakdown. In this case, “a different 
construction of the problem will be invited” and the patient will tell a different story about 
what has happened.234 This time, the story will be one that she is not ashamed of because the 
event is normalized instead of pathologized. What this example shows, they argue, is that the 
way that events are storied can greatly impact one’s psychological landscape. What happens 
to us matters, but how we tell stories about what happens to us also matters a great deal.  
Using their belief in the power of narrative, White and Epston developed a 
therapeutic method grounded in the use of narratives to empower patients to reframe the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 White and Epston, Narrative Means, 7-8.  
234 Ibid., 7.  
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events and retell the story of their lives so that they could be better integrated. In the case of 
a patient who has sustained trauma, the most general purpose of narrative therapy is to 
develop an account of the traumatic event or events in an effort to situate them within the 
larger life story of the patient. The method is based on the idea that if a patient can construct 
a meaningful narrative about the event that fits into her life story, she increases her chances 
of regaining some control over it and hindering it from continuously intruding into the 
present.235 Though White and Epston are influential in current clinical settings, it would be 
remiss to neglect the history that influenced them.  
  
4.11 Narrative Beginnings: The Emergence of the Talking Cure in Classical 
Psychoanalysis  
 The history of the use of narrative in clinical settings begins with the study of trauma 
in the late 1800s. As discussed in chapter one, in Studies On Hysteria, Sigmund Freud and 
Josef Breuer report their discovery that patients who verbalized their traumatic pasts often 
found profound remission of hysterical symptoms. The origin of their symptoms could be 
traced back to the perplexing tension between the presence and the absence of the traumatic 
past. Oddly, hysterical patients often did not have conscious access to the specifics of their 
pasts, but consistently found remnants of those past events present in somatic symptoms. 
Freud and Breuer employed hypnotism in order to unearth what was too overwhelming to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 For an excellent summary of narrative therapy and how it is situated within psychological theory, 
see Alphons Richert, Integrating Existential and Narrative Therapy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 2010), especially chapter three.  
  
143 
cope with in the moment and therefore had been repressed.236 What they discovered in their 
examination of hysterical patients was that when the overwhelming event or events could 
finally be uncovered, spoken of, and connected to the bodily symptoms that the patient was 
suffering from, the symptoms would disappear. Freud and Breuer themselves acknowledge 
that they came by this discovery largely by accident.  
For we found, to our great surprise at first, that each individual hysterical symptom 
immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly 
to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its 
accompanying affect, and when the patient had described the event in the greatest possible detail 
and had put the affect into words.237  
 
In other words, in their work with traumatized patients, they noticed that there seemed to be 
something therapeutic about simply externalizing the event by means of a narrative that gave 
voice to the emotions that were connected to the event. The first instance of this discovery 
was the case of Anna O.238 This patient is described by Breuer as an empathetic, sensitive 
and intelligent woman, who began suffering from hysterical symptoms over a ten-month 
span in which she was caring for her dying father. During his illness, and subsequently after 
his death, she suffered from dissociative psychosis, alternating states of consciousness, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 See Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, 37-38, my emphasis. 
237 Ibid., 40-1.  
238 Anna O. was a pseudonym for Bertha Pappenheim. There are two things that are especially 
important to note about her case. First, though the case study in Studies on Hysteria states that Anna 
O. was cured, this was not the case. After treating her for about two years, Breuer admitted her to 
Bellevue Sanatorium (which was under the direction of Ludwig Biswanger), where she remained 
suffering for several years. Pappenheim eventually recovered and became an influential scholar and 
feminist. The second thing that is important to note is that her case is cited as the beginning of what 
would come to be called the ‘talking cure.’ For the importance of Anna O. in the early days of 
psychoanalysis, see Dianne Hunter, “Hysteria, Psychoanalysis, and Feminism: The Case of Anna O.,” 
Feminist Studies 9, no. 3 (1983): 464-488. In many ways, the case studies presented in Studies on Hysteria 
can be seen as the beginning of psychoanalysis. See also, Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 19-20. For a 
thorough exploration of her life and mental illness, see Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Remembering Anna O.: 
A Century of Mystification (New York: Routledge, 1996).  
  
144 
severe headaches, a persistent squint, and intermittent paralysis of her upper and lower 
extremities and neck muscles among other distressing symptoms.239  
 One symptom that Breuer found particularly fascinating was that she seemed to 
“transfer into the past.” Specifically, she would retreat into the year before her father died 
whenever she smelled oranges, which she had eaten almost exclusively while first taking care 
of him. Her belief that it was 1880 instead of 1881 was so total that she forgot nearly every 
detail of 1881, including the fact that she had moved. As Breuer describes,  
She was carried back to the previous year with such intensity that in the new house 
she hallucinated her old room, so that when she wanted to go to the door she kicked 
up against the stove which stood in the same relation to the window as the door did 
in the old room.240  
 
Much like the veteran who hears a loud noise and is suddenly transported back to combat, in 
these moments when the past was ushered forward into the present, Anna ceased to be able 
to tell the difference between the past and the present. 
 After spending several months with her, Breuer stumbled upon a therapeutic 
procedure that he claimed rid her of all of these symptoms. He discovered this accidentally 
while trying to deal with one of the more urgent symptoms that had arisen, which was a 
complete inability to drink. Anna would feel thirsty, reach for a glass of water, and then push 
it away, unable to drink and with no conscious understanding of why she was suddenly 
hydrophobic. One evening, while under hypnosis, Anna started to tell a story about a visit 
with a friend, where she witnessed this friend letting her dog drink out of her own water 
glass. Anna had felt it necessary to be polite in the moment, but while under hypnosis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, 56.  
240 Ibid., 67.  
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revealed feeling intense anger and disgust. As soon as she told this story while expressing the 
initial anger and disgust while under hypnosis, she asked for a glass of water, drank it, and 
then awoke, never to experience hydrophobia again.241 Though this particular instance of 
seeing a dog drink from her friend’s water glass wasn’t necessarily traumatic in the way that 
the sickness and subsequent death of her father were, it was a time in which Anna felt 
intense affect that could not be discharged, which led to an interruption in her normal 
functioning. The incident signaled to Breuer that there might be a way to reach Anna and 
alleviate her symptoms.   
 Breuer went on to take each of her symptoms and connect them with the original 
disturbance through conversation with Anna while she was under hypnosis, and he reported 
that as they went through this process each symptom disappeared. As he says, “In this way 
her paralytic contractors and anesthesia, disorders of vision and hearing of every sort, 
neuralgias, coughing, tremors, etc. and finally her disturbances of speech were ‘talked 
away.’”242   
 Freud and Breuer theorized that if the patient could be convinced to talk about the 
traumatic event, while feeling the overwhelming emotions that were repressed, the traumatic 
symptoms no longer manifested themselves somatically in the patient. They explain:  
The injured person’s reaction to the trauma only exercises a completely ‘cathartic’ 
effect if it is an adequate reaction… but language serves as a substitute for action; by its 
help, an affect could be ‘abreacted’ almost as effectively.243   
 
In other words, hysterical symptoms appeared because there was some emotion or set of 
emotions that became internalized rather than expressed, and the internalization of 	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242 Ibid., 70. This moment in this particular case study marks the birth of the term ‘talking cure.’  
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unexpressed affect led to these somatic symptoms. These patients were so difficult to treat 
because the remnants of their pasts were constantly enacted even though there was no 
immediate consciousness of the past or awareness that the past was what was causing the 
symptoms. The cure was to give voice to the affect and release it, if not in action, in 
language.   
 Studies on Hysteria would have us think that this ‘talking cure’ was a panacea for 
hysteria.  Yet, while Anna may have experienced some relief, Breuer did not succeed in 
curing her and she went on to suffer continuously for several years. As mentioned in chapter 
one, Freud and Breuer would go on to disavow themselves of their research entirely, and set 
aside the subject of hysteria. Though the miraculousness of their discoveries was perhaps 
exaggerated, and their abandonment of their patients was certainly problematic, their 
findings were not entirely off the mark. The truth (or accuracy) of their findings lies in the 
core belief that narrating the traumatic event has therapeutic power.  
 
4.12 Abram Kardiner and a Turn Toward the Phenomenological   
 As discussed in chapter one, Abram Kardiner is one clinician who attempted to 
rescue these core ideas from the wreckage of Freud and Breuer’s work to improve the 
treatment of combat veterans in the 1940s. Kardiner’s experience with veterans brought a 
few notable theoretical differences and clinical improvements to Freud and Breuer’s initial 
work. Among these improvements was a deeper understanding of just what was helpful 
about talking through the traumatic event.  
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 Freud and Breuer had thought that the success of their treatment resulted from a 
combination of abreaction and catharsis, i.e., reliving the traumatic event and purging the 
repressed emotion, respectively.244 This might be termed the abreaction/catharsis model. 
Again, it is based on the theory that at the heart of hysteria was an event and corresponding 
set of emotions that had not been expressed. These emotions, as long as they continued to 
go unexpressed, would continue to produce and be enacted as hysterical symptoms. That is, 
of course, unless the clinician could get the patient to feel and express these emotions while 
rendering the event into coherent narrative form, or talking it through.  
 Kardiner held on to the theory that talking through the traumatic past could be 
therapeutic for victims, but dismissed the explanation that results came from abreaction and 
catharsis. Kardiner thought the mechanism behind the ‘talking cure’ was less about a release 
of pent up emotion and more about acknowledging those emotions as a logical reaction to 
an upsetting event, and then beginning a process of “re-education of [one’s] sense of reality.” 
245 In other words, the success of the therapy is not due to the fact that it allows patients to 
express some hitherto unexpressed emotion. As Kardiner remarks about the 
abreaction/catharsis model, “the matter is not quite so simple, as may be proven from the 
chronic cases where abreaction by itself has no curative value.”246 Instead, narrative therapy 
was successful because talking through the traumatic event lends structure and coherence to 
an overwhelming experience, thereby allowing the patient to stand back from the event and 
re-examine the ways in which the trauma might be coloring his current experience.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Though the ideas of abreaction and catharsis are repeated throughout the case studies in Studies on 
Hysteria, they are first mentioned in the Preliminary Communications on page 43. 
245 Kardiner, Traumatic Neuroses of War, 216-232.  
246 Ibid., 216.  
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The goal of therapy for a traumatized individual according to Kardiner is twofold. 
First, the patient should be gradually made aware of the way in which he may have 
developed maladaptive tendencies as a result of the traumatic event. As will be illustrated in a 
case study below, even though the patient may understand that he is experiencing symptoms 
as a result of his traumatic experience, the nuances of the origin and purpose of these 
symptoms will often evade him. Second, “every effort should be bent to re-educating the 
patient to the actual realities in which he lives rather than to the dangerous and inhospitable 
world in which he fancies himself.”247 Once the patient has been made aware of the 
connections between his symptoms and past trauma, he can begin to understand the 
difference between the past and present and eventually come to see that the trauma is not 
repeating itself in the present.  
 In one case study, Kardiner describes his treatment of a patient whose main 
symptoms were persistent and debilitating fainting spells and nightmares. The fainting spells 
were preceded by “a queer sensation in the pit of his stomach,” and the nightmares always 
involved falling from high places. 248 Kardiner reports that the patient was resistant to 
therapy at first, explaining that he was working hard to try and forget the things that 
Kardiner was trying to get him to remember. This patient had survived a plane crash in 
combat, but had no conscious memory of it, so he did not connect his symptoms with that 
event. The first step of therapy was for Kardiner to get the patient to see the ways in which 
he had developed maladaptive tendencies. Kardiner suspected that the ‘queer feeling in his 
stomach’ and his nightmares of falling from high places were instances of re-experiencing 	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149 
the plane crash.249 Though the patient was aware that he was having these fainting spells and 
nightmares, he had no conscious memory of the plane crash and so he did not see the 
connection between the somatic memory and the past event. When Kardiner helped the 
patient see this possible source of his symptoms, the patient was able to connect his present 
experience and symptoms to his experience in the cockpit during the crash. This process 
allowed the patient to understand his symptoms as maladaptive reflexes that arose from the 
original trauma. When the patient became aware that the uncomfortable symptoms arose 
from a fear of falling that originated from a somatic memory of his plane crash, this allowed 
him to find some distance between the past trauma and the present moment. This eventually 
enabled him to differentiate between the memory and the present moment and see that he is 
not actually in danger. Kardiner explains that these symptoms arise from an attempt to 
adapt. 
It was not very difficult to convince him of two important things. First, that all these 
devices he was using were defensive maneuvers of a more or less reflex and 
disorganized kind. And secondly, that these defensive devices were quite irrelevant to 
the actual world in which he was living.250 
 
When experiencing the overwhelming horror of hurtling through the air, the patient’s 
defense mechanism was to faint, perhaps as an attempt to evade the terror and pain of what 
was happening. This defense mechanism – which may have saved the patient in the moment 
– had become maladaptive, as it came to accompany experiences in the world in which there 
is no actual danger. Finding ways to get the patient to see how his symptoms arose from the 
attempt to adapt became a key part of healing. 
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Kardiner then goes on to describe the care with which he approached this patient, 
consistently allowing the patient to determine the pace at which they worked. Freud and 
Breuer worked with hypnotized patients who were sometimes forcibly brought back into the 
past by the clinician in order to abreact or relive the event, as part of an attempt to achieve a 
catharsis of emotions. Kardiner preferred to work with fully conscious patients, arguing that 
abreaction under hypnosis could be violent and destructive for both the patient and the 
clinician.251   
What is distinctive about Kardiner’s method here, as opposed to the 
abreaction/catharsis model employed by Freud and Breuer, is that it focuses on the first-
personal experience of the patient’s trauma as well as the first-personal experience of 
therapy. Further, the idea of re-educating the patient emerges from an understanding that 
traumatic symptoms are not simply instances of unexpressed emotion. Rather, Kardiner 
seems to be aware that what has been injured in the case of trauma is the way in which the 
victim sees and operates within the world (what Merleau-Ponty might call ‘the patient’s 
horizon’). Kardiner’s improvements on Freud and Breuer’s abreaction/catharsis model can 
be seen as a turn toward a phenomenological approach. In addition to giving priority to the 
first-personal experience of the patient, he seems to be aware that trauma is disruptive 
because it alters the patient’s phenomenal field. When Anna O. smelled oranges, her past 
came forward into the present. Her present experience of the world elided with her 
traumatic experience a year earlier, and her phenomenal field was then overtaken by the 
traumatic past. When the veteran felt a pit in his stomach, he was experiencing his fall all 
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over again. Kardiner seems to have recognized that, in order to help patients like these, the 
clinician first needs to understand not just that they are suffering from a delusion, or an 
incorrect view of the present, but that for them the past really is present in some important 
way.252 He is clear that the patient inhabits a different reality. Following this, he argues that 
the clinician needs to find a way to re-educate the patient, to alter her phenomenal field again 
in order to show her that this room is not in the old house, and that her father is not 
presently dying, but that this is a new house and her father has died. Or in the case of the 
veteran, that he is not falling through the air, but instead re-experiencing a fragment of the 
past.  
Though Kardiner might not have recognized it as such, he opened up a space for 
fruitfully reinterpreting Freud and Breuer’s work precisely by taking a phenomenological 
turn in understanding and treating the trauma victim. What Kardiner discovers is that the 
‘talking cure’ was not about reliving the trauma and going deeper into the emotional 
response. Instead it was about finding ways to stop the reliving. Kardiner’s improvements on 
Freud and Breuer’s theory are based in the understanding that abreaction and catharsis are 
not the cure for trauma, but that they are precisely the problem.  
 As a result of his improvements to Freud and Breuer’s work, Kardiner came to 
redefine trauma as an injury to adaptive processes, rather than understand it as the result of 
interrupted affects (the underlying premise of Freud and Breuer’s abreaction/catharsis 
model). According to Kardiner, trauma is an injury whereby, “adaptive processes are injured, 
spoiled, disorganized, or shattered.” Accordingly, traumatic symptoms must be understood 	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as “new adaptations.” 253 Kardiner’s method of treating combat victims assumes that in order 
to understand the traumatized patient, one must begin by examining what sorts of 
maladaptive structures of meaning have been constructed out of the trauma. Kardiner 
explains that a patient can achieve relief from his suffering only when his “picture of the 
outer world has been changed, when his courage and resources in handling this new external 
reality have been increased or restored, at least in part, to their erstwhile state.”254 To use 
Anna O. as an example, it is not enough for her to simply say what happened while feeling 
overwhelming emotions under hypnosis and then have this traumatic event connected to the 
present symptom by the therapist (though this may have had a short term positive effect). 
Kardiner might say that what Breuer failed to do was to find ways to show Anna that the 
present was not the threatening past, though it may have at times felt the same.  
To summarize, Kardiner’s improvements on Freud and Breuer’s initial theories 
about the talking cure marked a turning towards a clinical method with patent parallels to 
phenomenology. These parallels are on display in the way that Kardiner understands trauma 
to be an adaptive response, in his emphasis on the first personal experience of the patient, 
and in his understanding of the way that trauma alters what Merleau-Ponty would call the 
patient’s “phenomenal field.” Contemporary psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians have 
picked up where Kardiner left off, taking the phenomenological turn even more explicitly, 
especially as they struggle to understand and treat victims of trauma. There are two ways in 
which this can be seen, first with the resurgence of the talking cure under the new name of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Kardiner, Traumatic Neuroses of War, 74. Even within Kardiner’s definition of trauma, we can again 
see a turn towards a phenomenological understanding of trauma. As seen in the previous chapter, 
this language of trauma, injury and adaptation would be used by Merleau-Ponty just five years later in 
his attempt to give a phenomenological account of Schneider’s combat trauma. 
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“narrative therapy” in the 1990s, and second with the more recent movement that has been 
termed “psychoanalytic phenomenology.”  
 
4.13 The Phenomenological Turn in Current Approaches to Narrative Therapy 
At present, narrative approaches to therapy – including psychotherapy, cognitive 
behavioral therapy and narrative exposure therapy – all share a few foundational ideas.255 The 
first is the idea that individuals navigate the world and create personal realities through the 
use of language, and that because of this feature, personal identity is in some relevant sense 
shaped by narratives or stories. In keeping with this idea, proponents of a narrative approach 
hold that externalizing events and rendering them in story form can allow the patient to 
transform the way that she relates to the event. The extent to which an individual’s personal 
reality is constructed narratively is something that varies within the field of psychology. 
Radical constructivists, for example, hold that objective reality is inaccessible, and therefore 
the only version of reality that is relevant is the one that is created by the neurological 
structure of the individual human brain. Social constructivists, on the other hand, hold that 
reality - and by extension personal identity - is a social construction, and therefore that 
meaning is constructed socially. Critical constructivists also hold that reality is created 
socially, but they also believe that the mind can intervene and assign new meaning to that 
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reality.256 Though approaches differ based on which of these ideologies a clinician finds 
herself aligning with, all narrative approaches to therapy agree that who we are is in some 
important way a result of the stories that we tell about our past and future.  
As described above, narrative therapy experienced a renaissance in current clinical 
environments in part because of Michael White and David Epston’s book Narrative Means to 
Therapeutic Ends.257 Narrative therapists following White and Epston argue that psychological 
angst can be attributed to fissures in the story or stories that a patient is telling about herself 
and her life. They argue that a coherent story about one’s life is central to one’s sense of self. 
When the stories that one tells about one’s life do not match up with one another, or when 
they fail to adequately express an experience, this presents a problem. The solution is to use 
narrative in order to reframe the stories so that they do match up with and/or adequately 
express their experience. This empowers the patient to take control of the past by rendering 
into narrative form, and also to determine her own meaning of the events in the past.258 In 
order for the patient to render the events of the past in narrative form, she must step into 
the narrator position; which is a position that enables her to tell the story from a new 
temporal perspective. The narrator occupies the present moment and speaks of the past (or 
the future) as a distinct and distant thing. In so doing, the narrator has the opportunity to 
both report what happened, and also to create (or revise) the meaning of what happened.259 
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In the same way that objects appear different as we move away from them, so, too, can the 
events of our lives have different meanings at different times. Perhaps even more important 
is that when the ‘I’ position is occupied and able to tell a story about ‘me,’ a distance 
between the past and present is established. This allows the traumatic event to be situated in 
the past by the victim.   
This idea is based on the value of an integrative understanding of the self, i.e., the 
notion that the self is better understood not as an object, but as a way of interacting with the 
world. One’s sense of self can be understood as a “process of (or point of) meeting the 
world.”260 It is worth pointing out here that under this account the self is necessarily 
historical (because the world she interacts with is historical). What this means is that 
integration also requires some continuity between past, present and future. Eugene Gendlin’s 
concept of the felt-implicit is helpful here. The felt-implicit is the embodied experience that 
an individual has in the moment. It is pre-conceptual and remains so unless the subject finds 
a reason to articulate it through language – which she can choose to do at anytime. Gendlin 
argues that meaning creation occurs when lived experience (which though it is implicit it 
always carries with it the possibility of being made explicit) becomes explicit and meaningful 
through the use of language.261 In other words, our lived experience is immediate and 
inarticulate, and it becomes archived and meaningful when we put language to our 
experience. This process of putting experience into language enables the subject to both 
engage with the world as a relatively stable self because as she archives events, she 	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determines the importance of events and the meanings that they carry for her. Gendlin goes 
even further to argue that the way that the story is told and what it then means for the 
subject can change her experience of the external world.  
For example, if I were to tell you a story about a time when I nearly drowned after 
falling into a swimming pool at the age of five, I do so from a great distance from that event. 
Yet, I am still able to recognize myself in that story, and I am able to give an account of what 
this story means for me. In fact, the meaning of the story may change as I tell it in different 
times of my life. In this way, I am able to integrate my past with my present and I am able to 
assign and revise the meaning that events have. Under this account of narrative and 
selfhood, what is so problematic about traumatic events is precisely that they resist this kind 
of integration. One is either unable to gain the necessary perspective to separate between the 
past and present (‘me’ versus ‘I’, respectively) or she is somehow not able to entirely take up 
the perspective of the narrator ‘I’ who is able to fully recognize that the event happened and 
is not still happening. We can see this clearly in the case of Kardiner’s veteran whose 
symptoms occur because he cannot separate the inner feeling of falling from the past 
experience of the plane crash. When Kardiner recognizes the symptom as tied to the past, 
and is able to get the patient to recognize this as well, the ‘I’ perspective becomes accessible 
to the patient as he begins to be able to tell a story of what happened to ‘him.’262 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 It is important here to note the limitations of the ‘I’ versus ‘me’ metaphor. When Richert denotes 
the ‘me’ stance, he seems to assume that the ‘me’ always carries the past participle with it. In other 
words, when ‘I’ tell a story about ‘me,’ I always refer to a ‘me’ of the past. This doesn’t seem quite 
accurate, because I often tell stories about what is presently happening to ‘me.’ Though this may be 
indicative of a crack in the metaphor, it does not render the distinction futile. What is more relevant 
in narrating a present or a past event is the ability to take up both an internal and external perspective 
on that event. This taking up of the external perspective that Richert calls ‘I’ is what allows for a 
space not just between the past and the present, but also between the event and the self. In other 
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Dori Laub, a contemporary clinician who works primarily with holocaust survivors, 
bases his clinical methods on the power of giving testimony to heal trauma. He argues that 
taking up the two perspectives of present and past allows for an inner dialogue that is not 
only necessary for integration, but also required for empathic communication within the self. 
The connection between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ – or what Laub terms ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ – 
perspectives is essential, Laub argues, for normal functioning. For Laub, the role of narrative 
is not just one of archiving, but there is always an inner dialogue occurring between ‘I’ and 
‘Thou.’ ‘I’ address the inner ‘Thou’ in order to narrate and represent what has happened as 
well as to decipher meaning. Though victims may survive trauma physically, what has been 
annihilated is the inner ‘Thou’ perspective that is necessary for internal dialogue.263 The 
destruction of one half of this inner dyad is constitutive of traumatic experience, according 
to Laub, and healing can only happen when the dyad is restored. Restoration becomes 
possible when the traumatic event is narrated in the presence of another empathetic listener 
who can provide – from the outside – the perspective that has been annihilated. This outside 
perspective of the listener acts like a crutch until a conscious memory is created that can be 
integrated, at which point the internal dialogue is restored and the crutch is no longer 
needed.264 As he explains,  
Trauma, when relived and re-experienced in the context of a dialogue with an 
empathic listener, may restore, to a degree, the victim’s sense of being at home in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
words, even if ‘I’ am narrating a story about what is currently happening to ‘me,’ my ability to tell that 
story is predicated on a certain distance between myself and the event. This issue is perhaps better 
understood within the philosophical perspective, which is discussed below.  
263 Dori Laub, “Reestablishing the Internal ‘Thou’ in Testimony of Trauma,” Psychoanalysis, Culture & 
Society 18, no. 2 (2013): 184-198.  
264 Laub, “Reestablishing the Internal ‘Thou’,” 187.  
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world. There is no longer the utter aloneness and incommunicability that is part of 
the extreme traumatic experience.265  
 
In contemporary narrative therapy, and perhaps especially in Laub’s account of trauma and 
narrative, we see a radical turn toward a phenomenological approach to the experience of 
trauma. Clinical methods have evolved from simply understanding and cataloguing 
symptoms to focusing on the inner conscious experience of the traumatized patient and 
encouraging adaptation there. As Laub acknowledges,  
While both [psychoanalytic and neuroscientific] approaches offer a general 
understanding of the psychological phenomenology of extreme traumatic experience, 
neither specifically examines this phenomenology in order to glean from it a more 
precise understanding of its unique experiential dimension. Both stop short of 
looking at such experience from ‘the inside’.266  
 
What the phenomenological turn enables, then, is the evolution of the theoretical structure 
of narrative therapy from a method whereby a clinician gains access to unexpressed emotion 
to a method by which the patient becomes able to adapt to her world by gaining access to 
new perspectives.  
This embrace of a phenomenological approach can be seen perhaps even more 
explicitly in the movement termed psychoanalytic phenomenology, which links classical 
psychoanalysis with phenomenologists from the history of philosophy in order to better 
understand human experience. At the forefront of this movement are the clinicians Donna 
Orange, George Atwood, and Robert Stolorow, who use phenomenology in clinical settings 
in order to describe, understand and treat trauma and traumatic loss.267  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Ibid., 196. 
266 Ibid., 197.  
267 See, for example, Donna M. Orange, George E. Atwood, and Robert D. Stolorow, Working 
Intersubjectively: Contextualism in Psychoanalytic Practice (Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1997); and see 
Robert D. Stolorow, George E. Atwood, and Donna M. Orange, Worlds of Experience: Interweaving 
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Orange, Atwood and Stolorow (who work collaboratively as well as individually) 
begin from a stance that is directly phenomenological, as can be gathered from their 
contention that psychoanalysis suffers from its commitment to a version of Cartesian 
dualism (the separation of mind and body). They argue that behind Freud and Breuer’s 
abreaction/catharsis model betrays the inheritance of a mind/body dualism, since Freud and 
Breuer seem to have understood hysterical symptoms to arise from bodily affect that was 
divorced from the rational mind. On this account, psychological problems – and perhaps 
hysteria/trauma in particular – could be understood as a failure of the mind to control the 
body. Opposing this, Orange, Atwood and Stolorow have developed intersubjective-systems 
theory, which counters Cartesian dualism by holding that human behavior always occurs 
within relational contexts, and that these contexts must be taken into account when 
attempting to understand human behavior.268  
Perhaps most notable in Stolorow’s work in particular is the way that he uses 
psychoanalysis alongside phenomenology in order to define traumatic experience. Over and 
against the dualist model that views traumatic emotion as a kind of “flooding of an ill-
equipped Cartesian container,” Stolorow defines trauma as “an experience of unbearable 
affect… constituted in an intersubjective context in which severe emotional pain cannot find 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Philosophical and Clinical Dimensions in Psychoanalysis (New York: Basic Books, 2002). See also George 
Atwood and Robert Stolorow, Structures of Subjectivity: Explorations in Psychoanalytic Phenomenology and 
Contextualism (New York: Routledge, 2014); George Atwood, The Abyss of Madness (New York: 
Routledge, 2011); and Donna M. Orange, Thinking for Clinicians: Philosophical Resources for Contemporary 
(New York: Routledge, 2010). Each of these works examines the phenomenological perspective and 
its potential influence on psychoanalytic theory and/or practice. These clinicians and theorists each 
have important things to add to the discussion of phenomenology, but because Stolorow has written 
so directly about trauma, I will mostly limit my discussion here to Stolorow’s work. 
268 Stolorow, Trauma and Human Existence, 1-3; and Stolorow, World, Affectivity, Trauma, 13.  
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a relational home in which it can be held.”269 As discussed in chapter one, a relational home 
according to Stolorow is an intersubjective space where another person can help the 
individual bear those emotions and successfully put the event into the past. On this 
definition, trauma is an emotional pain that initially seems unbearable. In order for someone 
to remain captive of trauma so construed, i.e., in order to move beyond the traumatic 
ground zero of unbearable pain, she must successfully adapt to it and, in keeping with 
Stolorow’s definition, that means locating a relational home where she can gradually feel 
through and process (endure) the emotion with someone else. In the absence of a relational 
home, trauma will persist. As he observes, “Painful emotional experiences become 
enduringly traumatic in the absence of an intersubjective context within which they can be 
held and integrated.”270 
This observation emphasizes a key aspect of narrative as an adaptive tool in the case 
of trauma; namely, the importance of a particular kind of listener or audience. In other 
words, it is not sufficient to narrate a traumatic event to just anyone. Though there may be 
many possible ways in which one might constitute a ‘relational home,’ Stolorow argues that 
sharing the story and emotions specifically with someone who is able to respond 
empathetically is an especially powerful way to heal. It is powerful because narrating to 
someone who responds empathetically both creates the kind of structuring and distancing 
available in the narrative form, and provides the empathetic response that can reestablish 
what Laub would call the relationship with the inner ‘Thou.’ This empathy is possible even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Stolorow, Trauma and Human Existence, 3 & 10.  
270 Ibid., 47. For a discussion of some difficulties related to listening to others bear witness about 
their trauma see Ghislane Boulanger, “Witnesses to Reality: Working Psychodynamically With 
Survivors of Terror,” Psychoanalytic Dialogues 18 (2008): 638-657. 
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when the listener has not experienced a similar kind of trauma because Stolorow argues that 
trauma – or at the very least the possibility of trauma – is “fundamental to our existential 
constitution.”271 Though we are all separated by our unique experiences and perceptions of 
the world, we are also united in our shared vulnerability to loss and trauma. Borrowing a 
phrase from Lawrence Vogel, Stolorow argues that it is our shared vulnerability that allows 
us to empathize with each other, and become what Stolorow calls “Siblings in the Same 
Darkness.”272  
Just as finitude is fundamental to our existential constitution, so too is it constitutive 
of our existence that we meet each other as ‘brothers and sisters in the same dark 
night,’ deeply connected with one another in our common finitude. Thus, although 
the possibility of emotional trauma is ever present, so too is the possibility of 
forming bonds of deep emotional attunement within which devastating emotional 
pain can be held, rendered more tolerable, and, hopefully, eventually integrated.273  
 
In Stolorow’s work, we can see a balance of classical psychoanalysis and contemporary 
phenomenology. The idea of trauma as unbearable affect can be attributed to Freud and 
Breuer’s suspicion that unexpressed emotion lies at the heart of trauma. His emphasis on 
sharing one’s lived and subjective experience, on the other hand, comes directly from 
phenomenology.  
The turn toward a phenomenological approach is by no means complete in clinical 
psychoanalysis. Particularly in the current age of psychopharmaceutical intervention, many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Ibid., 49. It should be noted here that Stolorow references several thinkers in philosophy and 
psychoanalysis in his work. On this particular issue, Stolorow references Martin Heidegger and 
Simon Critchley’s critique of Heidegger, as well as the analysts Heinz Kohut. Though it is beyond the 
scope of this work, Critchley’s critique of Heidegger’s understanding of death as fundamentally non-
relational would be particularly interesting to examine within the discussion of the possibility of 
trauma as a relational phenomenon. For this critique, see Simon Critchley, “Enigma Variations: An 
Interpretation of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit,” Ratio 15 (2002): 154-175.  
272 Stolorow, Trauma and Human Existence, 47-51.  
273 Ibid., 49. See also, Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile ‘We”: Ethical Implications of Heidegger’s ‘Being-and-
Time,’ (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 93-98.   
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have turned back to what is generalizable rather than what is individual, and towards 
reductionist explanations of symptoms rather than holistic ones.274 Breuer and Freud laid the 
foundation for talk therapy, which was then improved upon by Kardiner. The groundwork 
laid in these two moments in the history of narrative adaptation to trauma seem to have 
opened a door to a phenomenological understanding of trauma and narrative adaptation to 
it. Indeed, the history of phenomenology and the talking cure suggests that psychology and 
phenomenology can continue to inform each other towards a deeper understanding of 
human phenomena in general, and specifically that of trauma.  
 
4.2 Narrative, Philosophy & Trauma 
 
The foregoing sketch of the history of narrative therapy all but sets the stage for 
consideration of the possibilities and limitations of narrative for coping with trauma.  Yet 
there is a further step of stage-setting that must be taken.  The proponents of narrative 
therapy start out, as we have seen, from the presupposition that narrative is instrumental, if 
not integral to self-identity. However, this presupposition is not universally shared.  Some 
philosophers challenge any appeal to narrative when it comes to identifying oneself 
authentically. Hence, before turning to its prospects for coping with trauma, it is incumbent 
on me to respond to this challenge and offer an argument for the positive role of narrative in 
questions of self-identity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 See, for example, Aho and Guignon, “Medicalized Psychiatry and Talking Cure,” 293-308. 
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 Philosophers debate the extent to which self-identity relies on narrative. Proponents 
of the idea that our lives do and must maintain narrative form occupy one pole of the 
debate, while the other is occupied by those who hold that this is neither true nor is it 
necessarily desirable. The case of trauma presents an interesting paradigm within the 
philosophical debate, as traumatic events seem to need to be narrated (which itself seems to 
gesture at the necessity of some basic narrative structure). However, as we have seen, trauma 
can feel impossible to render into narrative form. In addition to clarifying the stakes of this 
tension and its resolution, exposition of the debate within philosophy provides a theoretical 
structure for understanding why narrative can be so helpful in the psychological treatment of 
cases of trauma.  After glossing the views of two, diametrically opposed thinkers on this 
topic (Alasdair MacIntyre and Galen Strawson), I take up the moderate view of narrative 
elaborated by Peter Goldie.  The advantage of his view is its ability to reimagine the role of 
narrative in our lives while showing, at the same time, why narrative can be so helpful in the 
case of trauma.   
 Before delving into these debates about narrative, it is helpful to begin with a 
working definition of narrative. I take a narrative to be a linguistic representation of events 
or sequences that occur to conscious human agents, a representation that is expressed from 
a particular perspective. The occurrence to conscious human agents entails degrees of 
coherence, continuity and meaning. Narratives can apply to conscious human agents 
collectively (as in the case of communities) or individuals. This entailment explains why 
narratives help us understand, relate to, and file away the things that happen to us and to 
those around us. Though it is of course possible to tell completely fictional narratives, the 
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kind of narratives that are at play here are personal narratives in so far as they are about 
people and the events in their lives. There are a few essential things to note in this definition. 
First, a narrative is more than a simple list or chronicle, but does not need to necessarily 
have strong and coherent causation – both coherence and causation occur in degrees. 
Second, it is linguistic, meaning that its form is language, rather than music or painting for 
example – but it can be thought through and not necessarily spoken or written. Third, it is 
crucial to notice the interplay between the subjective perspective and the objective world in 
which the events that are narrated occur. A narrative cannot ever be purely objective because 
it is always a representation that comes from a particular perspective. This means that on 
some level, all narratives are colored both by the perspectives within them, and the 
perspective of the person telling them.  
However, it is crucial to note that it does not follow that all narratives are then false. 
Since a narrative is defined here as a representation of an event or sequence of events, it has 
important ties to the objective world. Both the objective reality of the event and the 
perspective of the person who lived through it and is now telling a story about it are 
necessary and important. Sometimes the objective reality of the events and the 
representation of the events match nearly perfectly, but sometimes there is quite a bit of 
space between them. As we have seen above, and will in more detail below, navigating the 
space between representation and reality is indeed one of the tasks of narrative as an 
adaptive tool in the case of trauma. Finally, narratives have a distinct purpose in our lives; 
they are not meant to encompass our lives. As I argue below, it is quite possible to hold the 
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view that narrative can be a crucial part of human life without maintaining that human life 
can or should be reduced to a story.  
 
4.21 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Narrative View  
The current philosophical debate in narrative can be traced back to MacIntyre’s book 
After Virtue, in which he argues that selfhood “resides in the unity of a narrative which links 
birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end.”275 MacIntyre holds that 
narrative cohesion is essential for a good life. He goes so far as to claim that if one does not 
have a cohesive, chronological story about oneself that is organized around a central quest 
for virtue, one does not have a self (or at the very least, one cannot be a virtuous person).276 
His argument for this rests on the same idea that grounds narrative theory in psychology. 
Namely, that the psychology of human beings is such that lives can only be lived and 
understood in narrative form. In other words, human lives simply are narrational, and to 
deny this would be akin to denying that human beings have rationality. Beyond the obvious 
parallel that human lives all conform to the general narrative arc - beginning, middle, and 
end - MacIntyre argues that we rely on narratives in order to navigate the world in general. 
No human action, he argues, makes sense without some intelligible or coherent story that 
the action fits within. In fact, there are two levels of coherence that actions must conform 
to in order to make sense. First, every action that an individual completes conforms to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 205.  
276 Though there is much that can be said in regards to MacIntyre’s larger claim that the virtuous life 
specifically requires a narrative sense of self, the virtuous life is not of concern here. Instead, I will 
focus on the general claims that MacIntyre is making about the necessity of narrative for meaning 
and coherence, as they are the subject of many of Strawson’s critiques, and they are more relevant to 
the discussion of narrative and trauma. 
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narrative structure - beginning, middle, and end - and the coherence of the action is 
measured by the extent to which those three segments flow together. Second, actions do not 
simply need to have individual coherence, but they also need to fit within larger contexts in 
order to be intelligible. To illustrate this, MacIntyre gives an example.  
I am standing waiting for a bus and the young man sitting next to me suddenly says, 
‘The name of the common wild duck is Histrionicus, Histrionicus, Histrionicus.’ There is 
no problem as to the meaning of the sentence he uttered: the problem is, how to 
answer the question, what was he doing in uttering it?277 
 
With this, MacIntyre argues that we rely on the embedded nature of narratives in order to 
navigate the world. Actions can be vaguely intelligible outside of context, however actions 
are only coherent and meaningful when their larger narrative context is transparent. In the 
case above, the isolated statement itself is intelligible; as MacIntyre says, it is not the meaning 
of the sentence itself that evades us. Rather, it is the larger (MacIntyre might say embedded) 
meaning that is missing because the context is not apparent. We are not aware of the larger 
story that the sentence is supposed to be occurring within, and therefore we cannot 
understand the meaning beyond the utterance of the sentence itself; this is why it seems 
incoherent. What this example shows is that even the most mundane conversations that we 
have in daily life must conform to basic narrative structure. As he says, “In each case the act 
of utterance becomes intelligible by finding its place within a narrative.”278 It is not just 
speech acts, however, that must conform to narrative structure in order to be intelligible.  
We also look for narrative structure when assessing non-narrative actions. McIntyre 
asks the reader to imagine if he were to break several eggs into a bowl and add sugar and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 210.  
278 Ibid. 
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flour while giving a lecture on Kant’s ethics. Though the actions are coherent individually - 
on one hand he is clearly giving a lecture, on another he is clearly baking - when taken 
together they leave us “both intellectually and practically baffled.”279 Both speech and 
actions, then, are essentially narrative in form. As he says,  
Narrative is not the work of poets, dramatists and novelists reflecting upon events, 
which had no narrative order before one was imposed by the singer or the writer; 
narrative form is neither disguise nor decoration. Barbara Hardy has written that ‘we 
dream in narrative, day-dream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair, 
believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love by 
narrative’ in arguing the same point.’280  
 
In other words, since we exist within and around and because of stories - stories that we 
ourselves author, stories that we participate in, and stories that other people tell about us - 
without them we are completely at a loss. Narrative structure doesn’t simply allow us to 
understand the world outside of us, it also provides the foundation for self-understanding 
and makes it possible to give an account of ourselves as ask for accounts from others. Our 
sense of self, then, is directly owed to the stories that we tell about our lives. In MacIntyre’s 
words:  
Thus, personal identity is just that identity presupposed by the unity of a character 
which the unity of a narrative requires… All attempts to elucidate the notion of 
personal identity independently of and in isolation from the notions of narrative, 
intelligibility, and accountability are bound to fail.281   
 
In other words, it isn’t just challenging to understand what a self is outside of the confines of 
narrative; according to MacIntyre, it’s impossible.  
 Under this account of narrative as foundational for both self-understanding and 
understanding of the world, it is easy to see why traumatic events can become so 	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problematic. Similar to the Histrionicus example, we might be able to understand the isolated 
traumatic event, but have trouble when it comes to fitting it within a larger context. We 
might be able to give a narrative of a traumatic event itself, but we struggle when it comes to 
assigning meaning to it in terms of the larger story of our lives. Laub credits traumatic 
disruption to the fact that someone traumatized cannot register traumatic events properly. 
He explains, “Massive trauma precludes its registration; the observing and recording 
mechanisms of the human mind are temporarily knocked out, malfunction.”282  As discussed 
in chapter two, this malfunction is a biological reality, as the presence of horror can trigger a 
set of responses within the nervous system that blunt access to the parts of the brain 
required for memory-making. But perhaps it can also be understood in the sense of narrative 
meaning. When we feel horror, it is precisely because we cannot imagine a world in which 
what is happening could possibly be happening.  
 One of Laub’s patients, a holocaust survivor whose testimony has been videotaped 
for the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale, describes her 
experience of being captured and handing her baby over to Nazi officers. As she tells the 
story, her eyes glaze over. She explains trying to hold the baby’s mouth so it wouldn’t cry, 
and that this eventually failed and she handed over her baby. Then she contradicts herself, 
claiming that it wasn’t a baby that she handed over, but just a “bundle.” “I think I was numb. 
Or something happened to me. I wasn’t even there. There was no baby. I was alone with 
myself. Now all my life I’m alone.”283 We can see why Laub might say that massive trauma 
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shuts down our recording mechanisms. In this woman’s case, it seems that she cannot let the 
entire event in, and at the same time, cannot forget it. As he says, the victim, “ ‘does not 
know’ what she knows of her experience of extremity.”284 Her account is perhaps as 
unintelligible as the experience must feel to her.  
  If our lives and selves are in some sense constituted by the meaning we assign to 
events in order to tell our story, traumatic events present a problem because they cannot be 
registered and filed away in the way that other events and memories are. Instead of 
becoming a part of the story, they can come to overshadow everything else. Merleau-Ponty 
alludes to this phenomenon.  
One present among all presents thus acquires an exceptional value; it displaces the others and 
deprives them of their value as authentic presents… I forgo my constant power of 
providing myself with ‘worlds’ in the interest of one of them, and for that very 
reason this privileged world loses its substance and eventually becomes no more than 
a certain dread.285  
 
To put this in the language of narratives, what Merleau-Ponty seems to be suggesting here is 
that part of what defines traumatic experience is the way that the trauma story – coherent or 
not – acquires an exceptional value precisely because it does not seem to fit in the larger 
horizon or phenomenal field, and so time cannot close up on the experience, and the event 
cannot be placed into the temporal past. Further, Merleau-Ponty seems to be suggesting that 
what is so disruptive about trauma is not just what happened, but the meaning for the 
victim. The traumatic event is destructive not simply because it happened, but because of 
what it signifies. 	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 Recall, for example, the example of Mr. A, the combat veteran who was traumatized 
by the experience of killing civilians and then feeling hungry at the smell of their burning 
flesh. Carr writes of Mr. A’s eventual confession, “It was his horror at himself for becoming 
so savage that Mr. A wanted to confess. Instead of violating the laws of armed conflict, he 
seemed to fear that he had violated the laws of being human.”286 In other words, it wasn’t 
simply what happened to Mr. A, but what it meant; specifically how that event might color 
the story one might tell about Mr. A, or the story he might tell about himself. How could it 
possibly be true, given the narrative that Mr. A had been living, that he would feel hungry at 
the smell of the burning human flesh of a civilian that he killed? How could he tell this story 
to himself or loved ones? What does it mean about who he is that the smell of burning 
human flesh made him hungry? At the center of this trauma for Mr. A is the inability to 
reconcile what happened with what he previously thought of himself and of the world. An 
essential part of what caused Mr. A to experience symptoms of PTSD, is not simply that he 
experienced a grotesque and deeply upsetting event, but that he could not seem to fit that 
event within the larger narrative context of his life and the world. As MacIntyre might say, 
we understand our own actions as well as those of others in narrative form. When an action 
does not seem to fit neatly within a narrative, this causes a problem.  
All of this, however, is still entangled with the MacIntyre’s claim that self-identity is 
narrative. His theory has met considerable criticism, most notably from Galen Strawson. If it 
is not true that what “links birth to life to death” is “narrative beginning to middle to end” 
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this presents a problem for both the understanding of life as narrative and of the 
understanding of trauma as something that challenges narrative structure. 
 
4.22 Galen Strawson’s Anti-Narrative View  
 Galen Strawson argues vehemently against MacIntyre’s conception of the role of 
narrativity in self-identity.287 The idea that the wild beauty of human experience and the rich 
complexity of ethical action can or should be reduced to a story is something that Strawson 
finds to be not just untrue and unsatisfying, but systematically harmful.288 A philosophical 
and psychological landscape that includes only one way of being, Strawson argues, is 
hegemonic and exclusionary. The idea that we must construct ourselves and understand the 
world narratively unnecessarily relegates those who simply do not see or experience their lives 
as a cohesive story to a subservient class of being. Strawson argues that many people 
(himself included) are not Narrative but Episodic, meaning they simply do not view their 
lives in narrative form. He argues that the existence of the Episodic non-Narrative paradigm 
proves that it is not necessary to understand the world narratively. It is possible to have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Strawson defines Narrativity as the idea, “that human beings typically see or live or experience 
their lives as a narrative or story of some sort, or at least as a collection of stories” (MacIntyre, After 
Virtue, 428). It should be noted that Strawson is not just arguing against MacIntyre, but anyone who 
falls in what he calls the “modern Narrativity camp” (Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” Ratio 
16, no. 4 [2004]: 437). This camp includes thinkers such as Daniel Dennett, Paul Ricoeur, and 
Charles Taylor most notably. Since each of these thinkers has their own unique view of Narrativity, 
and Strawson cites MacIntyre as the founder of the modern Narrativity Camp, for the sake of 
consistency and simplicity, references in this paper will be limited to Strawson’s specific criticisms of 
the Narrativity found in MacIntyre’s work. It should be noted that though there is certainly more 
than one way to interpret MacIntyre’s work, I will leave interpretive questions of MacIntyre’s 
Narrativity aside here. 
288 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 428-452.  
  
172 
functional and rich life without having a sense of oneself as a story, and he takes himself to 
be an exemplar of this.  
 Strawson defines a narrative as “a certain sort of developmental and hence temporal 
unity or coherence to the things which it is standardly applied - lives, parts of lives, pieces of 
writing…” Strawson goes on to explain that, “for a life to be a narrative in this sense it must 
be lived Narratively. The person whose life it is must see or feel it as a narrative, construe it 
as a narrative, live it as a narrative.”289 Again, it is crucial to point out that Strawson has taken 
the narrative stance to be one that espouses the idea of ‘life as narrative.’ Though one may 
argue that MacIntyre intended as much, it does not follow that all definitions of narrative 
include the ‘life as narrative’ stance. For example, in my definition of narrative above, 
narratives are defined as linguistic representations of events, and though they certainly may 
have bearing on one’s sense of self, they do not require that one sees one’s entire life as a 
story. Strawson’s view of Narrativity is bound to two ideas inherited from MacIntyre’s 
theory: first, that the act of narration necessarily implies the application of unity and/or 
coherence by the narrator. The suggestion here is that to tell a story about something means 
to borrow or create meaning and coherence and then attach them to chronologies that 
would not otherwise have meaning and coherence. The second idea is that if narratives are 
central to identity in the way that MacIntyre claims that they are, the Narrativist must live her 
life as a story, and see herself as a character.   
 One of the aspects of narrative that Strawson is particularly worried about is 
precisely what psychologists think is so powerful about telling stories, namely, the level of 
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fabrication (which Strawson takes to necessarily involve falsification) involved in narrative, 
applying unity and coherence to events that do not otherwise have them. Strawson explains 
that Narrativists (the term he gives for those who, like MacIntyre, see their lives as a story or 
collection of stories) have three tendencies, a “form-finding tendency,” a “story-telling 
tendency,” and a “revisionist tendency.”290 These tendencies are defined respectively as: 
(a) the propensity to find a particular shape to events that occur in one’s life;  
(b) the impulse to tell stories about events in an effort to relate them to that 
general shape, and  
(c) the propensity to revise events so that they fit into the larger landscape of the 
story.  
 
According to Strawson, the revisionist tendency is the most insidious because it essentially 
leads one to actively misrepresent one’s life in favor of creating a unified and coherent story.  
 Strawson worries that though it may be empowering for someone to be able to 
revise a story so that it fits better within a larger narrative, this empowerment always comes 
at the sacrifice of the truth. When a Narrativist re-frames (and effectively re-writes) an event 
in an effort to find meaning and coherence, the truth - what actually happened - can 
sometimes become eclipsed because the desire for unity and coherence overshadows reality. 
The Narrativist does not get closer to the truth by telling stories, Strawson argues; in fact 
what is more likely to happen when the story takes center stage is that reality will start to 
fade away. In other words, narrating our lives is far more dangerous than simply telling 
stories. Taking one’s life to be a narrative means running the risk of conflating the fabricated 
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story with reality. The result, then, of narration is that the individual narrating risks rendering 
herself fictional in attempting to see herself as a character in a novel.291  
 Though Strawson does not specifically mention trauma in his work, his concern 
about narratives falsifying reality are important to consider in regard to the reframing that 
occurs in narrative therapy. Even if a narrator does not aim for falsification, there is simply 
no getting around the fact that a narrative of an event is merely a representation of it and can 
only approach truth and accuracy to a degree. When narrative is used as an adaptive tool in 
the case of trauma, a part of the purpose of narration is to reframe, and in some sense then 
rewrite what happened. Isn’t reframing, even at its very best, a sort of revision of the truth? 
Isn’t it in some sense inherently dangerous to reassign meaning in the way that narrative 
therapy promises? Imagine, for example, that Mr. A was not a shame-filled combat veteran, 
but instead a sociopath. The idea that he is hungered by the smell of burning flesh means 
something entirely different in this case. If Mr. A were a sociopath, it would indeed be 
dangerous to reframe his actions and justify his violent behavior. In fact, even if Mr. A isn’t a 
sociopath, isn’t reframing his story so that he is absolved of responsibility still a justification 
of extreme violence? Historically, it is exactly this kind of reframing that has been used by 
perpetrators of violence to shift their responsibility. What Strawson seems to be worried 	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about - even in the cases where narrative is supposed to be an empowering adaptive tool - is 
that once we allow a certain level of flexibility into an account of events, it becomes possible 
to rewrite the story any number of ways, and with each revision we risk straying further and 
further from the truth. As he says, “The implication is plain: the more you recall, retell, 
narrate yourself, the further you risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from 
the truth of your being.”292  
 Though these concerns are worthy of investigation, they do not necessarily 
undermine the idea that narrative can be used as an adaptive tool.  To the contrary, it can be 
argued that these concerns in fact strengthen it. Though it is certainly possible that this 
adaptive tool could be misused to justify violence, or to falsify an event, that does not mean 
that it is an inherently dangerous method. In the face of these criticisms, it is perhaps helpful 
to remember the purpose of narrative reframing in the case of trauma.  The purpose of the 
reframing is not to falsify details of what happened, or one’s role in them, but instead to 
change what the events mean to the victim. In fact, many combat veterans report that 
absolving them of their perceived crimes does nothing to help their PTSD.293 Though it is 
true in the case of Mr. A that the narrative being reframed is a violent one, it is not the truth 
of his violence that is being rewritten, but what that violence might mean about him (i.e., that 
he is guilty of war crimes, that he is a monster).  
 Aside from this problem, Strawson’s larger issue with Narrativity is that the ubiquity 
of narrative structure.  Though MacIntyre and some trauma theorists view it as a solution, 	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this ubiquity can also be understood to be a part of the problem. If we were not so attached 
to the idea that events that occur to us have to fit within larger narratives, perhaps the fact 
that some events seem to challenge narrative unity would not be so upsetting and disruptive 
in the first place. Further, if it is true that an essential part of what is so upsetting about 
traumatic events is that they seem to defy the kind of narrative unity that MacIntyre 
advocates, isn’t it then paradoxical to suggest that narratives can help solve the problem? 
Jonathan Shay articulates this problem when he says,  
This may form part of the enormous difficulty that many survivors of severe trauma 
have in putting their experience into words; their experience is ineffable in a language 
that insists on ‘was’ and ‘will be.’ The trauma world only knows is.294  
 
On this account, the act of narrating traumatic events, particularly from the perspectives of 
those suffering from traumatic symptoms that have thrust the past continually into the 
present, seems to fail before it even gets started.  
 However, as Shay acknowledges, the issue of truth only presents a paradox if the 
goal of narrative is to truthfully and accurately describe what happened. This is not the goal 
in narrative therapy. As explained in the previous section, narrative therapy aims to reframe 
those events that the victim feels powerless in the face of, and it reframes them in order to 
alleviate symptoms of PTSD. This does not necessarily require a narrative that perfectly 
represents the event in its totality. Moreover, as was argued in the previous chapter, the goal 
for any treatment of any injury is to adapt to it rather than eradicate it (since eradication as 
such is impossible). Narrative therapy will always fail if it seen as something that will fix the 
past. However, this observation, while true, does not render it a useless method. Take for 
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example a veteran who has lost a leg in combat. The method of replacing the leg with a 
prosthetic one is an effective solution that allows the victim to navigate the world as he did 
prior to the event. However, this intervention does not replace the leg in the way that 
Strawson might expect the narrative to replace what has been broken in the case of 
psychological trauma. Though technological advances make prosthetics increasingly 
approach flesh and blood limbs, a prosthetic leg will never be the same exact thing as the 
missing leg. This does not mean that the treatment is not successful.  
Along the same lines, the goal of narrative therapy is not to find words that perfectly 
describe the intensity and complexity of what happened in an attempt to erase what 
happened.  Such an erasure would be as impossible as going back in time and preventing the 
injury that led to amputation. The goal is to adapt, to approach what happened with 
language, to reframe the event in a way that is not false, but perhaps just meaningful in a less 
threatening way. As Shay explains,  
The paradox disappears when we look at narration as a step in the survivor’s larger 
move to communalize the trauma by inducing others who were not there to feel 
what the victim did when he or she was going through it.295  
 
The importance of the intersubjective aspect of narrative that Stolorow focuses on can be 
seen here. It is not just that the event gets narrated; it is that the event is narrated to an 
audience or listener who is able to connect with the subject in her emotional response and 
provide a relational home. What was helpful in the case of Mr. A, for example, was that 
when he was able to narrate what happened and what he feared that it meant, Carr was able 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Ibid. 
  
178 
to work with him in order to reframe the meaning of the events. After Mr. A confessed to 
him, Carr responded:  
That experience must have been horrible for you. You’ve had to face a savage side of 
you that is in all of us. It is there in all of us, most of us just don’t have to 
acknowledge it. Experiencing it can make people feel separate from everyone else.296 
 
What Mr. A feared was that the event that he lived through and his response to it meant that 
he was a monster. Even if he himself did not feel like he was a monster, he feared that if he 
told that story to others, they would surely think that he was. One way to understand his 
posttraumatic symptoms would be to say that the story did not fit within Mr. A’s larger 
narrative about himself and the world, and so it kept intruding into the present in the form 
of traumatic flashbacks and nightmares. Carr’s response - that his reaction was something 
that anyone might have had in the situation - didn’t falsify the narrative, or change the details 
of what happened, but instead rendered it meaningful in a new way and allowed Mr. A to 
gain a different perspective. To put it in Stolorow’s terms, Carr provided a relational home 
for the unbearable affect.  
 This example serves to address Strawson’s concerns in two ways. First, it shows that 
a narrative can still be a powerful adaptive tool even if it cannot completely and accurately 
represent the traumatic event. Second, this example shows that the shifting of narrative 
meaning that occurs when a trauma victim narrates is not necessarily a falsification, but 
rather a reassigning of meaning that can help empower the victim without changing the details 
of the event or absolving the individual from guilt.  
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 However, even if this addresses some of Strawson’s concerns about truth and 
narrative, the claim that narrative can help reframe and reassign meaning is still predicated 
on the idea that we are in some important sense narrative beings. In other words, addressing 
Strawson’s concerns about truth does not seem to resolve the criticism that it might not be 
true that all people are narrative in this way. Perhaps Mr. A is someone who sees his life as a 
narrative and this is why Carr’s narrative treatment of the problem was helpful, but that if he 
were Episodic, like Strawson, this might not have been helpful at all. In fact, it might have 
been harmful. However, Strawson’s concerns point to the idea that a moderate view of 
narrative, i.e., one that occupies the middle between the two extreme positions occupied by 
MacIntyre and Strawson, might be more helpful.  
 
4.23 Peter Goldie’s Moderate Narrative View  
 Peter Goldie argues for the power of language in the face of trauma from a different 
angle. Rather than argue that human beings are or must be narrative in order to legitimize 
the claim that narratives are constitutive of personal identity, Goldie argues that narratives 
have a crucial place in our lives, but that it does not follow that human beings are essentially 
narrative. Goldie’s moderate view of narrativity, occupying the middle position discussed in 
the last paragraph, deserves consideration since it not only directly addresses some of the 
concerns that Strawson has about MacIntyre’s theory, but also shows the importance that 
narrative structure can have in the presence of traumatic experience.297  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 It should be noted here that Goldie writes more often of grief than trauma. He does briefly 
discuss the importance of emotional closure and trauma, and many of his examples (discussed below) 
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 Recognizing that the discussion of the role that narratives play in our lives can be 
quite polarizing, Goldie attempts to make a more modest claim about them.  According to 
Goldie, narratives are indeed very important, but stories do not provide the only way to 
engage with one’s past or future, nor should we attempt to make ourselves into fictional 
characters. His aim is to find “the right place for narrative in our lives.”298 Rather than argue 
that we are or should be narrative in the way that MacIntyre does, Goldie argues against the 
idea that identity is constituted narratively, and instead stipulates that there is “a realistic role 
for narrative in our lives.”299 MacIntyre’s claim that “personal identity is just that identity 
presupposed by the unity of a character which the unity of a narrative requires” is not, 
Goldie argues, a realistic stance and it exaggerates the role that narratives play in our lives.300 
To say that we are narrative would be similar to making the claim that since human beings 
use vision to navigate the physical world that it necessarily follows that human beings are 
essentially visual.301 What is more accurate is that vision provides one of several ways in 
which we understand and navigate the world. Goldie argues that since human beings are 
situated in time, there is a natural tendency to reflect on our pasts and project ourselves into 
the future. One of the ways that we do this is through rendering our thoughts into narrative 
form. For Goldie, narratives should be seen as a tool rather than the essence of personal 
identity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
refer to a kind of traumatic loss. For these reasons, I think it is uncontroversial to imagine that he 
would be sympathetic to my claims about narrative and trauma here.  
298 Peter Goldie, The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 1.  
299 Peter Goldie, "Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
67, no. 1 (2009): 97.  
300 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 218.  
301 Goldie, The Mess Inside, 120.  
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 Goldie’s characterization of a narrative focuses on the way that narratives can 
provide opportunities for the subject to assign meaning and explore alternative perspectives 
on events.  
A narrative is… a representation of events which is shaped, organized, and colored, 
presenting those events, and the people involved in them, from a certain perspective 
or perspectives, and thereby giving narrative structure - coherence, meaning, and 
evaluative and emotional import - to what is related.302 
 
Successful narratives, according to Goldie, contain all three of these attributes. Coherence 
“reveals causal connections to the audience in a way that a mere list or chronicle would not.” 
A narrative is meaningful insofar as it “enables the audience to understand how the actions 
of those persons who are internal to the narrative could have made sense to them at the 
time.” Emotional import refers to “the narrator’s external evaluation of, and emotional 
response to, what happened, from the ironic distance that his external perspective allows.”303  
 From the outset, distinctions between Goldie and both MacIntyre and Strawson are 
apparent in at least three relevant ways. First, a narrative is characterized here as a 
representation, which distances it from the actual event. A key distinction that Goldie wants 
to maintain is between the event that occurred and the narrative, which can only ever be a 
representation of the event. As he says,  
A narrative is distinct from what it is a narrative of. To fail to maintain this 
distinction is to lose the distinction between, on the one side, language and thought, 
and, on the other side, the world, between representation and what is represented.304  
 
Strawson’s Narrativist is perhaps in danger of falsifying her life, but this is not because of the 
danger inherent in telling stories, but because Strawson imagines the Narrativist to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Ibid., 2.  
303 Peter Goldie, "One's Remembered Past: Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and the External 
Perspective," Philosophical Papers 32, no. 3 (2003): 304-305.  
304 Goldie, The Mess Inside, 6.  
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collapsing the narrative and what it purports to narrate. Telling stories is only dangerous in 
this way if we forget that stories can only ever be representations of events.  
 Second, coherence, meaning, and emotional import in Goldie’s definition are found 
in the narrative structure of the event, not the event itself. When we tell stories, we lend 
narrative structure to the event in a way that allows us to assign meaning. It does not follow 
that narrating necessarily entails an attempt to make life into a story by claiming that the 
meaning that we gain from the narration exists within the event itself. The coherence, 
meaning and emotional import are being attached to what is represented, not what has 
occurred. This may seem like a small distinction, but it is crucial. Goldie’s transparency about 
the fact that the purpose of a narrative is to represent an event with narrative structure allays 
Strawson’s worry that to narrate is necessarily to falsify reality. The power of narratives for 
Goldie lies in their ability to allow the narrator to gain access to a variety of different 
perspectives that can shape and change how she relates to the event. Implicit in Goldie’s 
definition is the awareness of the narrator that she is lending narrative structure to an event. 
Since the purpose is to render the event into story form, the narrator recognizes that there is 
a distance between what occurred and how she relates to it. What she has the power to 
change, then, is her emotional response to the event, or what meaning the event carries for 
her. Telling a story about an event does not provide the narrator the ability to transform 
reality, it enables the narrator to shift what the event means to her. The material that is being 
molded by the narrative is the account of the event, not the event itself. The clarification of 
the distance between narrative and event allows us to avoid the collapse of story and reality 
that Strawson fears is inherent in MacIntyre’s account.  
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 Finally, in Goldie’s definition of narrative, the story is a tool that the subject is using; 
it is not constitutive of her identity. In fact, it seems by his account that the self is elsewhere, 
and thus cannot be contained by the story. It is the self that is doing the narrating, the 
assessing and revaluing, and therefore cannot be contained or reduced to the story, or even 
the sum of all of her stories. Since a narrative is a representation of an event, imbued with a 
certain perspective that is given by a subject, the most that we could have is a narrative sense 
of self. Goldie explains that a narrative sense of self simply refers to “a way of thinking of 
oneself… in narrative thinking.”305 Narrative is not constitutive of identity, but is instead one 
of many possible ways of being, and just because we have a narrative sense of self does not 
mean that the self is narrative. As he explains, “The narrative sense of self does not imply 
that there is such a thing as a narrative self; having a narrative sense of self is not the same as 
having a sense of narrative self.”306 This can be illustrated by the fact that we think 
narratively about things that have nothing to do with our sense of self - fiction, history, other 
people’s lives. For example, we can have a sense of Galen Strawson’s life as a story through 
reading his works, which often contain autobiographical vignettes. Having a narrative sense 
of Strawson’s life does not somehow mean that we are Galen Strawson, or that the totality of 
Galen Strawson is this narrative. 307  
 Setting aside the claim that human beings are narrative in the sense that MacIntrye 
and Strawson intend, Goldie argues that narratives are essential because they enable us to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Ibid., 118.  
306 Ibid.  
307 Goldie is in some sense indebted to Marya Schectman for this view, though she comes to a very 
different conclusion. She argues that what is constitutive of one’s personal identity is the stories that 
one can tell about oneself, but also the stories that others can tell about you. See Marya Schechtman, 
The Constitution of Selves (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996).  
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represent events from the past from a variety of different temporal perspectives. To illustrate 
the way that two perspectives appear in any simple narrative, he gives the following example. 
“Last night, in the dark, I tripped over because a suitcase had been left in the hall whilst I 
was out shopping.”308 Even in this minimalist story, there are two distinct perspectives; that 
of Goldie internal to the story (sometimes referred to as the lower-level perspective), 
tripping over a suitcase that he did not realize was in the way; and that of Goldie external to 
the story, telling the narrative now with the benefit of hindsight (sometimes referred to as 
the higher-level perspective). To draw a parallel between Goldie and the work done by Laub 
and Richert discussed in section 4.13, Goldie’s external, higher-level perspective corresponds 
with the ‘I’ while the internal, lower-level perspective corresponds with the ‘me.’ 
Table 1 
External, Higher-Level Perspective Internal, Lower-Level Perspective 
‘I’ that narrates the story of tripping 
over the suitcase 
‘me’ that lives through the tripping over 
the suitcase 
 
Notice that the higher-level perspective contains information that the lower-level perspective 
does not have access to. For example, the higher-level perspective is aware of what was 
tripped over, while the lower-level perspective is not.309 There is also a certain level of 
flexibility when it comes to meaning and emotional evaluation in the higher-level perspective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 Peter Goldie, "Narrative and Perspective; Values and Appropriate Emotions," in Philosophy and the 
Emotions ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 206.  
309 Goldie, Laub and others use slightly different terminology to indicate each perspective. Since this 
can get confusing, I will use the term ‘higher-level’ to denote the perspective external to the narrative, 
and ‘lower-level’ to denote the perspective internal to the narrative. It is crucial to note that the 
‘higher-level’ perspective may be inhabited by the narrator herself as she stands back from the event 
and looks at it from an external perspective, or it may be inhabited by a third-party who is actually 
external to the event.  
  
185 
of the narrator that is not available to the subject inside the narrative. From the point of 
view of the lower-level perspective, when Goldie tripped over the suitcase, he likely felt 
startled and experienced physical pain. He might have been subsequently frustrated and 
annoyed. From the higher-level perspective that he gains when telling the story, he might 
now find it humorous. He might imagine himself unknowingly stumbling around in the dark 
and feel foolish about his decision not to turn on the lights. He might imagine his wife 
leaving the suitcase in the hallway and feel anger and resentment. When he tells the story 
three weeks later, the anger and resentment he felt in the days following the event might 
have turned into amusement. 310 
 Though this is a very simple narrative (and indeed one that does not involve trauma), 
it is already evident that to tell or think through any narrative, one must step into the higher-
level perspective in order to tell the story. In order to tell the story about tripping over the 
suitcase, Goldie has to “stand back from [his] earlier self, acentrally imagining the scene 
unfold.”311 This act is one not of fictionalizing, but of observing. Goldie is not rewriting or 
falsifying the past, but rather witnessing what occurred from the vantage point of the higher-
level perspective. What this viewpoint allows is the opportunity to reevaluate one’s 
emotional response to the events. 
 Imagine, for example, that upon tripping over the suitcase in the hallway, Goldie 
flew into a rage and woke up his wife and screamed at her for several hours, admonishing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 It is important to note that though the language of perspectives here invokes spatial relationships, 
the internal and external perspectives that Goldie describes are temporal. The internal perspective is 
inside the event, the external perspective is outside, allowing us to occupy the present as we describe 
the past, for example. The distinction between internal and external perspectives is perhaps more 
helpful than Laub’s ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ or Richert’s ‘I’ and ‘me.’ 
311 Goldie, "Narrative and Perspective,” 206.  
  
186 
her for being so careless. In the moment, this emotional response seemed appropriate to 
him. In telling the story the next day to a friend, Goldie would be forced to stand back from 
his earlier self and in so doing, has the opportunity to reevaluate that response. He might, 
perhaps, decide that his emotional response was exaggerated and out of control, prompting 
him to apologize to his wife.  
 As is evident in this example, the higher-level perspective is powerful because of its 
flexibility. In telling the story, and inhabiting a higher-level perspective, the subject can look 
critically at the meaning that the event carries for her. This cannot be done from the lower-
level perspective because what is available to the subject internal to the story is the emotion 
that was initially attached to the event. Narratives are crucial to our lives, then, because they 
allow us to embody an alternate point of view, one that enables us to engage with the past 
from a certain distance if not with a certain objectivity.312  From this alternate point of view, 
we are in a position to determine whether or not a particular emotional response was 
appropriate. If there is rewriting going on in narrating, it is not of the events themselves as 
Strawson fears, but what they mean and how we relate to them.313  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 Goldie is aware that that the objectivity available in the higher-level perspective is not objective in 
the strictest sense of the word, because any narrative is first personal. However, he argues that just 
because a narrative is subjective, it does not follow that it is not objective in any sense. See Goldie, 
The Mess Inside, Chapter 7 for a thorough discussion on narrative and truth. 
313 There is always a kind of tension in narrative between the story being told about the event and the 
event itself. Questions of the extent to which the narrative can accurately represent what happened 
naturally arise. In my own definition of narrative above, I highlight the importance of understanding 
the narration to be both beholden to objective reality in some sense, but at the same time always 
articulating a particular subjective perspective. I maintain, following Goldie, that the perspective from 
which the narrative is being told does not necessarily falsify the event.  
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Table 2 
External, Higher-Level Perspective Internal, Lower-Level Perspective 
Stands back from the original event 
from one or more different 
perspectives and can reassign meaning 
‘me’ that lives through the event 
 
 Being able to stand back from an event and assess it from the higher-level 
perspective can be incredibly powerful for trauma victims. According to Goldie, appropriate 
emotional response is essential for closure. Goldie defines emotional closure as the ability to  
[L]ook back in the right way on one’s past life from one’s present external perspective: 
not just seeing the causal connections, and making sense of why one then thought, 
felt, and acted as one then did, but also making an external evaluation and having emotional 
responses that one feels are the appropriate ones to what happened.314  
 
Though there will inevitably be interpretive issues regarding what constitutes an appropriate 
emotional response to any given event, a lack of what would normally be considered an 
appropriate emotional response or even a full-blown emotional closure are perhaps most 
obvious in cases that involve trauma.315  
 Indeed, it seems uncontroversial to say that part of what constitutes PTSD is 
precisely an inappropriate emotional response. As we have seen, in cases of trauma, subjects 
either cannot give a coherent narrative of what has occurred, or they can give a chronology 
of the events but cannot seem to respond emotionally in the right way. A crucial part of 
what happens is that the victim gets locked into a lower-level perspective, reliving the initial 
event rather than being able to get any sort of distance from it. What is not available to a 
victim of trauma is either the ability to inhabit the higher-level perspective in a way that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Goldie, The Mess Inside, 71, my emphasis.  
315 Ibid., 70-75.  
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grants access to the emotions of the lower-level perspective in the right way, or the ability to 
inhabit it at all. If this higher-level perspective is not readily available to the victim, and this 
unavailability is a part what constitutes her trauma, one possible solution is to find a way to 
open it to her. Goldie suggests that this can be done through relating what happened to 
another person, who can embody the higher-level perspective in place of the victim.316  
By way of illustration, Goldie refers to Odysseus, who, in Book VIII of The Odyssey, 
is present at a dinner given by the king of the Phaiakians. At the dinner, the singer 
Demodokos entertains the guests by singing of Odysseus and his struggles. Upon hearing his 
own story from the perspective of another person, Odysseus weeps, understanding for the 
first time just how tragic his past has been. Odysseus goes on to tell his story to the guests of 
the party, and as he does so he begins to “evaluate and respond emotionally to his trials as he 
now sees that he should.”317 Witnessing another person inhabit an external perspective 
previously inaccessible to Odysseus makes it possible for him to experience the emotions 
appropriate to what he has been through. What the audience provides is a grounded external 
perspective through which Odysseus can come to see his experience in a new light.  
Dori Laub also argues that trauma victims need this higher-level perspective is in 
order to survive traumatic events. Laub claims that at the center of the integrated self is a 
narrative dialogue between ‘I’ and ‘Thou.’ Traumatic experience interrupts this dialogue and 
blocks access to the higher-level perspective that might bring coherence and empathy.  
When the empathic other totally fails in the external world of the death camps, the 
internal, empathic ‘Thou,’ the means for self-dialogue, ceases to exist. The ongoing 
internal dialogue, the internal ‘I’ speaking to the internal ‘Thou,’ which allows for 	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historicity, narrative, and meaning to unfold, falls silent. Sensory impressions, no 
matter how powerful, remain fragments that do not coalesce.318  
 
Without the higher-level perspective to address and be in dialogue with, the victim is left 
completely alone in her trauma. She cannot provide herself the reminder of temporal 
distance by telling the story as something that happened in the past. Nor can she provide 
herself with sympathy for her experience or reactions to that experience. What the listener 
can provide, then, is the bridge to reestablish communication between ‘I’ and ‘Thou.’ As 
Laub explains,  
In order to integrate the traumatic fragments and turn them into real knowledge, the 
survivor needs to locate the fervently yearned-for dialogic ‘Thou’ within herself. She 
can do so by finding a trustworthy, passionate and totally present companion-listener 
in whom she can temporarily anchor that internal ‘Thou’.319 
 
It is crucial to note that this anchoring is temporary. The listener does not become the missing 
perspective any more than a crutch becomes the broken leg. Rather, through the medium of 
narrative and witnessing, the other person acts as a crucial part of an adaptive tool whereby 
the victim can gradually become to witness her own experience and provide her own 
grounding perspective. In other words, the third person embodies a perspective that helps 
re-establish the inner dialogue.  
Further, it is not necessary that the perspective of the listener and that of the victim 
become so united that they collapse into one. Again, just as the crutch does not become the 
missing leg, the listener does not become the missing perspective. The embodiment of the 
higher-level perspective is not meant to be a replacement or an exact match, but rather a 
temporary approximation.  	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Table 3 
 
External, Higher-Level 
Perspective of 
Another Person 
External, Higher-
Level Perspective 
Internal, Lower-
Level 
Perspective 
PTSD Usually Missing Missing 
‘me’ that lives 
through the 
event 
Therapeutic 
Setting 
 
Stands back from the 
original event from 
one or more different 
perspectives and can 
reassign meaning  
‘me’ that lives 
through the 
event 
 
It is important to remember that the power of the higher-level perspective is not simply in 
its ability to establish temporal distance between the past and present, but also to provide 
alternative viewpoints on the emotional response that a trauma victim has to her past. We 
can see this at work in Carr’s case study of Mr. A. In this case, it is apparent that what 
narrative has done is precisely to help Mr. A gain a different perspective on what happened, 
and to reassess his original emotional response. He came into therapy with one perspective 
on the event in Iraq – he was a person who murdered civilians and then became hungry at 
the smell of their burning, human flesh and this meant that he could be tried for war crimes, 
that he violated the laws of human decency, that he is a monster. The emotional response 
that he had was marked by guilt, fear and horror; and, instead of closure, Mr. A repeatedly 
relived the initial event from the lower-level perspective in dreams and flashbacks. In this 
case, Mr. A could tell the story of the traumatic event, but he could not gain a perspective 
that allowed him to assess his emotional response to that event. In narrating the story and 
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talking about what that story meant to him, Mr. A was then given access to an alternative 
higher-level perspective through Carr’s response to his story. Carr’s emotional response was 
not one of disgust, but one of empathy. He felt that what Mr. A had been through was 
horrible, that anyone might have had the same reaction, that he hadn’t violated any laws of 
war or human decency. In narrating the story alongside someone who was able to embody 
an alternative higher-level perspective for him, Mr. A finally became able to stand back from 
his singular non-empathetic perspective. His dialogue with Carr allowed Mr. A to step into a 
new higher-level perspective and jettison his previous sense of meaning for a new one, 
which marked the lessening of his PTSD symptoms.  
 What we should notice in the examples of Odysseus and Mr. A is that in the case of 
trauma, the perspective necessary to reevaluate emotional response and meaning is only 
available interpersonally. Odysseus could not think through the story on his own in order to 
gain the right perspective, he had to hear his story from someone else in order to begin to 
inhabit the higher-level perspective in the right way. Mr. A is not able to gain closure on his 
traumatic experience until he is temporarily anchored by Carr’s third-person higher-level 
perspective.320 Laub claims that the impulse to narrate is constitutive of traumatic experience, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 As far as phenomenological considerations go, it is also relevant to notice some of the ways in 
which narratives are embodied. It is not simply about the words one uses, but also about the way the 
body is brought into play in the process. Goldie gives us an example of this. “For example, a woman 
might be narrating the horror of finding her husband dead in bed next to her when she woke up in 
the morning, and suddenly she cries out to her listener ‘I just can’t tell you how awful it was!’ And yet 
in her act of narration, accompanied as it is by a panoply of expressive gestures, she reveals what the 
narrative itself cannot reveal” (Goldie, The Mess Inside, 74). In other words, it is not just rendering the 
traumatic event into narrative form that aids in adapting to trauma, but the act of narrating to another 
person. It isn’t just something that feels incoherent gets rendered coherently, but that in the telling 
one is able to express what was previously seemed inexpressible by using one’s body – no less than 
language – to communicate. Merleau-Ponty makes a similar argument about the body. See, Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 225.  
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as the tension between the present traumatic symptoms alongside the absence of a coherent 
memory suggests that traumatic experience calls out to be narrated.321 This is certainly the 
case in many cases as veterans return home and have the impulse to narrate their traumatic 
experience to friends and loved ones. Jonathan Shay remarks that it is often the case that 
rather than be met with empathy, they are silenced. People do not want to hear of the horror 
of war, and so they dismiss or judge it. Shay argues that this solidifies the injury of trauma 
and perpetuates it by further isolating the victim. One of Shay’s patients gives an account of 
this.  
After dinner we were all sitting in the living room and [my wife’s] father said, “So, 
tell us what it was like.” And I started to tell them, and I told them. And do you 
know within five minutes the room was empty… After that I didn’t tell anybody I 
had been in Vietnam.322  
 
In cases like these, the victim reaches out for help, is rejected and becomes locked inside the 
trauma, in a never-ending loop of unbearable affect and traumatic response. This kind of 
response sends the message to the victim that what they have been through is indeed 
unbearable instead of providing a relational home for the unbearable emotions. What is 
required to battle this extreme isolation is what Shay terms ‘communalization of trauma,’ 
which he defines as “being able safely to tell the story to someone who is listening.”323 Bessel 
van der Kolk agrees, explaining that the ability to  
[F]ind words where words were absent before… is one of the most profound 
experiences that we can have, and such resonance, in which hitherto unspoken 
words can be discovered, uttered, and received, is fundamental to healing the 
isolation of trauma – especially if other people in our lives have ignored or silenced 
us. Communicating fully is the opposite of being traumatized.324 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Laub, “Reestablishing the inner ‘Thou’,” 185.   
322 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, xxii. 
323 Ibid., 4.  
324 van der Kolk, Body Keeps the Score, 235, my emphasis.  
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Implicit in Laub, Shay and van der Kolk’s accounts is the idea that, while listening is not 
sufficient, there is, as Stolorow suggests, a particular kind of listening that is necessary for 
healing trauma. Shay argues that healing is possible only if the victim is given the opportunity 
to narrate her particular story to a listener (or a community of listeners) who is:  
(a) strong enough to hear the story without being traumatized themselves, 
(b) capable of hearing the story from a non-judgmental standpoint without denying 
the experience or blaming the victim, and  
(c) willing and prepared to feel some of the emotions that the victim did.325  
 
The kind of listening that is non-productive and destructive is the kind that involves 
“intellectual sorting, with the professional grabbing the veterans’ words from the air and 
sticking them into mental bins.”326 It is worth noting that this seems to be the kind of 
reductionist psychology, gazing down on the patient from above, that Merleau-Ponty warns 
against. Shay argues that the problem with this kind of diagnostic, clinical listening is that it 
does not taken into account the individual meaning of the victims’ experience, and therefore, 
it “destroys trust.”327 Where there is no trust, there can be no relational home, and 
subsequently, no healing. Narrative adaptation, then, is not simply about rendering the 
traumatic event in narrative form. It is crucial that the act of narration occur in the presence 
of an empathetic audience. This also corresponds with Goldie’s suggestion that when we 
cannot embody the higher-level perspective it is possible for someone else to do this for us 
(to a certain extent). These arguments are backed up by the psychological literature, which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 188-193.  
326 Ibid., 4.  
327 Ibid.  
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filled with case studies that point to the power of empathy and narrative to help victims of 
trauma adapt to their experience and resulting symptoms.328  
To summarize, for Goldie, a narrative is a representation of a story that allows the 
speaker access to an alternative higher-level perspective. Instead of remaining inside the story 
the way that one might when one has a somatic memory, the subject is able to step out of 
the experience and examine it through a potentially third-person perspective, i.e., a 
perspective that others can share. Narratives allow us to lend coherence and assign meaning 
to events, and shift the way that we emotionally respond to them. Instead of drawing 
distinctions between Narrative and non-Narrative people as MacIntyre and Strawson do, the 
variation according to Goldie lies between times in which it is helpful to narrate and times in 
which it is not necessary or helpful. One such time in which narrative is particularly helpful 
is when we are faced with trauma, as this is a time when we might especially need coherence, 
meaning, and emotional import. As he says,  
Sometimes, especially where the remembered events are in some way tragic or 
traumatic, one is unable to do [get external perspective]: there is a gap in one’s 
narrative sense of self: one has a memory but not recollection. One’s effort to close 
this sort of gap, perhaps by going over and over what happened in one’s mind, or by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 For work from the philosophical perspective, see: Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer, 
Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present (Hanover, MA: University Press of New England, 1999); 
Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996); and Brison, Aftermath. From the perspectives of psychology and 
neuroscience, see David Crenshaw and Kenneth Hardy, “The Crucial Role of Empathy in Breaking 
the Silence of Traumatized Children in Play Therapy,” International Journal of Play Therapy 16, no. 2 
(2007): 160-175; Claire Williams and Rodger Li Wood, “Alexithymia and Emotional Empathy 
Following Traumatic Brain Injury,” Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 32, no. 3 (2010): 
259-267; Allan Schore, “Advances in Neuropsychoanalysis, Attachment Theory, and Trauma 
Research: Implications for Self Psychology.” Psychoanalytic Inquiry 22, no. 3 (2002): 433-484; as well as 
Peter Goldie and Amy Coplan, Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).  
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trying time and time again to relate one’s narrative to another person, reveals a 
desire... for emotional closure.329  
 
In other words, when we face trauma, shared narrative becomes a tool that is crucial for 
emotional closure. What narrating to others can provide in cases of trauma is an opportunity 
for a victim to examine her emotional response (including the meaning and coherence that 
she is assigning to an event) and to imagine how other perspectives might afford a different 
view and assessment of what happened. The power of narrative as an adaptive tool, then, lies 
in its ability to access an alternative higher-level perspective, assign new meaning, and find 
coherence in an event that seems to defy it, all the while assessing and, as appropriate, 
modifying the emotional import.  
In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty gave us the image of walking along 
the shore and watching the perception of a ship emerge from the horizon as we approach. 
Examining narrative as an adaptive tool from the perspectives of psychology and philosophy 
is akin to this in that we now have an outline of the idea on the horizon. Consideration of 
some neuroscientific findings of narrative adaptation suggests ways to fill in the outline.  
 
4.3 Interpersonal Neuroplasticity as a Correlate to Narrative Therapy  
 
Suppose that a trauma victim is completely locked up in an unbearable affect and any 
attempt to create an explicit memory is thwarted by an excess of stress hormones. In such a 
case there is no possibility for narrative to provide an opportunity for adaptation. Yet this 
extreme case does not rule out the possibility of cases where narrative, as a tool of 	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adaptation, works in tandem with changes in responses at the neurological level. Given this 
possibility, the neurobiology of PTSD may help corroborate that narrative can be an 
effective method for adapting to trauma and, perhaps, even aid in explaining how and why.  
 It is important to note that a full explanation and analysis of current theories about 
the neuroscience involved in the creation and extinction of fear response in the brain is well 
beyond the scope of this work. Instead, this section first examines some of the basic 
neurological functions involved in fear conditioning by looking once again at the different 
sections of the brain and the way that they “communicate” with one another. This provides 
a deeper understanding of how traumatic memories get relived and seem to resist rational 
intervention. Though this may illustrate some of the mechanisms involved in trauma on the 
neural level, it simultaneously raises the question of whether narrative is a realistic adaptive 
tool in the case of trauma. If the neurobiology of traumatic memory were such that 
traumatic experience thwarts the neural activity required for narrating, the neurobiology of 
trauma would then stand in contradiction to the claims made above about the power of 
narrative. However, this disagreement is merely apparent. Current neurological research – 
specifically in regards to mirror neurons and plasticity – suggests that though traumatic 
experience may challenge one’s ability to narrate, this ability can be restored interpersonally.  
 
4.31 Fear Conditioning on the Neural Level 
As discussed in chapter two, in 1920, John Watson artificially created a fear of rats in 
a little boy by exposing the boy to an upsetting clanging noise anytime the boy was in the 
presence of the rat. The boy quickly went from happily playing with the rat to refusing to go 
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near it and crying when it was nearby.330 Though this experiment laid the groundwork for a 
basic understanding of fear conditioning, it was not until very recently that scientists became 
able to understand what was happening on a neurobiological level.331 Advancements in 
imaging technology alongside biological discoveries about brain function on the cellular level 
have led to new theories about fear conditioning and trauma.332  
According to one widespread neurological model, there are three main systems in the 
brain that work together to achieve and maintain equilibrium. In this model, it is thought 
that each of these systems developed over the course of evolution, and that this 
development is paralleled over the course of the lifetime. The oldest system is the reptilian 
system, which includes the brain stem and is thought to be responsible for the most basic 
functions, like breathing, eating, and regulation of body temperature. This system is present 
and most active in newborn babies. Next is the mammalian system, which includes the 
limbic area responsible for emotions and emotional memory. This area is shaped by 
experience over the course of one’s life, so when Watson’s subject learns to fear the rat, this 
is possible because of his mammalian system. Finally there is the cortex, which is responsible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 Watson, Behaviorism, 159-166. See also Watson and Rayner, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions,” 
1-14. 
331 One seminal moment in the development of neuroscientific theory was Paul MacLean’s work on 
the triune brain in the 1990s, see MacLean, Triune Brain in Evolution. As mentioned in chapter one, 
though it is true that certain parts of MacLean’s theory have been expanded upon and debated 
(particularly the function of the limbic system), the general triune model persists. See, for example, 
van der Kolk, Body Keeps the Score, 51-73; Daniel Siegel, A Pocket Guide to Interpersonal Neurobiology (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 3.1-3.6.  
332 Fear conditioning has been a common area for researchers hoping to gain a better understanding 
of trauma and the trauma response primarily because trauma seems to be based in exactly the kind of 
associative learning that is present in fear conditioning. A better understanding of fear conditioning 
on the neurological level would accordingly lead to a better understanding of trauma and PTSD. See, 
for example, Michael Davis and Karyn Meyers, “The Role of Glutamate and Gamma-Amiobutyric 
Acid in Fear Extinction: Clinical Implications for Exposure Therapy,” Biological Psychiatry 52 (2002): 
998-1007.  
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for the highest level of cognition and rationality. The triune model can be split broadly into 
two levels: cortical and subcortical. The cortical level includes the cortex and its systems, and 
subcortical includes the brain stem and limbic system.333 Recall that the subcortical areas 
include the limbic system, which is responsible for the fear response and other emotional 
response, while the cortical areas are responsible for the regulation of these emotional 
responses. A traumatic event, and the subsequent experience of remembering that event 
involves a set of neural responses that lead to heightened fear and a correlated inability to 
access neural networks necessary for higher-level reasoning and cognition. When the brain is 
integrated, these distinct parts of the brain communicate freely with one another through 
electrochemical activity between neurons.  
A neuron is a type of cell that processes and transmits information through electrical 
and chemical signals. These signals are passed from cell to cell across the synaptic cleft (the 
gap between two cells). Neurons communicate both with other neurons as well as other 
kinds of cells). As a collective, neurons are stimulated – or ‘fire’ – on a near constant basis. 
Whenever an individual completes an action, learns something new, has a thought or 
remembers something, there is activity on the neural level. When a neuron is stimulated, it in 
turn releases neurotransmitters that cross the cell membrane into the synapse. When neurons 
connect to each other through synapses, they become neural networks, which are a series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 See MacLean, Triune Brain in Evolution, 15-18 & 247-268. For an excellent general discussion of the 
triune brain in development specifically as it relates to fear and trauma, see van der Kolk, Body Keeps 
the Score, 51-73. See also van der Kolk “Clinical Implications of Neuroscience Research,” 277-293. It 
should be noted that this is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the many different areas of the 
brain or of the ways in which they communicate and are integrated. Such an account is beyond the 
scope of this work. The account given here is one that highlights a particular subset of brain areas 
and functions that may be especially relevant to the understanding and treatment of trauma.  
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neurons whose activation follows a particular pathway. The more signals that get ‘sent down’ 
any neural path,334 the stronger the connections between those cells become.335 
This information can be used to better understand Watson’s fear conditioning 
experiment. When Watson began subjecting his patient to loud and upsetting noises while 
the boy played with the rat, neurons ‘fired’ in the boy’s brain and created a neural network 
that connected the presence of the rat with the upsetting loud noises. In other words, 
Watson’s patient came to associate the presence of the rat with loud noises and thus 
‘learned’ that the rat was something to be feared. This created what is now called a 
conditioned fear response, and the boy began to display aversive behavior when he saw the 
rat. Further research in the emotional development of children has shed light on this by 
showing that conditioned fear response like this can be credited in part to a lack of 
communication between the cortical and subcortical levels of the brain.336 
When it comes to the regulation and processing of emotions, it is crucial that these 
two levels are connected. Since the cortical area is responsible for higher-level cognition and 
rationality, while the subcortical area is responsible for impulses and emotions, when the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 In technical terms, the synapse is strengthened when the presynaptic and postsynaptic cells are co-
activated – called Hebbian Learning. 
335 It is thought that traumatic experience might lead to the formation of particularly strong neural 
networks. See, for example, Franz Caspar, “A Connectionist View of Psychotherapy,” in Neural 
Networks and Psychopathology: Connectionist Models in Practice and Research, ed. Dan J. Stein and Jacques 
Ludik (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 88-132.  
336 Again, this is a simplified account of brain integration. I focus here on the integration between 
cortical and sub-cortical levels of the brain (in part because these are the areas of the brain focused 
on in chapter two), but this is not the only way to examine the issue of integration in the regulation 
of fear. For example, the brain can also be divided laterally, into left and right hemispheres. The left 
hemisphere is largely responsible for rational thought involved in connecting language with 
experience, while the right hemisphere is responsible for emotional experience. Communication 
between hemispheres is particularly relevant in cases of trauma, as patients have trouble connecting 
words to their experience. For a discussion of the differences between the hemispheres and the way 
they are implicated in therapeutic settings, see Louis Cozolino, The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy (New 
York: Norton, 2010), 93-114.  
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cortical area is not interacting – “communicating” – sufficiently with the subcortical area, the 
result is poor response flexibility. Emotional responses in those cases are not tempered by 
rational choices. This can be seen most obviously in children who have not yet developed 
the ability to choose between expressing their anger with violent actions versus healthy 
communication, for example.337 Poor response flexibility, however, is not limited to children. 
In adults, when the subcortical area is highly active – as would be the case in an intensely 
threatening situation, or in the presence of a traumatic memory, which causes activity in the 
amygdala – the communication between the subcortical and the cortical area is inhibited. In 
other words, a trauma victim can lose the ability to rationally discern the presence of threat 
when exposed to a trigger that activates the subcortical brain and inhibits the cortical 
brain.338 What has happened with Watson’s patient, then, is that he has been conditioned to 
have an intense subcortical fear response to the presence of the rat. This fear response in 
turn makes it difficult for the boy to regulate his fear in part because the response inhibits 
communication from the cortical to the subcortical levels of the brain.  
This neurobiological explanation of the fear response specifically in regards to PTSD 
has been elaborated in more recent research. For example, in a current study using 
magnetoencephalography (which measures brain activity on the neural level), researchers 
were able to show that veterans with PTSD displayed radically different neural activity in 
response to neutral stimuli than their counterparts in the control group (who did not have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Studies have suggested that children who behave violently do so because of an inability to self-
regulate their emotional response. For an excellent article on the neuroscience of attachment, trauma, 
and violence, as well as a literature review of these studies see Allan N. Schore, “Early Relational 
Trauma, Disorganized Attachment, and the Development of a Predisposition to Violence,” in Healing 
Trauma: Attachment, Mind, Body, and Brain, ed. Marion Solomon and Daniel Siegel (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2003), 107-167.   
338 Siegel, The Developing Mind, 168-171.  
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PTSD). What the researchers found was that participants in the control group showed 
activity in the superior temporal gyrus, while participants with PTSD did not. Among other 
things, the superior temporal gyrus is the pathway between the amygdala (subcortical) and 
prefrontal cortex (cortical), and thus facilitates communication between these two levels of 
the brain. 339 According to the researchers, the brain activity that was present in the control 
group but not the PTSD group is called decorrelation, which they describe as the 
“mechanism by which the [neural] network is ‘freed’ from the hold of a particular input (e.g., 
sensory stimulus or, in our case, trauma event) and becomes available for encoding new 
information.”340 What this suggests is that an individual who has been exposed to a 
potentially traumatic event but who does not develop PTSD is able to be ‘freed’ from the 
hold of the memory in question. In the individual who has developed PTSD the ability to 
decorrelate in this way has been impaired. This suggests that the reliving of traumatic 
memory that is typical of PTSD can be credited in part to a failure of the neural networks to 
communicate and integrate between the cortical and subcortical areas.  
Returning to the concept of narrative, one might infer that it is impossible to tell a 
coherent narrative of a traumatic event, assuming that this activity would require 
decorrelation, which is only possible when the superior temporal gyrus is active and able to 
facilitate communication between these the cortical and subcortical areas of the brain. Yet 
such an inference would be precipitous, overlooking as it does the potential degrees of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 As discussed in chapter two, when there is an especially strong response in the amygdala, a set of 
reactions is set off inhibiting several different parts of the brain, the prefrontal cortex being one of 
them. Since the prefrontal cortex is responsible for higher-level cognitive function, when the 
amygdala is particularly active, this cognitive function is inhibited. 
340 Lisa M. James, et al., “Neural Network Modulation by Trauma as a Marker of Resilience: 
Differences Between Veterans With Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Resilient Controls,” JAMA 
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developing interaction between cortical and subcortical parts of the brain. To appreciate this 
point, recall that Watson’s experiment involved a boy who was not previously afraid of rats, 
which is why the response that Watson elicits is called a learned fear response. The discovery 
of learned fear response led researchers to wonder about how these responses become 
extinguished, and how they might facilitate that process.  
Behavior extinction processes are neural processes by which aversively motivated 
behavior (such as Watson’s patient crying in the presence of the rat) are reduced.341 
Researchers define extinction as “the decrease in conditioned response (CR) to a previously 
trained conditioned stimulus (CS).”342 Research has shown that mice who have had been 
conditioned to fear a particular stimulus can be conditioned to extinguish that response if 
they are exposed to the stimulus without negative consequences.343 Even though traumatic 
experience can lead to the creation of a neural network that effectively shuts down 
communication between cortical and subcortical areas of the brain, the neural network is not 
fixed and the communication is not severed, only inhibited. Behavior extinction processes 
show that the neural networks responsible for the fear response can be counteracted, and 
point to the overall malleability and adaptability of the brain. Indeed, the same study that 
highlights the inability of veterans with PTSD to decorrelate also suggests that knowledge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 It is crucial to note that extinction does not mean that the memory is erased. Nor does it mean 
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spontaneously reinstated. See Andre Fischer and Li-Huei Tsai, “Counteracting Molecular Pathways 
Regulating the Reduction of Fear: Implications for the Treatment of Anxiety Diseases,” in Post-
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Joseph LeDoux (New York: Humana Press, 2009), 83.   
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the neuron response in the PTSD group as opposed to the control group can lead to 
advances in clinical treatment. What researchers are currently working on is how to capitalize 
on this malleability in order to reliably facilitate the extinction process in order to treat 
anxiety disorders like PTSD.  
 
4.32 Mirror Neurons & Empathy: Narrative & Neurons 
As we can see in the way that traumatic experience alters neural networks, the brain 
is remarkably adaptable, and neural connections change and shift with new experiences and 
information. If we think of these neural networks as vast and complicated electrical systems, 
each new memory or fact learned or remembered can create a new connection or set of 
connections and thus changes the wiring of the electrical system in some small way. The 
ability of the brain to rewire neural connections is called neuroplasticity. Though the brain is 
often spoken about as if it were fixed or hard wired, neuroplasticity suggests that the brain – 
and the content within the brain – is in some important sense malleable on the cellular level. 
This suggestion is especially promising for those who study PTSD, as it points to the 
possibility that the neural networks responsible for the traumatic response can potentially be 
rewired.  
Some of the most natural ways that this rewiring might be done have proven to be 
problematic. For example, while studies with mice have shown that re-exposure to the 
conditioned stimulus can aid in extinction, the use and efficacy of exposure therapy in 
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human beings with PTSD remains controversial.344 As discussed above, one method that has 
proven to be effective is the use of narrative therapy. Parallels can be made between the 
psychological, phenomenological and neurological phenomena, as the effectiveness of 
narrative therapy on the neurological level is due in part to the presence of mirror neurons – 
which we might think of as the neurological corollary to Stolorow’s ‘relational home.’ 
Mirror neurons were discovered through a series of experiments with monkeys in the 
mid-1990s. In measuring neural activity while monkeys completed specific tasks such as 
pulling a lever, researchers found that when the task was repeated, the neural activity was 
also repeated. What they did not expect to find was that the same neural activity was present 
when a passive monkey watched another monkey pull a lever. In other words, neural activity 
did not just occur when acting, but also when observing action.345 The implications of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 In a recent article on exposure therapy, veteran and journalist David Morris explains, “The 
problem with prolonged exposure is that it has made a number of veterans violent, suicidal, and 
depressed, and it has a dropout rate that some researchers put at more than 50 percent, the highest 
dropout rate of any PTSD therapy that has been widely studied so far.” Morris quotes van der Kolk, 
who agrees saying, “The premise that the trauma needs to be relived over and over in order to heal 
has questionable scientific merit, because the brain areas that go offline during a traumatic experience 
and precipitate PTSD are once again deactivated when people are pressed to re-create the horrors of 
the past.” David Morris, “Trauma Post Trauma,” Slate Magazine, July 21st, 2015, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_ 
science/medical_examiner/2015/07/prolonged_exposure_therapy_for_ptsd_the_va_s_treatment_h
as_ 
dangerous_side.single.html.  
       For a review of relevant literature on exposure therapy in PTSD, see Agnes van Minnen, et. al., 
“Examining Potential Contraindications for Prolonged Exposure Therapy for PTSD,” European 
Journal of Psychotraumatology 3 (2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3406222/. It 
should be noted that exposure therapy does not occur in the absence of narrative therapy, but often 
alongside it. Even in the most minimal sense, it is first necessary to narrate what you have been 
exposed to in order to be subject to exposure therapy, so the efficacy of exposure therapy alone has 
not been adequately established.  
345 This research was first done by Iaccomo Rizzolati and Vittorio Gallassee, and the discovery of 
mirror neurons is reported to have been a complete accident. In one telling, Rizzolati first noticed the 
brain activity of the passive monkey when he himself reached for something in the lab and noticed 
that the machines attached to the monkey were reporting brain activity. See Marco Iacaboni, Mirroring 
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discovery rippled through the fields of neuroscience and psychology, as researchers believed 
that they had found a neurological explanation for the experience of empathy. As V.S. 
Ramachandran explains, “In essence, [the mirror] neuron is part of a network that allows 
you to see the world ‘from the other person’s point of view.’”346 Marco Iacoboni has said 
that neural mirroring solves the “problem of other minds (how we can access and 
understand the minds of others) and makes intersubjectivity possible, thus facilitating social 
behavior.”347 To be sure, these statements are hyperbolic and oversimplified. The locating of 
this ability in the brain does not solve the problem of other minds, nor is it entirely clear that 
the presence of mirror neurons adequately accounts for empathy. However, it is clear that in 
some important sense, mirror neurons have a hand in enabling us to experience a particular 
phenomenon that we are not currently experiencing. The reason this finding is so important 
in the study of trauma is that, as we have seen in the psychological and phenomenological 
accounts, access to another’s perspective on one’s traumatic past may both aid in the 
narration of the past trauma and may also facilitate healing. Further, on the neurobiological 
level, mirror neurons suggest that our brains are in some sense interpersonal – and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
People: The New Science of How We Connect With Others (New York: Picador, 2008), especially 8-20 for a 
detailed account of the discovery of mirror neurons. See also Marco Iacoboni, “Imitation, Empathy, 
and Mirror Neurons,” Annual Review of Psychology 60 (2009): 653-670. 
346 V.S. Ramachandran, “Mirror Neurons and the Brain in the Vat,” Edge (2006), 
http://edge.org/3rd_ 
culture/ramachandran06/ramachandran06_index.html. Current research has also shown that it is 
potentially a failure in the mirror neuron system that contributes to disorders such as autism and 
schizophrenia. See Giovanni Buccino and Mario Amore, “Mirror Neurons and the Understanding of 
Behavioural Symptoms in Psychiatric Disorders,” Current Opinion in Psychiatry 21 (2008): 281-285. This 
suggests that the study of mirror neurons in particular could be particularly helpful in the 
understanding and treatment of psychiatric disorders.  
347 Iacoboni, “Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons,” 653.  
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narrating our trauma to someone else might provide an opportunity for rewiring that is not 
possible as an individual.  
Psychiatrist Daniel Siegel coined the term ‘interpersonal neurobiology’ in 1999 to 
refer to the way in which the mind develops and changes as a direct result of one’s 
relationships with others.348 Siegel argues that narrative cohesion is necessary for well being 
because narrative processes are organizational, and accordingly they enable individuals to 
both understand the world and modulate emotional response. The ability to narrate one’s 
experience is directly related to the ability to self-regulate, and the absence of this capacity 
accordingly leads to an inability to self-regulate.349  
It follows then that the experience of trauma, which can lead to an inability to 
narrate, can also lead to an inability to regulate the emotions that surround the traumatic 
event. As Siegel explains, “one of the hallmarks of trauma is that it leads to incoherent 
narratives.”350 Siegel points out that the effects of coherent narratives on mental health can 
be seen developmentally in children and linked back to the “communication” between the 
cortical and subcortical levels of the brain. Since the ability to use the cortical area to 
intervene on the subcortical reactions is developmental and not innate, it is vitally dependent 
on one’s experience and environment. Childhood development research has shown that 
children develop the ability to self-regulate their emotions by modeling the way that their 
parents respond to their emotions. Studies have shown that children who are exposed to 
abuse and neglect, rather than compassion and empathy, come to have poorly developed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Siegel, The Developing Mind, 4 33, & 333-335; Solomon and Siegel, Healing Trauma, 1-55.  
349 Siegel, The Developing Mind, 333.  
350 Solomon and Siegel, Healing Trauma, 24.  
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self-regulation skills.351 Just because children may come to have poorly developed self-
regulation skills, this does not mean that they are doomed to suffer at the hands of their 
emotions forever. Since it is a skill that is learned developmentally, it can also be learned 
post-trauma (whether that trauma occurs in childhood or adulthood). Further, since this 
capacity is developed interpersonally, it follows that it can be reinstated interpersonally in the 
therapeutic setting.  
As van der Kolk explains, “trauma almost invariably involves not being seen, not 
being mirrored, and not being taken into account. Treatment needs to reactivate the capacity 
to safely mirror, and be mirrored by others.”352 In the therapeutic setting, reestablishing the 
connection between cortical and subcortical areas in the brain involves an interpersonal 
engagement, first the clinician is passive and allows the patient to express the feelings that 
are connected to the traumatic event. This creates a situation in which the clinician is feeling 
with the patient, and sharing some of the emotion that previously felt unbearable. When the 
clinician responds empathetically, the patient experiences the narrative from another 
persons’ perspective. Now the patient is passive, and can feel the emotions of empathy and 
compassion that the clinician feels. When Mr. A shares his experience of feeling hungry at 
the smell of burning flesh, Russell Carr reported feeling this along with him. When Russell 
Carr says to Mr. A that he understands how he is feeling, and that it is human to have this 
kind of response, he is at once validating Mr. A’s response as well as providing an 
opportunity to witness a compassionate response.353 This response, which has been absent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Siegel, The Developing Mind, 239-275. See also Solomon and Siegel, Healing Trauma, 40-55. 
352 van der Kolk, Body Keeps the Score, 59. It should be noted that though the word is the same that this 
use of ‘mirroring’ is distinct from the discussion of mirror neurons.  
353 Carr, “Combat and Human Existence,” 13. 
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within Mr. A – Laub might say that this is the ‘Thou’ response that has been annihilated – 
can then be reestablished, allowing Mr. A to feel compassion for himself. Previous to 
therapy, Mr. A only had access to the internal perspective of his traumatic past. 
Neurologically, this perspective is subcortical (or limbic) and not cortical. The reason that his 
conversations with Carr helped him adapt was because Mr. A was able to use Carr’s higher-
level perspective – his cortical (and rational) response – as a crutch. This kind of empathetic 
response is termed ‘attunement’ in the psychological literature. Attunement focuses on 
feeling with, rather than simply conceptualizing the feelings of the client. It has been 
remarked that,  
This is, in a sense, a hands-on, body-on, mind-on therapy in that the therapists whole 
self, while remaining emotionally stable, vibrates like a tuning fork to every quiver of 
emotion that the client experiences.354 
 
It seems that interpersonal connection is a key part in repairing communication between the 
cortical and subcortical levels of the brain, and thus a key part in facilitating decorrelation in 
those that have PTSD. As Cozolino remarks, “We now assume that when psychotherapy 
results in symptom reduction, the brain has, in some way, been integrated and rewired.” 355  
Since neurobiological research on mirror neurons is still in its infancy, this discussion 
is in part speculative. However, although it is only preliminary, neurological explanations of 
fear conditioning and mirroring seem to show that there is a neurological corollary to the 
philosophical and psychological claim that narrating in the presence of an empathetic 
audience can facilitate the reintegration of the brain and potentially heal the symptoms 
associated with PTSD. Though this provides a scientific basis – and thus a justification – for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Mary Jo Barrett and Linda Stone Fish, Treating Complex Trauma: A Rational Blueprint for Collaboration 
and Change (New York, Routledge, 2014), 57. 
355 Cozolino, The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy, 13.  
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these theories, it does not follow that the phenomenon can be reduced to its neurological 
explanation. This does not mean that neurobiological research overrides or replaces the 
psychological or phenomenological. Rather, they work in tandem toward a better 
understanding and treatment of traumatized patients.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I have made three claims about the experience of trauma, 
specifically combat trauma. The first is that understanding and treating combat trauma 
requires a dynamic, interdisciplinary approach. It is my contention that as long as trauma 
research remains limited to any single discipline, our understanding of it will remain 
incomplete. I have argued that an interdisciplinary model for understanding trauma does not 
require the denigration of any of the contributing fields, but it does require openness to the 
consideration of this phenomenon from more than one perspective. It also challenges the 
belief that trauma can be fully grasped by the sciences alone.  The experience of traumatic 
memory – a central symptom of PTSD – is, I noted, psychologically, neurologically, and 
phenomenologically distinct from other types of memory.  Yet, while parallel, the 
psychological, neurological, and phenomenological accounts of this memory are by no 
means identical, let alone equivalent.  This distinctness strongly suggests that the experience 
of trauma (and by extension, that of PTSD) is not limited to one’s brain function or one’s 
psychological state.  It suggests instead that the experience is a highly complex phenomenon 
involving distinct but complementary psychological, neurological, and phenomenological 
dimensions that form a rigorous unity.  Accordingly, if we are to understand the experience 
of trauma fully, we have good reason to adopt an interdisciplinary focus.  
The second claim that I have made here concerns the perspective that is perhaps 
most overlooked in this connection, at least by scientific investigators, namely, that of 
phenomenology. Though it is also necessary to consider trauma from the perspectives of 
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psychology and neuroscience, I have argued that it is particularly important to consider it 
from the perspective of phenomenology. The phenomenological perspective, and specifically 
that of Merleau-Ponty, allows for three things. First, phenomenology provides a critical 
stance on reductionist accounts that attempt to reduce the experience of trauma to simple 
causal explanation. Second, phenomenology allows us to address the phenomenon as it 
occurs to an embodied being who is engaged dynamically with her environment. Third, 
phenomenology allows us to return to the holistic, lived experience of trauma. I have argued 
that Merleau-Ponty approaches the examination of trauma with the goal of seeing it as a 
lived totality (as much as is possible). We don’t simply have an illness, “we live inside an 
illness.”356 In other words, the experience of trauma, which becomes chronic in the case of 
PTSD, paints the horizon within which the victim exists. This perspectives illustrates that a 
phenomenological approach to trauma (and perhaps any illness) is not merely helpful, but 
necessary.  
The third argument that I have made here is that an interdisciplinary approach to 
combat trauma that involves psychology, neuroscience, and phenomenology can yield a new 
definition of trauma, one that is not so steeped in stigma. Currently, the chronic experience 
of reliving a traumatic event is classified as a disorder. One of the first recorded instances of 
the word ‘disorder’ in the English language comes from Peter Martyr of Angleria in 1555, 
who writes, “Disorder of the partes is a deformitie to the hole.”357 The word disorder still 
carries this meaning, as those who have a disorder are often thought of as broken or at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Irwin C. Lieb, "The Image of Man in Medicine," The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1, no. 2 
(1976): 165. 
357 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Disorder, n.," accessed August 21, 2015. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/54859?isAdvanced=false&result=1&rskey=yhzaoD&.  
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very least malfunctioning. As we have seen, this is not the case when it comes to trauma. 
PTSD is not an abnormal or disordered reaction, but quite the opposite. The 
phenomenological approach to trauma allows us to see PTSD as an attempt at adaptation 
gone wrong – and thus more appropriately understood as a sign of strength rather than a 
weakness or disorder. I have suggested that PTSD is then more accurately understood as an 
injury rather than a mental illness. 
Each war has its ‘signature wounds,’ common injuries usually inflicted by new 
combat techniques or technologies. These wounds are often problematic precisely because 
they are not fatal. They are not as merciful as wounds that kill. Instead, they leave behind 
soldiers who are compromised and tortured. In World War I, mustard gas delivered in 
artillery shells burned and blistered the flesh of soldiers, caused internal and external 
bleeding, and stripped the mucous membranes of the bronchial tubes. It rarely killed 
soldiers, but often left them in excruciating pain for weeks. Petroleum burns from incendiary 
devices that spread ignited oil across the water were the signature wounds in World War II. 
Napalm – another petroleum-based weapon that stuck to skin and burned at temperatures 
upwards of 1400 degrees Fahrenheit – caused brutal burn wounds in Vietnam. After each of 
these wars, signature wounds are catalogued and studied, as learning how to manage these 
wounds and prevent them in the future became a key goal of military researchers. With each 
war came new technological developments that were designed to improve survival rates of 
soldiers by preventing these wounds. These developments have been successful, as soldiers 
in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been able to survive injuries that would have been 
impossible to survive 20 years ago.  
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Surviving war comes with its own challenges, as evidenced by the signature wound 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is PTSD. Once again, researchers are attempting 
to find ways to treat and prevent this signature wound. Since 2007, Congress has 
appropriated upwards of 1.5 billion dollars to help improve the prevention, diagnosis and 
treatment of PTSD.358 The military has implemented programs for what is called “embedded 
behavioral health,” which relocates teams of behavioral health clinicians out of hospitals and 
into areas where veterans live to provide more convenient, longer-term support.359 This 
embedding also occurs in war zones, as psychologists are placed in remote warfare units to 
provide screening and early intervention during combat.360 In locations where clinicians 
cannot be embedded (or in situations where stigma prevents a soldier from seeing a clinician 
in person) a related program is used called “telebehavioral health,” which refers to the use of 
videoconferencing therapeutic consultations for combat soldiers. 
 These interventions are a hopeful sign, and they point to a willingness on behalf of 
the military to accept PTSD as a legitimate wound, which certainly has not always been the 
case. The number of veterans with PTSD poses a current crisis that makes understanding 
and treating PTSD urgent. However, if we restrict the study and treatment of trauma to 
these particular wars, or exclusively to combat trauma, we run the risk of making the mistake 
that Kardiner and Herman warn of, creating just another episode in which trauma is studied 
intensively and then forgotten. We can avoid this by thinking about how the current work 
can be expanded into the future.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 United States Government, “Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the 
Committee on Armed Services,” One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, April 10th, 2013, 
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359 Ibid., 8-9. 
360 Ibid., 12.  
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To that end, there are at least three areas of future work that could be taken up from 
here. The first involves the expansion of the current study of combat trauma. I have 
restricted the examination here to that of combat trauma specifically because it is well 
researched and studied. However, this does not preclude the current study from being used 
as a foundation for understanding other types of trauma.  
The next issue to be taken up is that of practicality. If it is true that the kind of 
phenomenologically grounded narrative therapy that Carr implemented is effective as a 
method for adapting to trauma, how could this be systematized and made available to more 
victims? What other adaptive tools could be used that achieve a similar effect?  
Finally, there is a normative question. If empathic listening is a powerful adaptive 
tool, and if we are indeed surrounded by people who have experienced trauma, what 
responsibility (if any) do we have to bear witness to the traumatized around us? This 
question can be asked on the individual level and on the level of the larger community. 
Much has been written about post-war justice for civilians and governments that have been 
negatively affected by war, but what about post-war justice for the soldiers who we send to 
war?  
The aim of this work was to lay the foundation for an interdisciplinary account of 
trauma, but the work is by no means finished. As I have argued here, through the lenses of 
psychology, phenomenology and neuroscience, we can come to define trauma as a kind of 
mental injury that is legitimate, that comes about as a result of a normal reaction to abnormal 
circumstances, and that calls out to be addressed and healed, just like a broken bone. If this 
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aim has indeed been reached, we now have before us the task of addressing and healing 
these wounds.  
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